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Abstract
We discuss the links between the development of financial sector and eco-
nomic growth in macroeconomic models, both from the theoretical and from
the empirical point of view. Financial development is defined as the increase
in number or scope of action of financial institutions, whose activity consists
in taking deposits from savers and lending to entrepreneurs. In Chapter 1
we review the literature and, considering the width and time span covered by
the so called finance-growth nexus, we concentrate on dynamic, non-stochastic
models of real economies. In Chapter 2 we discuss financial openness as a
form of financial development which changes the structure of costs of financial
intermediation. We obtain the conditions under which cross border trade in
financial services and commercial presence are growth-enhancing with respect
to financial autarky. In Chapter 3 we present a model to study how financial
intermediation, or lack thereof, influences the two-way relationship between
income inequality and growth. We obtain that although in the steady state
income inequality growth is unaffected by the presence of financial interme-
diation or lack thereof, financial intermediation accelerates growth of income
inequality during transition. Also, economic growth reduces inequality if it
allows poor individuals to overcome minimum investment requirements, which
cut them off from accumulation. In Chapter 4 we consider a time series model,
providing a framework for testing causality in the finance-growth nexus. We
employ a newly developed technique to detect and estimate outliers, allowing
the empirical analysis of country cases characterized by frequent and/or violent
policy shocks. We obtain that in most cases financial development stimulates
economic growth.
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"Consider Fred, who has just developed a design for a new truck that extracts
rocks from a quarry better than existing trucks. His idea for manufacturing
trucks requires an intricate assembly line with specialized labor and capital.
Highly specialized production processes would be difficult without a medium
of exchange. He would find it prohibitively costly to pay his workers and sup-
pliers using barter exchange. Financial instruments and markets that facilitate
transactions will allow and promote specialization and thereby permit him to
organize his truck assembly line. Moreover, the increased specialization in-
duced by easier transactions may foster learning-by-doing and innovation by
the workers specializing on their individual tasks.
Production requires capital. Even if Fred had the savings, he would not
wish to put all of his savings in one risky investment. Also, he wants ready
access to savings for unplanned events; he is reluctant to tie up his savings in
the truck project, which will not yield profits, if it does yield profits, for a long
time. His distaste for risk and desire for liquidity create incentives for him
to (a) diversify the family’s investments and (b) not commit too much of his
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savings to an illiquid project, like producing a new truck. In fact, if Fred must
invest disproportionately in his illiquid truck project, he may forgo his plan.
Without a mechanism for managing risk, the project may die. Thus, liquidity,
risk pooling, and diversification will help him start his innovative project.
Moreover, Fred will require outside funding if he has insufficient savings to
initiate his truck project. There are problems, however, in mobilizing savings
for Fred’s truck company. First, it is very costly and time consuming to collect
savings from individual savers. Fred does not have the time, connections,
and information to collect savings from everyone in his town and neighboring
communities even though his idea is sound. Banks and investment banks,
however,can mobilize savings more cheaply than Fred due to economies of
scale, economies of scope, and experience. Thus, Fred may seek the help of
a financial intermediary to mobilize savings for his new truck plant." [Levine
(1997) p. 701-702]
This parable successfully summarizes what will be referred to as the "finance-
growth nnexus" in the history of economics. It shows the enrichment in terms
of meaning, giving way to linkages and connections across economic categories.
Walter Bagehot in the late XIX century was one of the first and most emi-
nent scholars supporting a link between financial intermediation and growth
arguing that it played a critical role in igniting industrialization in England by
facilitating the mobilization of capital for "immense works." [Levine (1997) p.
688]. In more recent times John Hicks took up the same argument situating
financial intermediation outside the Arrow-Debreu framework. In this con-
text, financial development can be defined as an improvement in information
asymmetries and/or reduction in transactions costs reached by any coalition
of agents (intermediaries), institutions (markets) or contracts (instruments)
which facilitates the working of linkages between the real and the financial
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sector. The latter can be identified in:
1. mobilization and transfer savings;
2. allocation of resources;
3. monitoring of managers’ performance once outsiders have founded a firm;
4. facilitation of risk management practices both across different firms and/or
across time;
5. facilitation of production and trading of goods, services and contracts.
All these channels of transmission are supposed to have a positive effect
on growth by facilitating capital accumulation. In the late 1990s however,
growth accounting literature underlined that physical capital accumulation
per se did not manage to account for much of cross-country differences in
economic growth rates and this put the finance-growth nexus under scrutiny
as a facilitator of economic growth. It was also observed that the strengthening
of a channel, say a wider mobilization of savings, might have an ambiguous
effect on aggregate savings and hence on growth. More specifically, a wider
mobilization of savings might increase aggregate savings as a result of the
substitution effect, but it might reduce them as well, via the income effect.
The 1990s also saw some reaction to find a new role for the financial sector
in economic growth. First of all, this particular branch of financial macroeco-
nomics took endogenous growth on board with Bencivenga and Smith (1991),
also economies of scale in overcoming asymmetric information in the credit
market and the endogenous formation of financial intermediaries were seen as
the main driving forces of the financial development process.
More specifically, Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), and Acemoglu and
Zilibotti (1997), endogenize the joint process of formation and evolution of the
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financial structure and economic development. In the former model the exis-
tence of non-convex costs associated with financial transactions, coupled with
the crucial assumption of heterogeneity of savers with respect to endowments,
implies that savers participate to the financial coalition (which operates as
an intermediary) depending on the level of economic development. At early
stage of economic and financial development few people can be entrepreneurs,
then economic growth makeS this opportunity available to a wider share of the
population, with a positive effect on aggregate economic growth. The distribu-
tional effect of financial deepening is thus adverse for poor individuals at early
stages, and become positive in the mature stages of development. The mechan-
ics are based on the cost of gathering information and obtaining organizational
capital. Intermediaries, whose role is to gather information and channel the re-
sources to higher returns, form endogenously only in developed economies and
financial development follows Kuznets’ hypothesis. In early stages of economic
development financial intermediaries are virtually non existent and growth is
slow, in the intermediate stage of growth financial intermediaries start to func-
tion, the saving rate increases, growth accelerates but inequality widens. In
the final stage of growth financial intermediation is fully functioning, saving
rates fall and the economy growth rate converges to a higher level than that
prevailing in the early stage of development.
In Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997), growth-inducing risky projects are not
funded at early stages of economic development because, being indivisible,
they expose entrepreneurs to too much risk. Since the relative size of indivis-
ibilities diminishes with economic development, these projects might become
economically viable at some later stage of development. These models shed
light on potential reasons why the effects of financial institutions on growth
might vary with the stage of economic development. The intuition is that the
performance of the financial sector is related to the conditions of the real sector
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of the economy.
On the empirical side the research on finance and growth broadly suggests
that countries with better functioning banks and markets grow faster and that
a better functioning financial system eases the financing constraints firms face,
allowing a thicker flow of investments and hence faster growth. However, a
general critique of empirical studies on financial development and growth is
that these are not in a position to support or disprove theoretical models
as they do not manage to measure the concepts emerging from theoretical
models. In their benchmark study King and Levine (1993) try to mitigate
this problem by using several measures of financial development and find that
financial development does predict growth in the long run.
After more than a decade, however, Rousseau and Wachtel (2005) call for
caution on the robustness of some classic findings on the cross-country rela-
tionship between financial development and economic growth. More precisely,
they conclude that "Our findings are in some ways reminiscent of Robert Lu-
cas’s famous critique of econometric policy evaluation advanced nearly three
decades ago. In Lucas the focus was on the now-obvious misuse of the Phillips
curve in formulating policy prescriptions, but the basic lesson may apply in our
application as well. In particular, policies that have promoted and/or forced
increases in financial depth over the past two decades, perhaps in response to
the prevailing Washington consensus, may well have altered the basic struc-
tural relationship between finance and growth. It would then be inappropriate
to use the coefficients on finance obtained with data before 1990 (i.e., prior to
the widespread acceptance of the finance-growth relationship) to estimate the
impact of future policy initiatives aimed at spurring growth through increasing
the size of a country’s financial sector."
Finally, this Chapter, and the whole work that follows, focus only on purely
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real economies and ignore work on finance and growth in monetary economies,
including work on the real effects of monetary policy via the credit channel
of transmission. Also, the institutional framework made by the legal, regula-
tory and tax environment will only be touched upon. This is not to say that
the topic is not important for understanding the numerous and varied links
between financial development and growth, but this work, will mainly concen-
trate on the channel of transmission regarding the mobilization of savings. The
legal, regulatory and tax environment will hence be taken as given and their
changes as exogenous to the models in presented in the models in the following
Chapters. More specifically, in Chapter 2 the legal and regulatory framework
will exogenously go from financial autarky to financial intermediation and in
Chapter 3 from financial autarky to international financial openness.
Models presented in the following Chapters are all based on a dynamic
setting within the overlapping generations (OLG) framework where at each
time t at least 2 types of agents are present: young and old. They are also set in
a non Arrow-Debreu framework and, although uncertainty and/or asymmetric
information are not made explicit, non linearities will be assumed to be the
optimal response to such environment, while the models rest in a deterministic
environment.
To summarize, the structure of this work is illustrated in Figure 1.1. The
following three Chapters are set in the theoretical framework that assumes
a non Arrow-Debreu framework where costly financial intermediation is the
efficient answer to an asymmetric information problem. Such solution justifies
the presence of financial intermediaries as specialized subjects who play the
main roles of mobilizing savings and facilitating production - i.e. only points
1 and 5 of the list in par. 1.1 - and thereby have an effect on growth. More
specifically, the aim in Chapter 2 is to explain how different modes of financial
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liberalization have an effect on the cost structure of financial intermediation
and hence on growth. In Chapter 3 transaction costs between savers and
investors take the extreme form of exclusion of some savers from productive
investment because of their low income. Should financial intermediation be
introduced, a virtuous cycle sets off, namely financial development sustains
growth that makes financial intermediation more accessible to a larger share
of the population further supporting growth. Chapter 4 is a time series studies
on the causality - or lack thereof - between financial development and economic
growth and results mostrly confrim the existence of a causal link from financial
development to economic growth, while bi-directional causality is less frequent
an outcome.
Figure 1.1: Financial Development and Growth - Aim of Resesarch
Financial Development: 
mobilitates savings and eases 
production
Main hp in the literature:
Asymmetric Information justifies Transaction 
costs between savers and firms 
→ Hp in Chapter 3: Inequality restricts 
access to growth while growth modifies 
inequality
Economic Growth
Main hp in the literature:
Financial development caused 
growth up until the wave of crisis in 
the Eighties and Nineties   
→ Hp in Chapter 4: Finance and 
growth  show a long term 
cointegration relationship with 
some concausality
Main hp in the literature:
Financial intermediation is costly both to set up 
and to run 
→ Hp in Chapter 2: Financial openness 
varies fixed costs of financial 
intermediation, while growth varies variable 
ones
In order to address these issues, in Section 1.2 and in Section 1.3 we exam-
ine the finance - growth literature with special reference to financial openness
and to income inequality respectively. In Section 1.4 we attempt a review of
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the empirical literature with special reference to time series studies. In Sec-
tion 1.5 we introduce the topics that we intend to analyze in the thesis and
we discuss how they are related to the literature reviewed. In the following
Chapters financial intermediation will mostly identify with the deposit-taking
and credit-granting functions. More specifically, in Chapter 2 financial devel-
opment will be modelled as a deepening of the operations of financial sector
and not, as it is traditionally, as the transition from a stage where individuals
finance themselves only from own savings to that where a third party - i.e. the
financial intermediary - emerges as a specialized subject. In Chapter 3 finan-
cial development comes as a widening of the availability of financial services
to the population as a whole.
1.2 The role of Financial Openness
As effectively reviewed in Andersen and Tarp (2003), from 1950 onwards con-
ventional policy advice has held that governments in developing countries
should actively promote development through massive restrictive interventions
in the financial sector. By the early 1970s, this "financial repression" policy
came under severe criticism and in the 1980s research on the effects of financial
openness on economic growth was mainly favorable to large scale liberaliza-
tions. The commonly held view, identified with the so called "Washington
Consensus", called for liberalization of capital flows and deregulation in the
recipient financial system, saving prudential regulation, as this would stimu-
late a sizeable flow of investments from rich countries to poor ones and could
accelerate development in the latter countries. This view was endorsed among
others by preeminent policy institutions such as the International Monetary
Fund, the World Bank and the U.S. Treasury Department. Unfortunately
these institutions, together with the supporting researchers, later took the
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blame when some Latin American countries, that had actually implemented
those policy recommendations, were hit by yet another bout of crisis in the
1990s1. Among the theoretical critics of the Washington Consensus, Krugman
(1993) maintained that financial integration could not be a major engine of
economic development. To the already mentioned view that capital was not
accountable for cross-country differences in economic growth rates, Krugman
added that no historical evidence suggested that liberalizing policies were fol-
lowed by large flows of capital from rich to poor countries.
By the end of the 1990s new impulse for the research on financial openness
- growth nexus came with the result that Total Factor Productivity - i.e. that
part of growth not accounted for by factor accumulation - explains the bulk
of differences in the growth rates across countries and it receives a positive
causal impact from the domestic financial system, as thoroughly reviewed in
Levine (1997). The line of argument linking financial openness and economic
growth runs as follows: if financial openness, as a form of liberalization, tends
to enhance the functioning of the domestic financial system, then it can be
maintained that financial openness has positive effects on the growth rate of
the liberalizing country. One way in which financial openness has an impact on
economic growth is by modifying the competitive framework of the financial
system in a formerly financially closed country. However, there is not a widely
shared agreement in the literature on the direction of the impact. On one
hand, assuming relationship banking as the standard mode of operations for
the financial sector, a more competitive environment may induce to channel
less financing to firms because there is less incentive in establishing a close
relationship with them. This implies that competition in financial markets
is detrimental to the establishment of specific, long-lasting relations between
1Caprio and Honohan (1999) report that the average cost of 59 banking crashes in de-
veloping countries during the period 1976—96 was 9% of GDP.
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a bank and a firm, that form the basis to overcome problems of asymmetric
information.
On the other hand, competition in the credit sector, as in any other indus-
try, implies the supply of a broader range of better-quality financial services at
a lower costs and therefore has a positive effect on economic growth. Also, with
more competition, financially dependent firms have less of an holdup prob-
lem, as they can easily break form a lending relationship without providing
an adverse signal of their own quality. A more competitive financial system
therefore supports more active demand for loans and hence higher growth.
The conventional view, as expressed in Pagano (1993) among others, is that
the second effects prevail and therefore a more competitive financial sector is
growth-enhancing.
Cetorelli (1997) challenges this view by introducing in a dynamic model
different types of entrepreneurs who require costly screening activities, so that
banks can lend only to the more productive type. Supposing that competitive
banks cannot establish an exclusive lending relationship with the high-quality
borrower, as free riding makes the type of entrepreneur publicly known, the
author finds that although a monopolist bank may lower the equilibrium quan-
tity of credit, it allows a better allocation of credit supply thanks to screening.
When the screening technology is very expensive then monopoly power by the
banks has an overall negative effect on growth. Policy-wise Cetorelli (1997)
arguments that monopoly power in the credit market could be especially ben-
eficial in developing countries which are characterized by major difficulties for
contract writing and enforceability - hence higher costs - and lower average
quality of productive capital.
Always on the role of financial openness in shaping the competition regime
of domestic banking, Claessens (2006) in his review of the policy oriented lit-
erature suggests that cross-border banking supports the development of an
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efficient and stable financial system that offers a wide access to quality finan-
cial services at low cost for the host country. However, while access to foreign
capital is surely enhanced for some borrowers and lenders by the presence of
foreign banks, better access to domestic capital is left in doubt. On this point
Detragiache, Poonam and Tressel (2006) find that foreign banks presence in
low-income countries leads to a reduction in credit and higher operating costs.
Kono and Shuknecht (1998) as well warn against cross-border supply of finan-
cial services for weak financial systems and Tamirisa et al. (2000) specifically
point out that ”the liberalization of commercial presence (...) raises questions
about strategic and cultural implications of foreign ownership in the financial
sector, financial stability and cherry-picking. Cross-border trade liberalization
presents additional challenges relating to the increased mobility of portfolio
and other capital” [p. 25]. These works, however, although analytical, do not
employ an economic growth framework leaving a gap in the analysis of the
potential gains rather than dangers of an integrated financial intermediation.
In a dynamic framework Detragiache (1999), although focusing on banking
fragility as a consequence of financial openness, concludes that international
integration of financial markets makes crises more likely. She also finds that
even when there are higher returns on foreign assets from international inte-
gration the gains are asymmetrically distributed and they will ultimately hurt
the domestic business sector.
As far as the empirical support is concerned Levine (2001) concludes that
foreign bank presence tends to enhance the efficiency of the domestic banking
system. In turn, better-developed banks spur economic growth primarily by
accelerating productivity growth. Thus international financial integration can
indeed promote economic development by encouraging improvements in the
domestic financial system. Also Claessens and Laeven (2005) find that sectors
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dependent on external finance grow faster in more competitive banking sys-
tem, so there is no support for the view that market power is good for access
to financing and the degree of competition is indeed an important aspect of
financial development and, in turn, of growth.
In conclusion, although the influence on the competition regime in the
domestic financial sector is recognized as the main determinant of the effects
of financial liberalization on growth rate there is no widespread agreement on
the direction of the actual consequences. Chapter 2 will present an attempt to
isolate aspects of the competition regime in order to underline specific channels
of transmission to economic growth.
1.3 The role of Income Inequality
The research on the effects of income distribution on growth reached its zenith
within the realm of the Keynesian tradition during the 1950s and the 1960s.
In his article in the American Economic Review in 1955 Kuznets maintained
that inequality in the distribution of income would increase in the early stage
of economic development, then it would slow down and pick up again in fully
developed economies, thereby introducing the famous "inverted U" thesis on
the relationship between income distribution and economic development. The
consequent conclusion, that wealth inequality is beneficial especially in low
income countries, is based on Kaldor’s hypothesis that the marginal propensity
to save is higher for wealthy agents than for poor ones. If economic growth is
directly related to the proportion on the national income that is saved, more
unequal economies are bound to grow faster than more egalitarian ones.
Also, if investment projects involve large sunk cost, say for setting up new
industries or the implementation of innovation, and equity market is not well
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functioning, then only wealthy agents are able to cover such large costs and
thereby initiate a new business2.
In the 1990s however, as reviewed in Levine (2006), the relationship be-
tween growth and income distribution started to be investigated together with
its links to finance and both theory and empirical evidence, beginning with
Perotti (1992), emphasized credit constraints as the channel through which
inequality has a depressing effect on growth. The mechanics are based on
the influence of financial development on saving decisions and the allocation
of resources. Because of the existence of informational asymmetries, which
are costly to overcome, and/or credit constraints not each individual may be
equal before the economic system. More specifically, Galor and Zeira (1993)
and Aghion and Bolton (1997) underline that these information costs may be
prohibitive for some agents, who do not have either own resources to invest
or collateral to access credit, hence they cannot contribute to growth. In such
a case aggregate growth may slow due to the fact that these potential en-
trepreneurs are denied funding. Aghion, Caroli and Garcìa Peñalosa (1999)
emphasize capital market imperfections discard the concept of aggregate pro-
duction function because when a bank refuses to lend funds, it does so to
a specific agent with a project, then he is cut off both from individual, and
necessarily from aggregate, production possibilities.
In such an environment financial development reduces information costs,
grants access to finance to more entrepreneurs, improves the allocation of capi-
tal and ultimately stimulates growth with the largest benefit to poor individu-
als3. Giné and Townsend (2003) too base their analysis on how capital market
2There is also a third line of research in the inequality and growth nexus which relates to
redistribution. The core relationship studied in the literature is a trade-off since redistribu-
tion decreases income inequality and hence increases growth. But redistribution is usually
financed through an income tax that dimishes the incentive to accumulate wealth. As this
will not be included in the model in Chapter 3 relevant literature of this topic has not been
reviewed here. Interested readers should refer to Aghion, Caroli and Garcìa Peñalosa (1999).
3It is also worth mentioning that some political economy theories suggest that financial
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imperfections restrain investment in human capital and find that financial lib-
eralization does indeed bring welfare gains and losses to different subsets of
the population. Primary winners are talented would-be entrepreneurs who
lack credit and cannot otherwise go into business (or, if they do, they invest
too little capital). It is worth mentioning that the adjustment mechanism in
this family of models - which also includes Cagetti and De Nardi (2003) and
Ghatak, Morelli and Slöström (2002) - is based on occupational choice and
wage differential rather than returns on savings as such. Financial intermedia-
tion modifies the impact of inequality on growth as it changes the partition of
occupational choice among financially unconstrained firms, constrained firms
and workers in equilibrium. Within this framework, Galor and Moav (2004)
argues that it is the replacement of physical capital accumulation by human
capital accumulation as a prime engine of growth that alters the qualitative
impact of inequality on growth. More specifically, as long as credit constraints
are binding, the higher the relative return to human capital, the more adverse
is the effect of inequality on growth. As a consequence, the presence of in-
ternational capital inflows reduces the impact of inequality by slackening the
credit constraint.
Following the reverse relationship, namely the one that leads from growth
to inequality, Matsuyama (2000) introduces a static model with endogenous
interest rate determination. The author finds that under some values for the
parameters his model predicts permanent separation of the population between
wealthy and poor individuals and that wealthy individuals are able to maintain
a high level of wealth partially because of the presence of poor ones. Under
development cannot be beneficial to the poor as it is primarily the rich and politically
connected who benefit of the services of the financial sector, at least in the early stages
of development. As a consequence, financial development can result in channelling more
capital to a selected few, further increasing inequality. For a review of the relevant literature
interested readers should refer to Levine (2006).
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other valorizations of parameters wealth trickles down from wealthy individ-
uals to poor ones and the former group pull the latter out of their relatively
disadvantaged state, eliminating inequality in the long run.
The two-way relationship between financial development and growth was
pioneered, as already mentioned, by Greenwood - Jovanovich (1990). In their
model on one hand, financial intermediaries foster growth via better allocation
of resources, even if there is a cost to joining them. On the other hand,
economic growth makes joining financial intermediation relatively cheaper and
more agents can afford to join thereby creating positive second order effects
on growth. In addition to that, this seminal paper is particularly relevant for
this work as it introduces a role for income distribution in the nexus between
financial development and growth. More specifically, adjustment comes via
both the quantity of savings available for investments and its returns. In fact
the development of financial intermediation allows a higher return to be earned
on capital invested that, in turn, feeds back on economic growth.
All in all, despite the relationship between income inequality and growth
is not as firmly established as the date of the milestone article by Kuznets
might suggest. The role of financial development within the above nexus is
similarly far from definite. More specifically, although it is considered almost
common knowledge that financial intermediation, being costly, can affect and
be affected by inequality, a full rounded picture of the three-party relationships
is missing. In addition to that, data do not seem to confirm the "inverted U"
hypothesis fully.
Figures 1.2 to 1.54 show snapshots of the Kuznets curve for the countries
where data for the distribution of income for year 2000 were available. Together
with the relationship between inequality and growth, as measured by the gross
4Data sources: UNU-WIDER World Inequality Map, World Bank (2006).
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national income per capita in US$, the diameter of each point is proportional
to financial development as measured by the credit to private sector as a % of
GDP.
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More specifically, in Low and High GNI countries there seem to be a ten-
dency for a decreasing inequality with respect to increasing level of income.
Financial development seems quite independent from the Gini index as rela-
tively highly financially developed countries are both in the upper part of the
figures - Nepal and Kenya among Low GNI countries and the United States in
the High GNI countries - and in the lower part, Vietnam, India and Denmark
and Switzerland respectively.
In Lower middle GNI countries the Kuzents curve still shows a decreasing
relationship, although less well defined than among Low GNI countries. In
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the Upper middle GNI countries there is a slight tendency to an increasing
inequality with income: comparatively financially developed countries, such as
South Africa and Panama, are among the less egalitarian countries.
Finally, empirical evidence on the relationship between financial develop-
ment, income inequality and economic growth is not very rich. Among the few
examples, Azariadis and de la Croix (2003), using a calibration exercise to fit
the long run economic performance of a panel of developing countries in the
1960s, find that abolishing credit constraints does indeed increase long term
growth, even if it decreases household savings and raises income inequality
permanently. Basically, the short-run and the long run effects of financial lib-
eralization go in opposite directions and, depending on the level of total factor
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productivity and capital labour elasticity of substitution, financial liberaliza-
tion effects may "trickle-down" to the population as a whole or relegate the
economy to a poverty trap equilibrium. Also Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine
(2004) give evidence to support the view that financial development boosts the
income of the poor and reduce income inequality. In their cross-country study
they look at how financial development influences (i) the growth rate of Gini
coefficients of income inequality, (ii) the growth rate of the income of the poor-
est 20% of society and (iii) the fraction of the population living in poverty and
they indeed find that financial development disproportionately lifts the poor
out of their state and hence reduces income inequality. Their results also hold
when using instrumental variables to control for the endogenous determina-
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tion of financial development and changes in income distribution and poverty
alleviation.
In conclusion, the role of financial intermediation in the relationship be-
tween income inequality and growth is is far from being defined. Research
built up from Kuznets’ article has underlined that the contribution of finan-
cial development to the inequality-growth nexus is not a static feature but
it is path-dependent. Financial intermediation should favor accumulation by
wealthy individuals in low income countries, to accelerate growth, and enlarge
its scope on the whole population as a country develops and moves along the
GNI line.
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1.4 Empirical Evidence on Financial Develop-
ment and Economic Growth
The empirical literature on the links between financial development and eco-
nomic growth is wide and very differentiated and there is no single way to
classify it. As surveyed in Levine (2006), the almost unique regularity re-
ported consistently across studies and estimation techniques is that the link
between theory and measurement is at best ambiguous.
A cornerstone of empirical studies is King and Levine (1993) who tried
to mitigate the measurement problem by examining a variety of alternatives.
They used four measures. Two of these measures are intended to gauge the
dimension of the financial sector: liquid liabilities of the financial system as
a fraction of GDP and the quantity of credit provided to private enterprises,
by both private-sector banks and the central bank, as a fraction of GDP. The
authors also used two measures of the efficiency of the financial system. The
first measured the share of total credit actually provided by private-sector
banks instead of the central bank. The second measured the share of total
credit allocated to private non financial firms. Implicit in the use of these two
measures is the belief that an economy with more lending by private-sector
banks and more lending to private firms will have a more efficient allocation of
external finance. A private-sector bank, seeking to maximize profits, is more
likely to fund worthwhile investment projects than is a government lender,
that may have to follow other criteria for loan evaluation. With a panel of 77
countries over the period 1960-1989, the authors find that the level of financial
depth at the beginning of the sample does predict economic growth in the long
run.
Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) in their panel studies from 1960 to 1995
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confirm an economically large and statistically significant relationship between
financial development and both real per capita GDP growth and total factor
productivity growth. In their study the positive link between financial interme-
diary development and both physical capital accumulation and private savings
rates is however ambiguous since it is not robust to alterations in estimation
techniques and to measures of financial intermediary development.
Harrison, Sussman and Zeira (1999), using a panel of data for 48 US states
from 1982-1994, find a feedback effect between the real and the financial sector
that helps to explain intra-national differences in output per capita.
On the question of causality the state of the art is apparently that to "agree
to disagree" as differences in long run relationship and short-run dynamics or in
the non-linearity of the relationship itself, are frequently picked up in different
studies and make it impossible to reach a definitive conclusion on the presence
and direction of causality. In fact, Loayza and Ranciere (2002) with a re-
gression on 17 countries find a positive long-run relationship between financial
intermediation and output growth coexists with a, mostly, negative short-run
relationship. Also, Deidda and Fattouh (2002) with a threshold regression
find a positive relationship between the level of financial depth and economic
growth for countries with high income per capita but no significant relation-
ship for lower-income countries, which is consistent with the non monotonic
relationship implied in the model.
The strongest critique to all these studies comes from Aretis and Demetri-
ades (1997). The authors, using King and Levine’s data show that the con-
temporaneous correlation between the main financial indicator and economic
growth is much stronger than the correlation between lagged financial devel-
opment and growth. In fact conditioning on contemporaneous financial de-
velopment destroys the association between lagged financial development and
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economic growth completely. Thus, the authors underline that the question
of causality cannot be satisfactorily addressed in a cross-section framework.
Also, the cross-country regression approach can only refer to the "average ef-
fect" of a variable across countries. In the context of causality testing, this
limitation is particularly severe, as the possibility of differences in causality
patterns across countries is quite likely. Such differences are, in fact, detected
by time-series studies. Using data on Germany and the United States, Aretis
and Demetriades (1997) find that while in the former country causality runs
form financial development to growth, in the latter countries it goes the other
way round. In addition to the value of results per se, the study strongly sup-
ports the claim that differences in the links between finance and growth across
countries are extremely relevant and, as a consequence, the "average" country
concept on which cross-country studies are based is not adequate. On the
other hand, it must be pointed out that Aretis and Demetriades (1997) use
quarterly data form 1979Q2 to 1991Q1 and it is not clear whether the use
of quarterly data and an error correction model fully abstracts from high fre-
quency factors influencing the variables, allowing the correct representation of
long-run relationships.
Rousseau and Sylla (2001) study seventeen countries over the period 1850-
1997 and find evidence of a leading role for finance. The result is further
supported by Rousseau and Wachtel (1998) who, examining the links between
the financial and real sectors for five countries that underwent rapid indus-
trialization over the 1870-1929 period, are able to confirm that financial in-
termediation Granger-cause real output, with little evidence of feedback from
output to intermediation.
Luintel and Khan (1999) using cointegration technique on ten developing
countries with yearly data from the 1950s to the mid-1990s find two long-
run equilibrium relationships linking financial and economic development and
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bi-directional causality between them. It is also worth mentioning that con-
sensus is not uniform among time series scholars. Demetriades and Hussein
(1996) in their studies of 16 developing countries, with 30 to 40 yearly data
from the 1960s on, find that in quite a few countries economic growth system-
atically causes financial development and in most countries evidence favours
bi-directional causality, especially in Korea and Thailand which, up to the
Asian crisis of the late 1990s were considered to be some of the most successful
examples of financial reform.
Also Shan, Morris and Sun (2001), using quarterly data from the mid-
1970s to end 1990s for nine OECD countries, find evidence of reverse causal-
ity, namely from growth to financial development, in some countries and bi-
directional causality in others, but no evidence of one-way causality from fi-
nancial development to growth.
Finally, the fact that many time-series studies yield unreliable results due
to the short time spans of typical data sets cannot be ignored. For this rea-
son Christopoulos and Tsionas (2004) resort to panel technique that increases
sample size. With panel unit root tests and panel cointegration analyses the
authors examine the relationship between financial development and economic
growth in ten developing countries and perform causality inferences. They find
strong evidence in favor of the hypothesis that long-run causality runs from
financial development to growth and that there is no evidence of bi-directional
causality. Furthermore, they find a unique cointegrating vector between growth
and financial development, and emphasize the long-run nature of the relation-
ship between finance and growth.
In conclusion, although empirical findings on the question of causality in
the finance-growth nexus are far from conclusive, the critique from Aretsis and
Demetriades (1997) cannot be ignored. This is the main reason why a time
series approach has been chosen for Chapter 4.
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1.5 Further steps in the research on Financial
Development and Growth
1.5.1 About financially open economies
The literature reviewed in section 1.2 does not come to a clear-cut conclu-
sion about the positive effects of financial openness on growth. All authors
recognize the role of capital and portfolio movements and the variations in
the competitive regime of the financial sector, once it has opened to inter-
national competition, as the main driving forces shaping the finance growth
nexus. Conclusions, however, are not unanimous.
The core mechanism through which the effects of financial openness on
growth will be studied in Chapter 2 will be the variation in the structure
of costs of financial intermediation. In particular in Chapter 2 the framework
features both fixed and variable costs: the former are per intermediary opened,
while the latter are in the form of economies of specialization, thereby they
decrease with the market share of the financial intermediary. This framework is
hence very different from Levine (2001), where the way financial intermediation
improve resource allocation is by permitting the exploitation of economies of
scale within the financial sector itself.
If one assumes that fixed costs can also represent a minimum capital re-
quirement, needed as a safety and soundness instrument in presence of risky
lending, and that average variable costs increasing with market size stem from
the possibility of establishing exclusive lending relationship only with a limited
number of creditors, then the model in Chapter 2 can find some common areas
with Cetorelli (1997). However, differently from Cetorelli (1997), the regime
of competition of the credit market is not exogenous but it is the result of the
interplay between the free entry condition and profit-maximizing choices by
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financial intermediaries.
With such a structure of costs, the question of openness is first of all tied
to the competition regime via the variation, or lack thereof, of the equilibrium
market share consequent to financial openness. Secondly, considering that the
open economy operates like a customs union which hosts the whole population
of the formerly autarkic countries and produces with the most efficient tech-
nology - investment is necessarily in the only available technology, so there is
no role for portfolio movements.
This is the main reason why the results obtained in Chapter 2 are quite in
contrast with those of Detragiache (1999). The latter work, as the author her-
self points out, rests on the hypothesis that the bank deposit market becomes
internationally integrated faster than the loan market. Putting money into
the foreign asset hence becomes more attractive. As mentioned, the model in
Chapter 2 hosts a single asset class, so the lack of synchronization during fi-
nancial openness plays no role. Also, in Detragiache (1999) domestic firms can
only borrow from domestic banks and not from foreign banks as it is assumed
that banking skills require knowledge of the local market conditions, local cus-
toms, law enforcement and long-term customer relationships. In section 2.5 of
Chapter 2 a form of seclusion of deposit market is indeed introduced, but the
lending market is always perfectly integrated under financial openness, hence
the difference in results.
Finally the model in Chapter 2 results in a two-way mechanism: finan-
cial openness favours growth because it stimulates competition and efficiency
in the financial sector with a positive effect on economic growth and growth
accelerates financial development as it increases the number of operating in-
termediaries. The model in Blackburn and Hung (1998) contains a similar
bi-directional link but the transmission mechanims is based on the reduction
in the cost of project appraisal and ultimately of lending and the costs of
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establishing delegation.
1.5.2 About income inequality
The literature reviewed in section 1.3, although very comprehensive for the
types of credit constraint analyzed and consequent different transition mech-
anisms, fails short of supplying a unique framework that can model both the
effects of growth on inequality and the reverse relationship, as shaped from
financial intermediation or lack thereof.
On the former issue, Chapter 3 is an attempt to take up Matsuyama
(2000)’s crucial question "In a capitalistic society, do the rich maintain a high
level of wealth at the expense of the poor? Or would an accumulation of
the wealth by the rich eventually trickle down to the poor and pull the latter
out of poverty?" within a dynamic structure. Matsuyama (2002) proposes a
static model whose main hypotheses are that output, after a given minimum
investment requirement, is linear in investment and individuals can borrow
only up to a fraction of the actual value of the project output. The interest
rate adjusts endogenously to maintain the balance between demand and sup-
ply of credit and rich individuals benefit when interest rate is low, due to the
presence of poor individuals who have no option for their savings other than
lending. In Matsuyama (2004) this basic framework is enriched with an over-
lapping generation dynamic structure featuring diminishing returns to scale
and a multi-country setting in order to capture financial market globalization.
Here as well the author finds the conditions under which globalization might
change the endogenous distribution of income in the different countries, given
that financial openness has no effects on the degree of credit market imperfec-
tion. In both works the role of financial intermediation coincides with interest
rate adjustment. In
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To study the effects of income inequality on growth Galor and Zeira (1993)
use an adjustment mechanism where income inequality translates into a par-
ticular partition among agents. More specifically, the authors underline that
the channel through which capital market imperfections have an impact on
income distribution is by excluding some people from costly human capital
accumulation - in so far as individuals cannot borrow to accumulate human
capital -, thereby cutting them off from higher wage in the future. The authors
confirm that under the exclusive effect of credit market imperfections initial
wealth distribution converges to a unique ergodic distribution.
Galor and Moav (2004) further specify that the role of capital market im-
perfection is to magnify rather than drive the effects of inequality on growth.
This differs from the traditional credit market imperfection framework, where
the effects of income inequality on growth depends on the level on income
per se. However, as income increases, credit constraints are no longer binding
and the effect of initial income inequality on growth becomes irrelevant. So in
order to obtain permanent effects of income inequality on growth Galor and
Moav (2004) introduce a Kaldor Keynes utility function which makes wealthy
individuals always more willing to save than poor ones.
So, in order to include most of the features presented in the literature in
Chapter 3 an overlapping generations5 setting will be adopted, containing both
the Kaldor-Keynesian saving function, where bequest is an increasing function
of wealth as in Galor and Moav (2004), and financial market imperfections in
the form of non-linearities in the rates of return to savings. In fact produc-
tion is characterized by a minimum capital requirement, as in Matsuyama’s
models. Differently from both approaches however, the adjustment mechanism
will be based on different rate of returns on savings and not on higher wages
5The steady state in infinitely-lived representative agent models leave the distribution of
income indeterminate and this makes this kind of models not particularly useful. See note
4 in Matsuyama (2004).
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consequent to capital accumulation as in Galor and Moav (2004). Moving
away from Matsuyama (2002) equilibrium interest rate will not adjust as the
production function, hence the rate of return on capital, is characterized by
an endogenous growth framework. Finally, as already mentioned, the relation-
ships between income inequality and growth will be studied both in a financial
autarky framework and under financial intermediation. While the former iden-
tifies with the full exclusion of poor agents from the production possibilities,
leaving them no choice but to store their savings, the latter will smooth but
not eliminate credit constraints for poor agents.
The resulting dynamics will present both the features of optimal bequest
from the Kaldor-Keynesian saving function and those of the characterizing
financial regime.
1.5.3 About empirical analysis with time series tech-
niques
Arestis and Demetriades (1997) conclude that "We have warned against the
over-simplified nature of results obtained from cross-country regressions in that
they may not accurately reflect individual country circumstances such as the
institutional structure of the financial system, the policy regime and the de-
gree of effective governance. The econometric evidence we have reviewed using
time-series estimations on individual countries suggests that the results exhibit
substantial variation across countries, even when the same variables and esti-
mation methods are used. Thus, the ’average’ country for which cross-country
regressions must, presumably, relate to may well not exist." (p. 796-797). A
further warning for caution on the above statement is that, although the time
series framework seems more appropriate to study the long run relationship
between finance and growth than cross-section techniques, recent history of
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Depending on the value of parameters credit market imperfections
generate either perfect equality or endogenous inequality in the 
long run. Matsuyama (2000)
Chapter 3:
Inequality
hampers growth more 
(less) forcefully (with) without
financial Intermediation.
&
Economic growth dampens inequality faster
(more slowly) with (without) financial intermediation
mismanaged financial opening, institutional changes and financial crises may
have hit the relationship hard.
Working with economies subject to external, as well as internal, shocks is
particularly problematic with time series. Often, the volatility around shocks
causes autocorrelation in the residuals to which the Johansen procedure - on
which the determination of the cointegration rank that identifies the num-
ber of long run relationships among endogenous variables is based - is very
sensitive. The introduction or the omission of dummy variables, which is the
standard technical instrument to whiten residuals, has to be done carefully in a
cointegration framework as a dummy may influence several variables similarly,
39
such that the effect cancels in a linear combination of them, and no dummy
is needed. Alternatively, a dummy variable may only affect a subset of the
variables (or several, but asymmetrically), and the effect will not disappear
in the linear combination of the variable which constitutes the cointegration
relation, so a dummy must be included. Furthermore, the properties of the
resulting formulation may prove undesirable with respect to the objective of
the estimation as parameter inference, policy simulations, and forecasting are
much more sensitive to the specification of the deterministic than the stochas-
tic components of the VAR model6.
The above mentioned problems with outliers in cointegrating framework
have found a technical solution in Bohn-Nielsen (2004) which was systemati-
cally applied on all the sample countries analyzed in Chapter 4. This allowed
for meaningful results to be found even for dummy-laden countries such as the
Central African Republic and Ghana.
Finally, following Andersen and Tarp (2003) in Chapter 4 causality is tested
according to the concept of absence of weak exogeneity. The authors maintain
that the possibility to use these tests makes time series studies particularly
sensitive in distinguishing between different causal patterns in the countries
studied. This is desirable since the functioning of the financial system is par-
ticularly contingent upon the institutional setting. Results in Chapter 4 show
the presence of countries where financial development causes economic growth
as well as cases of bi-directional causality.
6This non technical discussion of the problems relating to the use of dummy variables
within a cointegration framework are taken by Hendry and Juselius (1999b). Readers inter-
ested in a more technical discussion should refer to Doornik, Hendry, and Nielsen (1998).




Growth in Financially Open
Economies
2.1 Introduction
As reviewed in the previous Chapter, economics scholars and policy makers
have offered only discontinuous support to the liberalization of financial flows
across countries, i.e. financial openness. This Chapter aims to contribute to
the debate of how financial liberalization does increase economic growth and it
presents a dynamic model which offer an analytical framework to identify the
contribution of efficiency and competition in the financial sector to economic
growth. Financial liberalization and financial openness will hence be used as
synonyms in what follows.
The model features two countries each operating in an overlapping gener-
ation framework where individuals share their income between consumption
and savings, which are deposited with financial intermediaries. They hence
borrow from savers and lends to firms - which produce according to a constant
return technology only if externally funded - through a technology involving
economies of scale and of specialization.
Under F inancial Autarky (FA from now on) in each country domestic
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savers lend only to domestic firms. When the financial sector is opened, de-
posits of the two formerly financially autarkic countries may (in theCommercial
P resence mode of financial liberalization) or may not (in the Cross Border
mode of financial liberalization) be pooled to finance investments in the open
economy. Fixed costs of financial intermediation change depending on which
mode of operation is chosen to obtain financial openness.
The main contribution of the Chapter is the identification of the ratio be-
tween productivity and the fixed costs of financial intermediation as the driving
force which determines whether financial liberalization promotes faster growth
in the open economy as opposed to a single country in financial autarky: the
higher the ratio, the faster is growth in the financially open economy, as op-
posed to financial autarky. The ratio between productivity and the fixed costs
of financial intermediation also determines a threshold of economic develop-
ment above which the financial sector operates in monopolistic competition,
sustaining an accelerating rate of growth. The higher the ratio, the lower the
level of development needed to sustain monopolistic competition in the finan-
cial sector as an equilibrium outcome. This is to say that below the threshold
the dynamics of growth mainly sustain financial development, while above the
threshold a bi-directional, self-reinforcing link is envisaged. Financial liberal-
ization decreases this threshold level of development and this is in line with
Pagano (1999) and Classens (2006) who showed that opening a sector usually
brings more competition. Therefore, should a country under financial autarky
have a higher ratio between productivity and the fixed costs of financial inter-
mediation than under financial openness, competition in the financial sector
will decrease the threshold level of development sustaining competition and
this will, in turn, spur faster growth for a high level of development, despite
the higher ratio in fundamentals under financial autarky.
Finally, the model finds that among different modes of financial openness,
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that with the lowest fixed costs of financial intermediation per capita ensures
a faster growth.
The change in fixed costs in the different modes of financial openness and
the interplay between financial openness and the regime of competition in the
financial sector are the main features of all the results in the model and as
strategic behavior by competing financial intermediaries permanently lowers
the number of financial intermediaries operating in equilibrium, hence it de-
creases the pace of growth with respect to a scenario where such behavior is
not present.
Section 2 will introduce the framework of financial autarky. In section 3
two different modes of financial liberalization will be sketched out, namely
Commercial P resence and Cross Border mode of operations; they will be
subsequently embodied in formal models in sections 4 and 5 respectively.
2.2 The economy under Financial Autarky (FA)
Under FA in each country capital accumulation can only be financed out of
domestic savings. In this framework the traditional overlapping generations
model, used among others by Deidda (2006), will be expanded in three main
ways. First of all, it will not be applied to a single financially autarkic economy
but to two economies i = H for the Home country and i = F for the Foreign
country. Each economy will be composed of a continuum of size i of individuals,
modelled as a standard 2-period OLG structure.
Secondly, it is assumed that the financial sector has developed in each
country, i.e. that there is no alternative way to invest savings in equilibrium.
Considering that the finance sector is characterized by fixed capital costs,
the latter assumption is equivalent to saying that the level of development
in each country is such that there is enough capital for at least one financial
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Individuals inelastically supply labor during the first period of life and receive
a salary wt which is partly saved and partly consumed according to





c1t = wt − dt and c2t+1 = R
d
t dt
where c1t is the consumption of the presently young generation, dt is young
people’s saving that is entirely deposited, c2t+1 is their consumption of the
same people when old at t+1, ρ is the discount rate and Rdt is the gross return
on deposits from t to t + 1. This framework results in optimal savings which
are a constant fraction of wage as
dt = (2 + ρ)
−1wt = swt (2.1)
Firms
Firms have no initial endowment. They operate if and only if they are exter-
nally funded. It is also assumed that they are price takers and demand loans
at the lowest rate, being indifferent across intermediaries for all other aspects
of the lending contract. The production function for the firm operating in
country i is
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where j is the exogenous productivity coefficient in country i and j = h








> β > 1 is an externality effect associated with capital
accumulation.
The two countries H and F differ in the level of the exogenous productivity
in per capita terms j - and it is assumed that H is the high productivity
country as h > f - and in the dimension of the two economies, as the number
of operating firms is H and F for the two countries respectively.

















where Rl,i is the return on lending in country i when full capital depre-
ciation is assumed. Equation (2.3) formalizes the assumption that the only
variable relevant to firms vis-à-vis financial intermediaries is the cost of the
loan, i.e. Rl,i.
In equilibrium the price of the factors of production will be










t = βj (2.5)
in the market for labor and capital respectively. The constant rate of return
on capital in equilibrium implies constant returns to scale in the cumulable
factor, which is the distinguishing feature of endogenous growth.
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2.2.2 Credit market
In this framework financial intermediation will consist of the activities of
deposit-taking and lending. Deposit-taking requires the establishment of an
intermediary in the territory where savers are resident. This is not neces-
sarily the case for lending. The latter activity will be characterized by both
economies of scale and of specialization. Economies of scale stem from the
assumption that a fixed amount of real resources Ei has to be invested each
period in order to establish a financial intermediary. Such assumption is widely
supported by the literature1 ,2.
Similarly to Sussman (1993), financial intermediaries also face a marginal
cost which is increasing in the market share because of the economies of spe-
cialization. It is in fact assumed that more customers imply a wider variety
and hence increasing costs for evaluating them, i.e. lower economies of special-
ization. The simultaneous presence of economies of scale and specialization
in financial intermediation is also supported by Berger (2004). The author
underlines that lending technologies can be described along a continuum rang-
ing from those that are primarily based on “hard” quantitative data — such
as financial statement lending, asset-based lending, and credit scoring systems
— to relationship-based lending, which, in contrast, is based in large part on
“soft” information, such as the character and reliability of the firm’s owner, his
specific experience in the sector, the history of the firm’s relationships with its
suppliers, and the business prospects in the market in which the firm operates.
1Freixas and Rochet (2008) offer an updated review of the role of economies of scale
in financial intermediation in para 2.1.2. These authors summarize their position citing
Benston and Smith (1976) stating "The raison d’être for this industry is the existence of
transaction costs." (page 215).
2Were such economies of scale not present, then any single lender would have to bear the
fixed costs with inefficient duplications across the economy and direct lending by individuals
could be sustained as an equilibrium solution. Greenwood and Jovanovich (1990), among
others, justify the existence of institutions, as opposed to direct lending, because of their
ability to pool resources among individuals, to take up information gathering and contract-
writing efficiently and to diversify risk.
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Information used in a quantitative, data-based lending technology is generally
relatively transparent, easily observable and verified at the time of the credit
origination. Technology to access, store and operate this information is based
on computer systems and databases and originates economies of scale, as its
capacity limits are quite large. On the other hand, in relationship-based lend-
ing information is generally gathered through contact over time by the bank
loan officer with the firm, its owner, its suppliers and its outlet market on
a variety of dimensions. In lending practice, analysis at credit origination is
carried out using both techniques in a complementary fashion. Only when
quantitative data are not available or not of a good quality, is lending actually
carried out purely on "soft" information. The larger is the share of borrow-
ing firms evaluated on "soft" information only in the financial intermediary’s
market share, the lower will be the exploitation of economies of specialization.
In this Chapter, financial intermediaries fund themselves by issuing deposit
contracts to households and they consume real resources for a fixed amount Ei
each period and for
∫ zit
0
q(z)dz per unit of lending to individual firms, where zit
is the mass of funded firms. The consumption of real resources in the lending
activity is motivated by the just described need to set up technology to carry
out quantitative credit analysis as well as by delegation of lending to financial
intermediaries for the fixed part Ei, and by heterogeneity across firms, and
hence the cost of gathering "soft" information for the variable part. More





= qzit + q (2.6)
where 0 < q < 1 and lim
z→0
q(z) = q > 0. The lending technology hence
involves the consumption of a fraction q per unit of allocated loan to the
individual firm. q is the constant marginal effect of specialization, hence a
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low zit decreases total costs. Also, the minimal market share involves positive
costs. In fact, credit analysis must be carried out for every single potential
customer at credit origination before a loan is granted, i.e. before the potential
borrower becomes an actual client, hence when zit −→ 0.





















zit + q (2.8)
For any given z, marginal costs are higher than the average variable cost,
formally q (z) > Q(z)
z
. So a marginal increase in the market size z will raise
average variable costs by dampening the working of the economies of special-
ization.
The balance sheet of the representative financial intermediary originating



















where Dit are deposits originated in country i and b
i
t is the amount of loans
per firm.
Using (2.6) and (2.9) the profit of the n-th financial intermediary operating
























where Ru,it with u = l, d are returns on loans or deposits respectively. Hence




t and all the resources needed
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and fixed ones (Ei) times
the cost of funding Rd,it .
Regime of Competition in the Credit Market
Competition in the credit market is characterized by lenders who choose prices
and the market share they wish to serve to maximize their profits and by firms
which, given the price of loans, demand a quantity of credit to maximize their
profits. More precisely, it is assumed that:
1. financial intermediaries act as price takers in the market for deposits.
In the market for loans each intermediary sets the interest rate Rl,it as
well as its market share zit in order to maximize (2.10), given the optimal
behavior by competitors. Financial intermediaries do not to discriminate
across borrowers and charge the same interest rate to all clients;
2. there is free entry in the credit market. The number of financial inter-
mediaries operating in economy i is nit and it is taken as given by each
single intermediary;
3. firms are price-takers in the market for loans and they demand as much
credit as they need to maximize their profits to the lowest rate available
on the credit market.
Focus is on symmetric equilibria where all intermediaries set the same in-









for a given rate of return on deposits Rd,i
∗
such that:
• each intermediary offers a rate Rl,i
∗
and serves a market share zi
∗
which
is the best response to competitors’ offers;
• ni
∗
is such that profits of each operating financial intermediary is zero;
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• firms demand the profit maximizing quantity of credit.
In what follows the number of operating intermediaries in equilibrium nFE,it
given Rl,it and z
i





will be calculated to establish ni
∗
.
Number of financial intermediaries operating in equilibrium
The assumption of free entry in the credit market and the existence of fixed
costs imply an imperfectly competitive market where as many intermediaries
will operate until the profit for each of them drops to zero.
Setting (2.10) to zero and substituting bit with the mass of loans actually
serviced by an intermediary, i.e. the ratio of total investments ikt+1 to the




















The equilibrium value of kt+1 is hence determined by the equality of the















where the LHS defines aggregate deposits as the product of individual de-
posits - themselves a constant fraction of wage from (2.4) - multiplied by the
size of the economy and the RHS sums resources needed for lending activities
and those used to cover fixed and variable costs of financial intermediation for







in (2.12), the accumulation equation can be written as
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kt+1 =









The accumulation equation is the ratio of individual savings s(1−β)jkt (net
of per capita fixed cost for financial intermediation nit
Ei
i
) to variable resources























As a consequence, for any given kt, n
FE,i
t intermediaries are operating.
Hence each of them cannot have more than i
nFE,it
market share as a potential
customer base, as i is the number of operating firms in the economy.
Local Monopoly Symmetric Equilibrium
In local monopoly equilibrium each intermediary sets the interest rate on loans
and the market share so as to maximize (2.10). First the profit-maximizing
interest rate and market share for the intermediaries will be calculated and
then the conditions for these values to be sustained as an equilibrium will be
verified.
















































































< β < 1 and Γ = q(2β−1)
2(1+q)s(1−β)3
.





Result 1. A local monopoly symmetric equilibrium exists if and only if
the mass of firms which are actually served by all intermediaries is lower than
the total market i, i.e. if nFAi,mzFAm ≤ i.
Proof. Given zFAm from (2.18), nFAi,mzFAm ≤ i is verified for nFAi,m ≤
n̂FAi = Γsi(1− β)2 and, as nFAi,m depends on kt, n




hence a threshold level of capital k̂FAi exists below which













bit, which at R
l,i
t from (2.17), equals
zero. The values of Rl,it from (2.17), z
i
t from (2.18) and n
i
t from (2.14) can be
considered an equilibrium for kt ≤ k̂
FAi as intermediaries are not incentived
to compete by undercutting on the price of loans as nFAi,mzFAm ≤ i ensures
their market shares are not conflicting.
When kt > k̂
FAi, nitz
i
t is no longer lower than i and the margin on the z
i
t-th







As a result, market shares would be conflicting and the profit-maximizing
behavior of financial intermediaries would drive them to undercut the price.
Consequently, Rl,it from (2.17), z
i
t from (2.18) and n
i
t from (2.14) cannot be
considered an equilibrium for kt > k̂
FAi.
k̂FAi is the level of development below which the capital available to set up
financial intermediaries is limited relative to the number of borrowing firms i
and it is so low that the resulting market shares for operating intermediaries
cannot conflict and they will operate like local monopolists.
In essence, when the country is not sufficiently developed, i.e. kt ≤ k̂
FAi,
the number of financial intermediaries operating in equilibrium as determined
by the free entry condition are too few, i.e. nFAi,m ≤ n̂FAi. Hence, each
intermediary has a potential market share larger than the profit maximizing
one, i.e. zFAmt ; as a consequence each can offer a monopoly rate R
l,FAm with no
danger of competitors’ undercutting them, as no one has an interest in lowering
profit to gain a market share that is larger than the profit maximizing one.
Rl,FAm and zl,FAm are constant and independent of the level of development
kt or the size of the economy i and in this equilibrium in the aggregate not all






Monopolistic Competition Symmetric Equilibrium
Eventually, economic growth will make the level of capital per capita grow
above k̂FAi, as a consequence the number of operating intermediaries will in-
crease above n̂FAi. Should financial intermediaries behave like under monop-
olistic competition, market share would be conflicting in equilibrium, making
equilibrium untenable.
In such an environment, equilibrium has to sustain a market share poten-
tially available to a single intermediary of i
nFAi,mct
as i is the number of operat-
ing firms in the economy. With such a market share and a rate of return from
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(2.15) each intermediary would earn an extra-profit, as he would be able to
reap a monopoly price from a market share that is actually smaller than the
profit maximizing one in monopoly. As a consequence, each intermediary, by







with a drop in revenues of ε i
nFAi,mct
→ 0.
This will start a process of undercutting by intermediaries until the possibility















Finally, substituting (2.20) and zt =
i
nFAi,mct























Result 2. A monopolistic competition symmetric equilibrium exists if and




Proof. Should kt ≤ k̂FAi, there would be no monopolistic competition sym-
metric equilibrium as Result 1 would apply. Should kt > k̂
FAi, Result 1 would
not apply, and the monopolistic competition symmetric equilibrium would have
to be such as there is no incentive for intermediaries to deviate from it and no
alternative equilibrium with zt =
i
nFAi,mct
and Rlt different from (2.20) can be
calculated.








to be an equilibrium is that
no possible gain is obtainable by deviating from such equilibrium, given the
competitors’ best response. The increase in profit for the marginal client for
a single intermediary can be proxied by the product of the derivative of profit
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∆zit = 0 ∀∆z
i
t ≶ 03, hence neither an increase nor a decrease
in market size can increase profit for the intermediary who has therefore no
























can be considered an equilibrium. Suppose an inter-
mediary were to lower his lending rate at Rlt = R
l,FAimc
t −ε with ε→ 0. Should
competitors leave their rate unchanged, the deviating intermediary could gain






, but as he is earning zero on the i
nit
-th
client, he has no incentive in lowering the interest rate so that he has losses on
inframarginal client to increase his market share.
Suppose an intermediary were to increase his lending rate atRlt = R
l,FAimc
t +
ε with ε → 0. Should competitors leave their rate unchanged, the deviating
intermediary would receive no demand from any firm, as they demand the













can be sustained as an equi-
librium in monopolistic competition. All the borrowing firms are served, i.e.
bit = kt+1, and the equilibrium variables are sensitive to the level of develop-
ment as the credit market has reached its efficiency limit and only economic
growth can actually enlarge it.
Also, in order to assess the effects of strategic interaction among inter-
mediaries, the difference between the number of operating intermediaries in




, which, given that lim
kt→∞



























4This is the case when the mass of borrowing firms is large enough. For further details
see note 7 on page 236 of Deidda (2006).
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limits. This is to say, that the more growth increases the number of operating
intermediaries in equilibrium, the less strategic interaction will slow this entry
with respect to a scenario where it were was present. The difference in equilib-
rium market shares will disappear as kt →∞, while the return on loans would
have been permanently higher, were strategic interaction not operating.
2.2.3 Equilibrium growth under Financial Autarky
F inancial Autarky is defined as the mode of operation whereby the amount
of investments in a country is funded exclusively by savings of resident indi-
viduals. It will also be assumed that each country is initially endowed with
sufficient capital to develop financial intermediation5.
As detailed in the previous paragraph, the interplay between the regime of
competition in the financial sector, as determined by the free entry condition,
and profit-maximizing choices by the financial intermediaries determines two
possible equilibria for country i in F inancial Autarky depending on the level
of economic development kt. More precisely, by substituting (2.19) or (2.21) in

















− 1 for kt > k̂
FAi
(2.22)
The equilibrium growth rate of the economy allows to specify the different
contributions of structural and financial factors to economic growth. More
precisely, the higher are the saving rate s, exogenous productivity j and capital
share in the economy β, the faster is growth, independently of the competition




regime in the financial sector. On the other hand, the higher are variable costs
of financial intermediation, the slower is growth.
When the country is not developed, i.e. kt ≤ k̂
FAi its demand for in-
vestment is not fully funded and the country will grow at a constant rate
which will be lower the larger is zFAmt . In essence, a vicious cycle sets in: the
less a country is developed, the fewer the operating intermediaries in equi-
librium, the larger zFAmt . As a consequence, a less developed country grows
more slowly also because its financial sector is not efficient, given that it uses






. When the country
is developed, i.e. kt > k̂
FAi its financial sector is competitive, then growth
will be self-feeding. In fact an accelerating rate of growth will be fed by the
increasing number of operating intermediaries that will in turn decrease the
available market share zi,mct
6 and support growth. This is a consequence of
the economies of specialization as the smaller is z, the lower are marginal costs
q(zi,mct ), since a smaller market share supports the functioning of the economies
of specialization. Hence, the link between financial development and economic
growth is bi-directional when intermediaries compete, i.e. kt > k̂
FAi - as fi-
nancial development lowers zi,mct and boosts growth, which in turn increases
kt and nt further squeezing z
i,mc
t - while it goes from economic growth to fi-
nancial development when financial intermediaries act as monopolists in their
own market share, i.e. kt < k̂
FAi, as zi,m is constant.
The development threshold k̂FAi, above which competition in the financial
sector accelerates growth, is higher the more costly is to set up a financial
intermediary, either because fixed costs are high (high Ei) or because the
economy is not very productive (low j). High fixed costs imply more resources
are needed just to enter financial sector, let alone operate in it, hence local












monopoly as an equilibrium outcome becomes more probable, leading to a
constant rate of growth for the economy.
The overall mechanics of the model in the FA mode, that will remain un-
changed in the mode of operations in the open economy, are illustrated in
figure 2.1. The level of development of a country and the free entry condition
determine the number of operating financial intermediaries (top right quad-
rant). This together with their profit-maximizing behavior generate a market
share zit (top left quadrant) which, via average or marginal costs, in turn re-
sults in git+1 calculated in (2.22) (bottom left quadrant). The resulting capital
per capita is the new initial level of development for the mechanism to start
again (bottom right quadrant).





















k̂FAi, n̂FAi and gFAimt+1 in (2.22) are represented by letters A, B and C. More
precisely, when kt ≤ k̂
FAi, the number of operating intermediaries increases,
the market share results in zm (letter B in the top left quadrant) and the growth
rate is constant as represented by the point C in the bottom left quadrant.









and gFAimct+1 in (2.22) where the number of operating
intermediaries in equilibrium (D) originates a market share at E in the top left
quadrant and a growth rate at F in the bottom left quadrant, finally leading
onto a new level of development k2.
Changes in the regime of competition are visible in all the represented
functions; in particular the break at point A in the top right quadrant shows
the difference in the steepness of the two segments (β − η) which represents
the effects of strategic interaction. As detailed in the previous paragraph, be-
cause each intermediary takes into consideration the impact of competitors’
choices, strategic interaction puts a lower ceiling on revenues in equilibrium.
The main consequence is that for kt > k̂
FAi, the number of operating financial
intermediaries who gain market access via the free entry condition is perma-
nently lower than would have been without strategic interaction and hence
the pace at which competition further reduces the available market share in
equilibrium slows down and consequently decelerates growth. Starting from k1
the dynamics of the system without strategic interaction would have brought
the number of intermediaries operating in equilibrium above D, with a conse-
quently stronger impact on the functions in the other quadrants.
As far as out-of-equilibrium behavior is concerned, rewriting (2.12) gives














. As long as savings (LHS) exceed
the demand for funds (RHS) more financial intermediaries will be created via
the free entry condition (2.11). For a low level of development nit is low and
new entrants will not bite into the incumbents’ market shares; in other words,
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excess savings will mainly raise nit as long as profit maximizing behavior of
financial intermediaries generates non conflicting market shares. But as the
economy keeps growing market shares will end up conflicting and competition
will kick in. So, if there is an excess of savings over demand for funds, it will
be again employed covering fixed costs - i.e. increasing nit - but this will now
further lower zi,mct , hence boosting growth.
Finally, as income per capita is a linear function of kt - and individuals
optimally save and consume a constant fraction of their income - (2.22) is also
the growth rate of income per capita and consumption. In fact this model has
no transition dynamics.
Suppose now that in two countries, which differs by size i = F,H (and i
= H,F ), productivity j = f, h (and j = h, f) with f < h, and fixed costs in
the financial sector Ei, financial intermediaries operate in F inancial Autarky;
then the following proposition holds.
Proposition 2.1 Given two countries H and F whose financial sector oper-
ates under the FA mode, country i will grow faster than country i if:
1. its absolute productivity is higher and kt ≤ k̂
FAi











The Proposition is proved in Appendix 2.7.2.
Discussion. Proposition 2.1 compares the growth rates between countries
in the FA mode. The intuition for the results rests on the role of productivity
and fixed costs of financial intermediation. From (2.13) the growth rate is the
ratio between aggregate savings, net of fixed costs of financial intermediation
and average variable costs.
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Hence, for low levels of development, the profit maximizing behavior of
intermediaries drives the economy to EFAim , and productivity j has a positive
effect on the numerator of the ratio determining the growth rate as it enlarges
the pool of savings. Financial intermediation seems to play no apparent role
in the comparison of growth rates. This is because at any given kt ≤ k̂
FAi
accumulation changes neither the market share of active intermediaries nor
variable costs of the financial sector. This case is shown in figure 2.2 for levels
of development below k̂1.
For higher levels of development, j has a positive effect both on the numer-
ator and on the denominator of the ratio determining the economy’s growth
rate. More specifically, higher productivity maintains the growth-boosting
property of enlarging the pool of savings to invest but it also restricts the mar-
ket share available to each financial intermediary via nFAimct , thereby lowering
costs of financial intermediation. In fact, the higher the total productivity to
fixed cost ratio j
Ei
, the smaller is the market share, hence the lower average
variable costs for financial intermediaries and the higher growth. Hence j has a
positive and quadratic effect on growth. So, given two countries with the same
level of development measured by kt, the country with the highest productivity
to fixed cost ratio will grow faster along the whole of the growth path. The




and the dashed line represents(
1 + gF2,t+1
)
. Should country H be absolutely more productive than F (i.e.





), then for low kt country H will grow more slowly because of the
larger EH that delays competition. Eventually the growth in nit will pace up
and zH,mct will fasten its decline. In country F , starting with a smaller pool
of savings because it is absolutely less productive, growth in the number of
financial intermediaries nt will slow as the pool of savings is smaller, as shown




. Hence zF,mct will decline more
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slowly, pushing the rate of growth below that in country H.








k1 k2 k3 
2.3 Modes of Financial Service Liberalization
Liberalization of trade in financial services (or financial liberalization) may
have different implications on economic growth depending on the way liberal-
ization actually interacts with the competitive setting of the financial sector.
The literature on the relationship between financial openness as a form of fi-
nancial development and economic growth is quite wide7. Broadly defined
"financial liberalization" can imply very different flows of funds (loans and/or
7Tornell andWesterman (2004) and Baltagi et al. (2009), together with their contribution
to the debate, offer very updated reviews of the literature both on the theoretical and on
the empirical side.
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Foreign Direct Investments) depending on the source of funding for the loans.
With reference to the traditional commercial banking activity, table 2.1 spec-
ifies that in the "Commercial P resence" (CP ) mode of operation a foreign
entrant financial intermediary needs either to acquire a domestic subsidiary or
to establish a branch network in the host country, but gains access to foreign
funding through deposit-taking activities from foreign savers. In this mode
of operation a firm can arrange a loan with a foreign financial intermediary
locally. By contrast, in the "Cross Border" (CB) mode of operation foreign
entrant financial intermediaries effectively channel home-country deposits to
finance host-country loans without sustaining further costs to set up a "for-
eign" branch network. In this mode of operation a firm can arrange a loan
with a foreign financial intermediary abroad via telephone or some other way
of communication. This is usually the case when the host country retail market
receives protection as a "strategic infant industry".





























ments to ”set up
shop”
Adapted from Kono - Schuknecht (1998)
The sample of developing countries in table 2.2 shows that according to
columns showing the level of commitments, liberalization under CP mode is
the most frequent outcome (when the indicator is equal to -2) while liberal-
ization under the CB mode (when the indicator is equal to 2) is both less
frequent an outcome and, if present, it is carried out along with the CP mode.
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This might be due to several reasons such as the fear of excessive competition
in the sector and the fear of crises - such as in Ecuador and Peru -, or a tradi-
tion of directed lending and the desire of the authorities to keep strict control
on lending by foreign intermediaries, thereby requiring physical presence in
the country via CP mode. Political economy factors such as the weight of
incumbents within each national financial sector - as remarked by Baltagi et
al. (2009) among others - or bargaining power within WTO might also play a
role in the actual scope of commitments.
Table 2.2: Assessment of Financial Services Commitments in the GATS, Se-
lected Developing Countries
Level of  
Commitments 1/ 
































Chile 0 -1 -1 0 Yes Some Some Some 2.5 1.5 
Ecuador 2 -2 0 0 Yes Yes Yes Yes 4.0 4.0 
Ghana 2 -2 0 0 No No No No 0.0 0.0 
India 0 -1 -1 0 Yes Yes Yes Some 3.5 2.5 
Kenya 2 -2 0 0 No No No No 0.0 0.0 
Morocco 0 -2 -2 2 No No Some No 0.5 0.5 
Pakistan 0 -1 -1 0 Yes Yes Yes Some 3.5 2.5 
Peru 0 -2 -2 2 Some Yes No No 1.5 1.5 
Venezuela 0 -1 -1 2 Yes Yes Yes Yes 4.0 3.0 
Source: Kono Schuknecht (1998) for Chile, Ghana, India, Morocco and Venezuela. Author’s calculation according to 
the most recent GATS schedules for Central African Republic, Ecuador, Kenya, Pakistan and Peru 
1/ 0 = unbound (=no commitment taken) or non-member, 1/-1 = commitments to partial liberalization, 2/-2 = 
commitment to full liberalization. 
2/ Indicator is nominal difference between previous columns.  It ranges from -2 to 2; -2 would imply full 
commitments under Commercial Presence mode and unbound/non-member under Cross Border mode; 2 would imply 
full commitments under Cross Border mode and unbound/non-member under Commercial Presence mode. 
3/ 0 means equal commitments for lending and securities or more liberal commitments for securities; 2 and 4 mean 
weak/strong bias in favour of lending liberalization. 
4/ Indicator ranges from 0 to 4; 0 implies no restrictions on business practices in the four categories assessed, 4 
implies important restrictions in all four areas. "Yes" in previous columns is quantified as 1, "Some" as 0.5, "No" as 0. 
 
The actual grouping of countries under a "prevalent" mode of liberaliza-
tion in financial services is, however, not unquestionable as it emerges from
the comparison of first two columns of table 2.2 with the last one. In par-
ticular Ecuador, despite full commitment to liberalization in both modes of
operations, imposes several restrictions in actual operations of foreign estab-
lishments nearly vanishing the effects of full commitments to liberalization.
This is not the case for similarly committed Ghana and Kenya, with no re-
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strictions at all, or CP -mode champion Morocco. This is one of the main
reasons why in Chapter 4 the empirical test of openness will be done using a
de facto indicator of openness instead of de jure criteria such as those illus-
trated in table 2.2.
In this Chapter the implementation of these modes of operation of trade in
financial services in a two-economy setting will be reflected in modifications of
(2.12) both on the demand for funds for financial intermediation and on the
supply of funds. More precisely:
• the CP mode of operations will imply a full integration of both the
lending market and the deposit market. As a consequence both (2.9)
and (2.12) will be changed to the sum of the respective functions in the
two countries. Because of the need to open or buy a local network, fixed
cost of financial intermediation will change to ECP , irrespective of the
origin of the entrant financial intermediary;
• the CB mode of operations will imply a full integration in the lending
markets and a perfect separation of deposit markets. As a consequence,
only (2.9) will be changed to the sum of the respective functions across
the two countries.
In this frictionless two-country world the liberalization of the financial sec-
tor follows the liberalization of the real side of the economy. In particular it
will be assumed that financial liberalization comes after the open economy has
adopted the more efficient production technology, namely that of country H,
following liberalization of trade in technology. This assumption has the ad-
vantage of providing a motive for investments by the firms, namely to produce
with the more efficient technology, for firms based in both formerly autarkic
countries. This condition can be seen also as a result of an equilibrium choice
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in favor of trade openness that for the less productive country F is based on
reaching a higher productivity and for H is based on getting access to a wider
market. This is the case of countries moving from a customs union, as far
as the trade in goods is concerned, to further liberalization in services aiming
towards a common market. In line with the pioneering work of Corden (1972)
"When the union is formed, one of the two producers, say country A’s, will
capture the whole union market, the other going out of business. Hence the
average costs of country A’s producer fall. Total costs of producing the prod-
uct in the union thus decline because of specialization". Baltagi et al. (2009),
among others, provide empirical support to the contribution of trade and fi-
nancial openness to financial development and Tornell and Westerman (2004),
in a model describing the effects of financial liberalization on the tradable and
the non tradable sector, envisage a similar scenario expressing the results in
terms of productivity and economic growth.
Hence, in what follows, in order to outline the consequences of liberaliza-
tion to trade in financial services, a perfectly integrated loan market is set up
in a customs union economy with a population (H + F ) and with the higher
productivity h. With respect to single countries in the FA mode, this implies
a per capita productivity shock in region F of size (h− f). In this scenario op-
timal per capita savings will not change in the higher productivity region, i.e.
in formerly autarkic country H, while they will increase in F due to the pro-
ductivity shock. As far as costs of financial intermediation are concerned, the
structure of variable costs of financial intermediation will remain unchanged
while fixed costs of financial intermediation will change only in the CP mode
as the integration of deposit market is allowed following higher setup cost.
This can be justified not only by the need to have premises and staff in loco,
but also by the need of upgrading in systems and procedures to operate in the
new environment and/or comply with restrictions on foreign establishments as
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detailed in the previous paragraph.
Finally, the choice of the CB or CP mode of financial service liberalization
is made by the regulators, and optimizing financial intermediaries take this
choice as given. The possibility that one country opens in the CB mode
and the other one in the CP mode is ruled out by assuming the principle of
reciprocity, as it is often the case with international trade agreements.
2.4 Financial liberalization under Commercial
Presence or ”Set up shop” abroad (CP)
In the Commercial Presence (CP ) mode both the loan and the deposit markets
are perfectly integrated. Provided that financial intermediaries of whatever ori-
gin are willing to pay ECP to participate in the CP market, they can borrow
from and lend to whomever in the open economy. In this environment a fi-
nancial intermediary’s profit as shown in (2.10) is modified as revenues in the




t , where b
CP
t is the amount of loans actually






CP are respectively vari-
able and fixed cost of financial intermediation. In this setting, for any given
kt, the maximum potential market share available to a single financial inter-
mediary is now the ratio of the total number of firms in the open economy
(H + F ) to the number of financial intermediaries nCPt .
Number of financial intermediaries operating in equilibrium under
Commercial Presence
The open economy setting does alter the consumer problem as the whole ter-
ritory has now a productivity of h. Hence the pool of deposits equals the sum
of savings in previously financially autarkic countries at the new exogenous
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productivity level h i. e.
St = Hs(1− β)hkt + Fs(1− β)hkt = (H + F ) s(1− β)hkt (2.23)
The resources used for loans and consumed by the financial sector as oper-
ating in the open economy are increased with respect to the FA case for two
reasons. Firstly, the demand for loans is increased by the larger size of the
economy and secondly, the fixed costs of financial intermediation increase to
ECP . So the equilibrium is described by






























The optimal number of financial intermediaries is found by imposing a free















CP . Substituting (2.25) one obtains
nCPt =











Therefore, for any given kt, n
CP
t intermediaries will be operating in the
open economy with an available market share no larger than H+F
nCPt
each as a
potential customer base, as (H + F ) is the number of operating firms in the




tomers in equilibrium, market shares of single lenders will conflict and strategic
interaction will occur among competing intermediaries. Should this not be the
case, each intermediary will operate as a local monopolist.
2.4.1 Symmetric Equilibrium under Commercial Pres-
ence
Along the same lines of the F inancial Autarky mode of operations the interplay
between the free entry condition and the optimizing behavior of intermediaries


























< β < 1 when kt ≤ k̂
CP = Γh
ECP
8, i.e. when the single financial
































 when they cannot, i.e. kt > k̂CP .
Substituting nCPt from (2.27) or (2.28) in (2.25) one obtains the growth
rate as:
8As nCPmt z















− 1 for kt > k̂
CP
(2.29)




so one of the first effects of financial openness under
the CP mode vs. FA is to anticipate (delay) the level of economic develop-
ment needed for the financial sector to contribute to an accelerating growth
if the productivity to fixed costs ratio is lower (higher). Also, the number of
financial intermediaries has increased or decreased relative to financial autarky
in proportion to the ratio of productivity relative to per capita fixed costs of















This is to say that liberalization stimulates financial intermediation, by in-
creasing the number of operating intermediaries, if the productivity to fixed
costs ratio in per capita terms in the open economy is larger than the sum of
the corresponding ratios in the two formerly autarkic countries.
The question whether the new mode of financial operation is growth-
enhancing for the new open economy vs. financial autarky mode is examined
in the next proposition.
Proposition 2.2 An open economy whose financial sector operates under the
CP mode will grow faster than a high (low) productivity country i (i) operating
in the FA mode if:
1. its absolute productivity is higher and kt ≤ k̂
CP











and kt > k̂
CP .
The Proposition is proved in Appendix 2.7.3.
Discussion. The intuition behind Proposition 2.2 lies again in the inter-
action between productivity and the fixed costs of financial intermediation
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which do vary in the CP mode, due to the need to "set up shop abroad". If
the country was not developed in FA and if the productivity to fixed cost ratio
is more favorable in the CP mode, i.e. if kt < k̂
CP < k̂FAi, then only absolute
productivity matter for growth. As a consequence the CP mode cannot be
beneficial relative to the FAi mode for both formerly autarkic countries but
only for the less productive one.
Similarly, if the country was developed in FA mode and still is after open-
ing under the CP mode, i.e. if k < k̂FAit < k̂
CP , and if it were the more
productive country, then the only different factor is the fixed cost of financial
intermediation as there is no productivity shock in per capita terms. With re-
spect to the less productive country F , the growth rate in the open economy
under the CP mode offers both an absolute productivity benefit on the net






increase in savings originated by the productivity shock in the open economy
is partly used to finance higher set up costs, which have therefore an inverse
relationship to the growth rate, and partly to increase growth.
Of particular interest for the dynamics of the rate of growth are the cases
which combine openness and switch in the competition regime of the financial
sector due to impact of ECP on the free entry condition. In particular there
might be cases where:
• k̂CP < kt < k̂
FAi : in this case the intermediaries of country i were
operating as monopolist in FA and, because with financial openness the
cost of "setting up shop" in the open economy has decreased, they now
start to compete and set off an accelerating rate of growth. In the case of
European Union this might be exemplified by countries whose financial
sector was protected against foreign competition by national legislation,
causing high EFAi relative to productivity. The access to the Union
71
has called for liberalization, which has decreased fixed costs. Financial
intermediaries can thus compete on a level with the other European
partners;
• k̂FAi < kt < k̂
CP : in this case the intermediaries of country i were com-
peting in FA and with financial openness the cost of "setting up shop"
in the open economy has increased. This slows down the rate of growth.
In the case of European Union this might be exemplified by countries
which were actually "financial centres" taking the benefit of a very low
level of regulation, hence a low EFAi relative to productivity. Access
to the Union in this case has called for more regulation and barriers to
entry in the financial sector have relatively increased ECP with respect
to EFAi, with adverse effects on competition.
2.5 Financial liberalization under Cross-Border
trade in Financial Services (CB)
In the Cross Border (CB) mode of operation, financial intermediaries face the
larger open-economy demand for loans but cannot access the deposit taking
activity in the other region of the open economy. This is because while lending
activity can be organized with ways of communication - such as telephone,
and/or internet - which do not require physical presence, this is not the case for
deposit taking. On the other hand, this mode of operations has the advantage
of not requiring higher fixed costs, as is the case in the CP mode of operation.
The main consequence of the seclusion of saving pools is that in each of
the two regions of the open economy - i.e. formerly autarkic countries - only
those intermediaries will operate, that the own pool of saving can support.
Formally, in the open economy a financial intermediary’s profit as presented
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in (2.10) is modified for financial intermediaries originating in each single region
i. More precisely, the demand for loans bCBit is the ratio between the total
demand for loans in the open economy (H + F )kt+1 and the aggregate share
served by financial intermediaries originated in i, i.e. zCBit n
CBi
t . Also the
maximum potential market share available to a single financial intermediary
originating in any region is now the ratio of the total number of firms, i.e.
(H + F ) , to the total number of financial intermediaries actually operating in




Number of financial intermediaries operating in equilibrium under
Cross-Border trade in Financial Services
As in equilibrium the supply of funds must equal the demand for funds in each
single region of the open economy, taking into account that the whole territory
has now a productivity of h yields

























On the right hand side of (2.30), the demand for loans is the total amount
of resources needed and consumed for lending activities by financial interme-












) i = F,H (2.32)
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The optimal number of financial intermediaries is found by imposing two



























 i = F,H (2.33)
In addition to that, as the market for loans is unique in the CB mode
equilibrium must also hold at open economy level, hence adding up (2.30)
across regions of the open economy one obtains











By summing up equations (2.30) across countries on the left-hand side one
obtains the same supply of saving as in the CP mode9, i.e. the left-hand side
of (2.34). This is further evidence that the size of the financial market in the
CB mode is the same as in the CP and that the modes of operation differ

































Summarizing, in terms of definition of regime of competition in the financial
sector the CB mode of operation fares midway between the FA and the CP
























more financial intermediaries from the less productive formerly autarkic coun-
try F are now able to operate, following the positive productivity shock to
this region in the open economy environment. Similarly to the CP mode,
for any given kt, each intermediaries will be operating in the open economy




each as a potential mar-
ket share. If the representative intermediary has to serve these customers in
equilibrium, market shares of single intermediaries will conflict and strategic
interaction will occur among competing intermediaries. Should this not be the
case, each lender will operate as a local monopolist.
2.5.1 Symmetric Equilibrium under Cross Border trade
in Financial Services
Similarly to the previously analyzed modes of operation the interplay between
the free entry condition and the profit maximizing behavior of intermediaries
































< β < 1 if the single financial intermediary can operate as a local






















nCBimt ≤ (H + F ) for kt ≤ k̂
CB
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− 1 for kt > k̂
CB
(2.38)









so one of the first effects of financial openness
under the CP mode vs. FA is to anticipate (delay) the level of economic
development needed for the financial sector to contribute to an accelerating
growth if the productivity to fixed costs ratio is lower (higher).
The next proposition examines whether the newmode of financial operation
is growth-enhancing for the new open economy vs. financial autarky.
Proposition 2.3 An open economy whose financial sector operates under the
CB mode will grow faster than a high (low) productivity country i (i) operating
in the FA mode if:
1. its absolute productivity is higher and kt ≤ k̂
CB











higher and kt > k̂
CB
The Proposition is proved in Appendix 2.7.4.
Discussion. The comparisons in Proposition 2.3 rely on the same mechanics
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of the open economy as in Proposition 2.2 with the only difference represented
by fixed costs. If kt < k̂
CB < k̂FAi, then only absolute productivity matters for
growth. The CB mode too cannot be beneficial with respect to the FAi mode
for both formerly autarkic countries, but only for the less productive one.
The relevant fixed costs in per capita terms are a weighted average of those




. As a consequence, for formerly autarkic country H, which
by assumption does not benefit from any productivity shocks when joining the
open economy, what matters is the absolute level of the partner country fixed
costs. Should the latter be lower than its own in autarky, then the growth
rate for the region in the open economy would be higher. This is because the
(weighed) average quantity of capital used to cover fixed cost with financial
intermediaries originating from both countries H and F is lower in per capita
terms than that needed to set up the whole financial sector with representative
financial intermediaries from formerly autarkic country H only.
As in the CP mode, the comparative advantage for country F to enter as
a region in the open economy rather than remaining financially autarkic under
the FA mode depends on both productivity and fixed costs. If the squared
productivity to fixed cost ratio is more favorable in the partner country, then
the weighted average of fixed costs for financial intermediation will be lower
and it will be advantageous for country F to join the Cross Border mode of
operations. Should this not be the case, higher growth will be reached by
region F in the Cross Border mode only for high level of development.
The introduction of interbank bilateral agreements for the supply of savings
could make the analysis of the CB mode redundant as national deposit markets
would no longer be segregated. This development, however, is not considered




The models presented in this paper establish a direct link between financial
development and economic growth, which is essentially shaped by the costs of
financial intermediation and the regime of competition in the financial sector.
From the comparisons of the dynamics of the finance - growth relationship
across countries under Financial Autarky it becomes apparent that differences
in the growth performance can be explained by dissimilarities of the absolute
level of fixed costs of financial intermediation or its ratio to productivity.
When the same analysis is applied to a single open economy under Finan-
cial Autarky vs. being a member of a custom union with has also liberalized
trade in financial services, the model offer a multifaceted answer to the ques-
tion whether financial liberalization is actually growth-enhancing. In line with
the relevant literature, Cetorelli (1997), Tornell and Westermann (2004) and
Claessens (2006) among others, the channels of transmission of the effects of fi-
nancial liberalization on economic growth are identified with the change in the
costs of financial intermediation, and eventually of the regime of competition
in the financial sector, and the increase in the economy’s productivity.
More specifically, when the lending technology is characterized by both
economies of scale and specialization, financial openness does increase eco-
nomic growth for both formerly autarkic countries only if:
• the level of fixed costs of financial intermediation in financial openness is
lower than that under financial autarky in the more productive country
H;
• the productivity-to-fixed cost ratio in financial openness is more favorable
than that under financial autarky for the less productive country F .
Should formerly autarkic country F be less productive than partner country
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H in absolute terms, but not relatively to the costs of financial intermediation,
then it would still be growth enhancing for country F to open financially but
only when a high level development is reached. This is because for country F
the effect of joining the open economy is ambiguous as an increase in fixed costs
with respect to F inancial Autarky reduces the number of financial intermedi-
aries, potentially hindering the functioning of the economies of specialization,
but the increase in productivity counterbalances this effect.
The empirical evidence in Chapter 4 broadly supports these theoretical
results as it identifies one equilibrium relationship between financial and eco-
nomic development with mostly a positive effect of the level of development,
openness and real interest rates. Financially open sample countries show higher
values for the effect of openness on financial development, underlining the dif-
ferent effects that financial openness may activate on the traditional links
between economic growth and financial development. In particular, within
financially open sample countries Morocco’s value estimates for the effect of
openness on financial development is definitely larger than that of Ecuador,
which shares a similar end-of-sample level of openness and level of economic
development (both are Lower-Middle income countries according to the World
Bank classification). Morocco - which in table 2.2 is indicated as committed
to liberalization under the Commercial P resence mode - might constitute an
example where the fixed costs to productivity ratio relative to the rest of the
world was higher before liberalization. On the other hand in Ecuador the
restrictions on practices by foreign establishments might have played a role
despite the country’s full commitment to liberalization both under CP and
the CB modes.
As far as causality is concerned, the empirical findings in Chapter 4 mostly
indicate that financial development causes economic growth.
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Whether the largest gain in growth for a country in financial autarky is
reached within an open economy operating either under the CB or the CP
mode, it depends on the mode of operation with the lowest fixed costs of finan-
cial intermediation per capita. If there is no absolute costs advantage, then
the growth-enhancing properties of the different modes of financial openness
depend on the level of development and show path-dependency. An immediate
policy implication is that a low productivity country might not find it rational
to open financially under the CP mode if fixed costs ECP are too high, but
it might find some advantage if the financial sector is opened under the CB
mode.
Finally, regarding the question of the regime of competition in the financial
sector of the open economy, the thresholds in the level of development measured
by k leading to monopolistic competition decrease with respect to those in the
FAimode. So it might be the case that, following liberalization in the financial
sector, the credit market in one country goes from local monopoly under FA
to monopolistic competition in the open economy. This is consistent with the
view that opening a sector usually brings more competition, as underlined in
Pagano (1993) and Claessens (2006) among others.
The main implication in terms of policy recommendation is the desirability
to stimulate competition in the financial sector by lowering barriers to entry
in the form of fixed costs. Such conclusion must however by circumstantiated
by allowing for the fact that the model does not allow for macroeconomic or
idiosyncratic risk, hence fixed costs in the form of capital requirements do
not depend on past lending performance, i.e. financial intermediaries’ capital
cannot be used as a buffer against clients’ defaults or cyclical movements in
the economy.
The current framework relies on technology assumptions that are undoubt-
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edly restrictive both for the analysis of financial autarky and of financial open-
ness. A deterministic production function for a representative firm cannot
allow for the impact of monitoring costs in the financial sector nor for crises
via macroeconomic shocks. Similarly liberalization of the financial sector in
a one-country, one-good environment does not allow for the analysis of port-
folio flows and risk diversification. However, as the main focus of the paper
is the study of the effects of different modes of financial liberalization on the
real economy via the credit channel, these simplifying assumptions have been
considered necessary in order to keep the model tractable while preserving the
main features of the mechanism of transmission.
2.7 Appendices to Chapter 2
2.7.1 Proof of proposition 2.1







− 1 > sβ(1−β)f
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− 1
hence if h > f




























































































2.7.2 Proof of proposition 2.2








t ∀kt as h > f















































































then gCP,mct > g
FAF,mc
t ∀kt
2.7.3 Proof of proposition 2.3








t ∀kt as h > f


















































































In Chapter 2 we discussed the effects of financial openness on the link be-
tween financial development and economic growth. Here we try to model one
additional force shaping this relationship, namely income distribution.
Income distribution does not perhaps top the "most wanted" list of of-
fenders when thinking out loud about the good and evil effects of financial
development on economic growth. However, if business is risky and informa-
tion asymmetric, the debtor can hide true profits from his creditor and resort
to default instead of paying back loans. If such opportunity for moral hazard
is common, it can be difficult for the creditor to lend money in the first place.
The traditional answer to this problem has been to grant loans only against
collateral, more frequently in the form of properties through mortgages, but
also in terms of personal guarantees on the future flows of income resulting
from investments.
In this Chapter financial intermediation will shape the link between in-
come inequality and growth. More specifically, since the financial system is
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assumed to ask for guarantees because of asymmetric information, its impact
on economic growth will be influenced by inequality in income distribution.
Also the working of the financial system, or its lack thereof, will generate dif-
ferent returns to different individuals and so it will affect aggregate growth
and inequality in income distribution. All models in this Chapter are built
on individual non-homothetic, altruistic, preferences on the consumption side,
according to a Kaldor-Keynes utility function as in Galor and Moav (2004),
and non-linearities on the investment side. Timewise, individuals work only
when young and receive a salary which they fully save. When they are old
they consume and leave a bequest to their child. Production technology neces-
sitates a minimum investment to be productive1. Should this be unavailable
to some subjects that an alternative storage technology can be used instead.
Financial markets, when present, are imperfect as lending is not available
against the initial investment; therefore only those who can supply the initial
investment out of personal wealth (oldW ealthy) may actually be entrepreneur
and employ young workers. Those who do not reach this wealth threshold (old
Poor) can only store their income in financial autarky or lend it, if financial ex-
change is developed. Differently from the literature reviewed in Aghion, Caroli
and Garcìa Peñalosa (1999) the effects of growth on inequality are based on
differential returns on capital rather than on wage differentials. The frame-
work is also distinct from Galor and Moav (2004), as there is a single aggregate
notion of capital, and, because of imperfect capital markets, savings from poor
and wealthy people have different returns.
As in is a driver of the effects of inequality on growth both with and without
financial intermediation. As a consequence, during transition Poor agents may
not fully contribute to accumulation and see an increase in the return on their
1For a non technincal discussion of outside funding in the presence of minimum investment
requirement see the section G "A Parable" in Levine (1997).
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savings.
Models are set in a dynamic framework characterized by endogenous growth
that describes both the effects of income distribution on growth and the reverse
relationship and where the two-way link passes through financial intermedia-
tion.
The main contribution of the Chapter is twofold: the representation of the
relationship between economic growth and inequality as bi-directional and the
study of the effects of F inancial Intermediation (or lack thereof) on it.
As far as the effects of inequality on growth are concerned, the models in the
chapter show that inequality slows growth down in transition stages, as some
proportion of the population is cut off from accumulation. Under financial
intermediation the slowdown in growth is smaller than under financial autarky.
This is because financial intermediation allows an earlier participation of Poor
agents in the accumulation process. In the steady state, as the population
is no longer partitioned and credit constraints are no longer binding, growth
is maximized and it is independent of a functioning financial system or lack
thereof. Should the minimum investment requirement evolve with technology,
as it is in section 5, then the effects of inequality on growth can be permanent.
As far as the effects of growth on inequality are concerned, inequality is
at its maximum at the beginning of transition and growth reduces inequality
through a "trickle down" mechanism that transfers the possibility to accu-
mulate and get access to a more productive technology from W ealty to Poor
individuals. Transition stages are shorter when financial intermediation oper-
ates rather than under financial autarky. In the steady state the growth rate
of inequality is the same across financial autarky and financial intermediation
and it shows the minimum value. The mitigating effects of growth and finan-
cial development on inequality are diminished when technological progress is
capital-deepening. In this case permanently increasing inequality can result in
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the steady state.
In order to emphasize the role of financial development, in section 3 the
equilibrium and the development path will be studied in a financial autarky
regime, whereby old W ealthy individuals can only invest their own resources;
while in section 4 old Poor individuals will be able to lend to old W ealthy
individuals, side-stepping non-linearity in production and possibly accelerat-
ing growth. Finally in section 5 a model with a capital-deepening minimum
investment requirement will be attempted.
3.2 Model Specification
The economy is composed by a continuum of individuals of size L. There are
two categories of individuals W ealthy and Poor i = P,W. All individuals are
born equal in terms of preferences2, but they differ in terms of bequest received.
Therefore, each income group can be represented by a single agent. Each
individual of type i has one parent and one child and there is no population
growth.
The time line follows a standard 2-period OLG dynamic framework where
in the first period of life any individual of type i born in period t is endowed
with one unit of labour and receives a bequest (if any). In the second period
he consumes and leaves a bequest (if he can afford it) out of his savings.
Utility is log-linear and it features the traditional "warm-glow" form of
altruism





where β ∈ (0, 1) , ζ > 0, ci,t+1 is consumption when old and bi,t+1 is bequest left
to offsprings of generation t. Equation (3.1) justifies two motives for saving:
2Among other things such feature assumes away the problem of intra-generation income
distribution of Jappelli-Pagano (1994) and Bhattacharya (1998).
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a selfish and an altruistic one. In fact, an individual will give up consumption
when young to finance both his own consumption when old and to leave bequest
to his child.
Therefore his income at time t is
Ii,t = (bi,t + wt) (3.2)
whereas, in the second period of life, his income is generated exclusively by
the return on savings i.e.
Ii,t+1 = Ri,t+1Ii,t = (1 + ri,t+1 − δ)Ii,t (3.3)
where ri,t+1 is the return on savings available to agent i. It will be assumed
that capital fully depreciates within one year, hence Ri,t+1 = ri,t+1.
A single good used both for consumption and for investment purposes is





where A is a technological parameter, Bt = k
1−α
t is the function of the average
capital labour ratio k that reflects externalities, Kt is aggregate capital, L is
labour, which needs q units of capital to be productive. If an individual’s
wealth is higher than this minimum requirement, he may choose to be an
entrepreneur or to store his income; whereas if an individual cannot satisfy
this minimum requirement, he has to store his income. In the latter case, a
storage technology with no minimum capital requirement is available in the
form of
Zt = RP,tKt = ρKt (3.5)
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In what follows these two technologies will determine the equilibrium return
on investments for the type of agent who can actually afford to run them.
3.2.1 Static optimization
At each time t optimal consumption is the solution to (3.1) subject to the
lifetime income constraint
Ri,t+1Ii,t = ci,t+1 + bi,t+1 (3.6)
the result is  ci,t+1 = (1− β)Ri,t+1Ii,t + βζbi,t+1 = max {0; β (Ri,t+1Ii,t − ζ)} (3.7)
for i ∈ (P,R) where Ii,t is (3.2) and βζ = (1−β)ζ. While optimal consumption
is always positive, being the sum of ζ > 0 and a fraction of income Ri,t+1Ii,t,
bequest is positive only if income is sufficient to fill the optimal consumption
share, and null otherwise. More specifically, the level of income below which





I i,t can be identified with the present value of the utility threshold ζ and it is
decreasing in the return on savings Ri,t+1.







1−α − wt+1L−RW,t+1Kt+1 (3.9)
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The return on investments is RW,t+1 accruing only to W ealthy individual.
Poor individuals are, by definition, those whose income is below the threshold
q and therefore can neither access production via (3.4) nor enjoy its returns
RW,t+1.
FOCs imply that






















wt+1 = (1− α)Akt+1 = Γkt+1 (3.12)










Assuming αA > ρ implies that in equilibrium any agent whose income is
higher than q will choose to produce. Should this not be the case, then for





















αA > ρ→ u∗i,t |Ri,t+1=ρ< u
∗
i,t |Ri,t+1=αA (3.15)
implying that any agent, having the opportunity to do so, will definitely
become an entrepreneur and earn RW,t.
Recalling the hypothesis of full depreciation, in equilibrium returns become
Ri =
 RP = ρ if 0 < Ii,t < qRW = αA if Ii,t > q (3.16)
Returns are hence piece-wise defined, i.e. non linear, with respect to in-
come.






if 0 < Ii,t < q
ζ
RW
if Ii,t > q
(3.17)
3.3 Growth and inequality in financial autarky
Under financial autarky external funding is not available soW ealthy individu-
als can only invest their own savings but cannot borrow. Poor individuals ones
can only store their savings until their income does not overtake the threshold
q.
Suppose that the economy starts with (1− λ) W ealthy individuals with
a level of income such that ζ
RW
< q < IW,0 and λ Poor individuals with a
level of income IP,0 <
ζ
RP
< q. This means that as long as individuals can
be defined as Wealthy they will always have enough money both to leave a




if b∗i,t+1 > 0 and
∂u∗i,t
∂Ri,t+1
> 0 as all elements of the sum are positve
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be gained by Poor individuals sequentially - positive bequest first and access to
the productive technology after - once their income grows. Positive aggregate
accumulation of capital is always possible via Wealthy individuals’ bequest,
who are so defined as their income is higher than the minimum investment
requirement q. The unequal distribution of income also shapes the aggregate
accumulation function. More precisely, the latter can be described by
kW,t+1 =
 (1− λ) (wt + bW,t) if IW,t >
ζ
RW
; IP,t < q
(1− λ) (wt + bW,t) + λ (wt + bP,t) if IW,t >
ζ
RW
; IP,t > q
(3.18)
Because of the features of preferences embodied in the static equilibrium -
implying that all young people work and save all their income - dynamics in
(3.18) are driven both by labour productivity and by bequest.
As to optimal bequest, following (3.7), (3.16) and the above mentioned
initial conditions, W ealthy individuals would always be in a position to leave
a bequest, as IW,0 >
ζ
RW
, and to invest it in production, as IW,0 > q. On the
other hand, by hypothesis Poor individuals cannot afford any bequest at the
beginning. Should their income grow they will eventually be able to leave a
bequest and store it together with their wage, and finally, once their income
reaches the threshold q, they will have access to investment implying higher
equilibrium return on savings and contribution to aggregate accumulation.
The full path of development of the economy is divided in stages delimited
by thresholds for the income of the Poor individuals in (3.17). The stages fea-
ture different combinations of aggregate accumulation from (3.18) and optimal
bequest by different groups of individuals, and specifically
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Stage Time IP,t Dynamics




kW,t+1 = (1− λ) (ΓkW,t + bW,t)








< IP,t < q

kW,t+1 = (1− λ) (ΓkW,t + bW,t)
bW,t+1 = β [RW (ΓkW,t + bW,t)− ζ]







kW,t+1 = ΓkW,t + (1− λ) bW,t + λbP,t
bW,t+1 = β [RW (ΓkW,t + bW,t)− ζ]
bP,t+1 = β [RW (ΓkW,t + bP,t)− ζ]
(3.19)
More precisely:
• in the first stage onlyWealthy individuals can afford a bequest hence ag-
gregate accumulation is fed only by all the savings of the (1− λ)W ealthy
individuals, which are made up by wages and bequest. Poor individuals’
savings are exclusively made up by wages as they cannot afford any be-
quest. Also their savings have to be stored so they do not feed aggregate




• from t+ 1 Poor individuals can afford a bequest hence the amount they
store grows with respect to the previous stage. However, such amount
cannot yet be invested as it is still below the minimum investment re-
quirement. W ealthy individuals’ bequest and aggregate capital accumu-
lation maintain the same dynamics as in the previous stage. This stage
lasts up to time t defined as t : IP,t+1 > q;
• from t+1 Poor individuals can invest and therefore by (3.16) they give up
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storing and receive the same return on their savings as initially W ealthy
individuals. Consequently in this stage all agents contribute to aggregate
accumulation.
3.3.1 The dynamics in financial autarky
Each stage j in (3.19) is represented by a non-homogeneous system of first-




gk̂R,t = (1− λ) Γ + βRW − 1




gk̂R,t = (1− λ) Γ + βRW − 1
gb̂R,t = (1− λ) Γ + βRW − 1




((1− λ) Γ + βRW )− 1
j = 3

gk̂R,t = Γ + βRW − 1




[Γ + βRW ]− 1




[Γ + βRW ]− 1
(3.20)
where gx̂t is the growth rate of the normalized variable x̂t = xt−x
∗, with x∗
being the long run equilibrium value of the variable xt, and ̟x̂l|j are weights
4
defined in Appendix 3.7.1.
Should (1− λ) Γ+βRW > 1, then the long run equilibrium for variables in
level is unstable, as expected in a endogenous growth framework, and growth
pulls the economy through all the stages of development.
(3.20) firstly shows that accumulation and the distribution of income through
4As shown in the Appendix they are actually function of time but t in ̟x̂l,t|j has been
left out for simplicity.
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bequest follow paths that are not always perfectly related. This is due to one of
the core features of the model, namely that capital accumulation has 2 regimes
due to the non-linearity represented by q, while bequest behavior follow the
3 regimes corresponding to Poor individuals’ bequest thresholds. These are
the result of optimizing choices within the combined influence of non-linear
optimal bequest, via the utility threshold ζ, and non linearity in returns.
Secondly, the rate of accumulation gk̂R,t|j is constant and it is the sum of
the aggregate savings of wealthy young individuals - the Γ-term - and return
on old individual’s saving, i.e. bequest, represented by the βRW -term. While
all of the bequest that is accumulated contributes to growth, not all of young
individuals’ saving does. In fact the Γ-term is scaled down by (1− λ) < 1
as the λ share, i.e. savings from young poor agents, has to be stored during
transition. In the steady state accumulation accelerates precisely because the
share of savings by young individuals is equal to unity. In other words the
presence of minimum capital requirements hampers growth by excluding some
individuals from accumulation in so far as gkR,j=1 < gkR,j=3 precisely because
λ > 0.
Finally, as shown in Appendix 3.7.1, W ealthy individuals’ bequest grows
at the same rate as the economy - although only asymptotically so in the
steady state - while Poor individuals’ bequest, if positive, grows faster than
gkR during transition and in the steady state. More precisely, in stage 2 it
is true that Poors’ savings receive a lower return, but the mere fact to have
a positive rather than zero bequest allows them to benefit from the "trickle
down" effect in the words Matsuyama (2000), i.e. the gain in wage accruing
from accumulation fuelled by W ealthy individuals’ bequests. In the steady
state bequest by Poor individuals grows more than that of W ealthy ones,




. Formally, defining inequality as the difference in optimal bequests,
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given that the wage part of income is equal across individuals, one obtains
Stage Inequality Dynamics gδ̂t =
b̂W,t−b̂P,t
b̂W,t−1−b̂P,t−1
− 1 t > 1
j = 1 Γ (1− λ) + βRW − 1




(Γ (1− λ) + βRW )− 1
j = 3 βRW − 1
(3.21)
where 0 < ̟δ̂|j=2 < 1 is defined in Appendix 3.7.1.
As shown in Appendix 3.7.1 inequality persists both in transition and in
the steady state, although at a declining pace. In the first stage inequality
grows at the same rate as the economy, βζ excludes Poor individuals from be-
queathing their children. In the second stage storage makes up for some of the
difference in bequests and, as mentioned, positive bequests by Poor individuals
allow them to benefit from the "trickle down" effect of Wealthy individuals’
accumulation. However, because of lower returns, Poor individuals’ income
does not manage to keep pace with that of W ealthy individuals and inequality
keeps on growing, albeit at slower rate than in the previous stage.
Finally, in the steady state inequality grows at a minimum rate βRW which
represents the loss in terms of higher returns suffered by the Poor during tran-
sition. The model is hence consistent with Kutznets’ "inverted U" hypotheses
of decelerating inequality along with development.
3.4 Growth and inequality in financial inter-
mediation
Suppose that, giving up a constant fraction 0 < ε < 1 of the returns in order to
make up for transaction costs, it were possible to transfer savings of some group
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of population to investments of some other group. Should this be the case,
and should ρ < αA (1− ε), Poor lenders can enjoy higher returns with respect
to financial autarky, even with an income below the minimum investment




P = αA (1− ε) if 0 < Ii,t < q
RW = αA if Ii,t > q
(3.22)
Financial intermediation changes the framework of the model in other two
important ways. First of all, assuming that intermediation costs are fully
born by Poor individuals - who are savers until their income overtakes q -
implies that in equilibrium the return toW ealthy individuals is unchanged with
respect to F inancial Autarky, so they will decide to invest and be entrepreneurs
rather than save and lend.
Secondly, as it is assumed that ρ < αA (1− ε) , F inancial Intermediation
dominates storage in equilibrium and thereby increases the capital stock avail-
able for investments with respect of financial autarky. Therefore (3.18) changes
into
kW,t+1 = wt + (1− λ) bW,t + λbP,t ∀IP,t, IR,t (3.23)
Under F inancial Intermediation anybody has always access to borrowing
or lending and (3.23) describe accumulation throughout all the stages of de-
velopment. As demand for borrowing by W ealthy individuals increases with
kt, while supply of funds is constrained to savings from Poor individuals, the
return on borrowing should increase in stage 2 and in stage 3, where everyone
would choose to be a borrower. As a consequence, a non competitive market
may arise with changes in the equilibrium return on savings. Here a perfectly
elastic source of funding outside exogenous to the model is assumed. Access
to the international capital markets as a price-taker can provide a real world
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example of such assumption.
Also, R′P > RP implies that the cut-off income level in (3.17) is lower,








if 0 < Ii,t < q
ζ
RW
if Ii,t > q
(3.24)
Summarizing, the sequence of the 3 stages of development in financial in-
termediation is
Stage IP,t Dynamics






kW,t+1 = ΓkW,t + (1− λ) bW,t + λbP,t
bW,t+1 = β [RW (ΓkW,t + bW,t)− ζ]
bP,t+1 = 0




< IP,t < q

kW,t+1 = ΓkW,t + (1− λ) bW,t + λbP,t
bW,t+1 = β [RW (ΓkW,t + bW,t)− ζ]
bP,t+1 = β [R
′
P (ΓkW,t + bP,t)− ζ]
j = 3 IP,t > q

kW,t+1 = ΓkW,t + (1− λ) bW,t + λbP,t
bW,t+1 = β [RW (ΓkW,t + bW,t)− ζ]
bP,t+1 = β [RW (ΓkW,t + bP,t)− ζ]
(3.25)
The main difference with (3.19) is that all young people - irrespective
whether they are W ealthy or Poor - fuel accumulation with their saving be-
havior in any stage. The threshold q, however, has still its raison d’être in so
far as the return on savings is still lower for a given k for savers whose income
is below q, as they have to bear the full cost of financial intermediation.



































gk̂R,t = z3|j=3 − 1











where zs|j s = 1, 2, 3 and ̟x̂l|j are defined in Appendix 3.7.2.
gx̂l|j = z3|j −̟x̂l|j multiplies a constant for x̂l|j = b̂P , b̂R, k̂R and j = 1, 2.
Hence, as long as zFI3|j=1,2 > z
FA
3|j=1,2, where the superscript FA stands for
F inancialAutarky and the superscript FI stands for F inancial Intermediation,
growth will be higher under F inancial Intermediation during transition stages
at least asymptotically.
(A3.3) in Appendix 3.7.2 shows that this is the case for x̂l = b̂R, k̂R in




> 1 also implies that as under
F inancial Autarky, in F inancial Intermediation the economy will go through
all three stages of development with an accelerating pace and because of the
threshold in the utility function, excluding Poors from bequest in the first stage





is because F inancial Intermediation cannot counteract the effect of the Kaldor
Keynes saving function for Poor individuals who receive no bequest.




as it has been assumed that all agents
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can borrow as price-takers and with no transaction costs on the international
financial market.
As a consequence inequality evolves with




j = 1 gb̂W |j=1
j = 2 ̟δ̂|j=2z2,j=2 + (1−̟δ̂|j=2)z3,j=2 − 1
j = 3 βRW − 1
(3.27)
where ̟δ̂|j=2 is defined in (A3.9) in Appendix 3.7.2
(3.27) shows that inequality grows at rates that are asymptotic to the





transition inequality grows faster under F inancial Intermediation than un-








. This is because during tran-
sition costs are born by Poor individuals. In the steady state F inancial
Intermediation has no differential impact on inequality when compared to
F inancial Autarky.
Summarizing, with respect to F inancial Autarky, F inancial Intermediation
represents a first best scenario as it shortens stage one, allowing initially Poor
individuals to afford a bequest sooner than under F inancial Autarky. Given
R
′
P > RP , F inancial Intermediation grants initially Poor individuals higher
returns on their savings decreasing inequality, although at a slower pace than
under FA. On the other hand, during transition inequality decreases more
slowly than under F inancial Autarky as transaction costs drag down lenders’,
i.e. Poor agents’, returns. This result is in line with the prediction that finan-
cial development may accelerate the path of an economy along the inverted U
shape which links economic growth and inequality but at the cost of having
higher inequality during transition.
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3.5 Growth and inequality in financial autarky
with capital-deepening initial investment
Suppose that technological progress is capital deepening, i.e. that the min-
imum capital requirement to make technology productive increases with the
level of development as measured by capital per capita under
qt+1 = mkt + nqt (3.28)
with m > 0 and 0 < n < βRW +Γ (1− λ) . This assumption, coupled with
IW,0 > q0, guarantees that Wealthy individuals’ income cannot fall below qt at
any t, hence implying a "once Wealthy, always W ealthy" path of growth.
Equation (3.28) aims to capture the fact that the minimum investment re-
quirement threshold evolves both endogenously through n and it is also driven
by the aggregate notion of capital per capita k. So if an economy can be as-
similated to a large-scale productive unit, say because of technology or sector
specialization, it will have even higher q in the future and at the same time
the more an economy accumulates, as capital is abundant, it will probably
specialize in large-scale capital intensive technologies5.
If equilibrium returns remain unchanged from (3.17), Wealthy individuals’
level of income is ζ
RW
< q0 < IW,0 and λ is the number of initially Poor, then
5The ongoing decline in the relative prices of new capital goods, such as computers
and semiconductors, can be taken as current evidence for capital-augmenting technological
change. However, defining the nature of technological progress goes beyond the scope of this
Chapter and iterested readers shoudl refer to Jalava, Pohjola, Ripatti, Vilmunen (2005).
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aggregate accumulation can be described by
kW,t+1 =
 (1− λ) (wt + bW,t) if IW,t > qt; 0 < IP,t < qt(wt + bW,t) if IW,t > qt; IP,t > qt (3.29)
Similarly to the dynamics in the fixed q model the 3 stages of economic
growth can be defined by
Stage IP,t Dynamics




kW,t+1 = (1− λ) (ΓkW,t + bW,t)
bW,t+1 = β [RW (ΓkW,t + bW,t)− ζ]
bP,t+1 = 0
qt+1 = mkt + nqt
j = 2 ζ
RP
< IP,t < qt

kW,t+1 = (1− λ) (ΓkW,t + bW,t)
bW,t+1 = β [RW (ΓkW,t + bW,t)− ζ]
bP,t+1 = β [RP (ΓkW,t + bP,t)− ζ]
qt+1 = mkt + nqt
j = 3 IP,t > qt

kW,t+1 = ΓkR,t + (1− λ) bW,t + λbR,t
bW,t+1 = β [RW (ΓkR,t + bW,t)− ζ]
bP,t+1 = β [RW (ΓkR,t + bP,t)− ζ]
qt+1 = mkt + nqt
(3.30)
By construction (3.28) does not have any feedback on other variables so, tech-
nically although the system in each stage of development has 4 variables, the
dynamics of k̂R,t, b̂R,t and b̂P,t remain independent of those of q̂t. In fact the





gk̂W,t = βRW + Γ (1− λ)− 1
gb̂W,t = βRW + Γ (1− λ)− 1
gb̂P,t = 0







gk̂W,t = βRW + Γ (1− λ)− 1
gb̂W,t = βRW + Γ (1− λ)− 1












gk̂W,t = Γ + βRW − 1
















and̟l|j with l = b̂P , b̂R, q̂ are constant weights similar to those in F inancial
Autarky.
The evolution of the minimum investment threshold qt is a weighted average
between the growth rate of the economy and that of technology and the latter
does not influence any of the equilibrium growth rates of the other variables.
As a consequence, inequality will evolve in the same way as in the model with a
fixed q, namely with a decreasing rate during transition reaching the minimum
in the steady state.
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j = 1 gb̂W





j = 3 βRW − 1
(3.32)
where ̟δ|j=2 is defined in Appendix 3.7.3.
Therefore the main conclusions remain the same as the model with a fixed
q, however if
∄t∗ : b̂P,t∗ + Γk̂W,t∗ > q̂t∗ (3.33)
then Poor individuals’ income will never be able to overtake qt hence they will
never have access to higher returns asWealthy individuals have. In such a case,
credit market imperfections will have a long-lasting effects on growth, given
that gk̂W,t will permanently increase at the lower rate (βRW + (1− λ) Γ) , instead
of reaching the higher path characterized by (βRW + Γ) growth rate. This is
because initially Poor will be cut off form higher returns and from accumula-
tion for ever.
Galor and Moav (2004) maintain that the importance of inequality for
physical capital accumulation would raise, if non convexities in production of
physical capital were introduced, and that the latter might also increase the
likelihood of poverty traps and persistent inequality. The case where equation
(3.33) is verified can be thought of as an example of such occurrence.
3.6 Discussion
This paper presents a unified approach for the dynamic implications of financial
development on growth and income distribution. The framework of analysis
is characterized by constant return to scales in production, a Kaldor-Keynes
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utility function and non linearities in financial intermediation. A core feature
of the model is that the combination of optimal savings, which are increasing
in individual wealth, and non linearities in the functioning of the financial
sector generates threshold levels both in access to production and in returns
on savings.
More specifically, initially W ealthy agents are assumed to be always in a
position to save and leave a bequest to the next generation, while initially
Poor individuals’ income is assumed to be below the bequest threshold. Con-
sequently while aggregate accumulation is characterized by 2 stages of develop-
ment, depending on the share of the population having access to accumulation,
the distribution of income features 3 different stages according to optimal sav-
ings by Poor individuals.
The main result of the Chapter is the identification of a bi-directional link
between economic growth and inequality which is shaped by the functioning
of the financial sector.
As to the effects of growth on inequality, under F inancial Autarky inequal-
ity grows as much as the economy in the first stage of development, given that
the Poor cannot afford any bequest. Subsequently, inequality growth slows
down, as the effects of W ealthy agents’ accumulation "trickle down" to Poor
agents and pull initially Poor individuals out of their relative scarcity state. A
steady state is then reached where inequality grows at a minimum rate. The
working of the "trickle down" is ensured by the fact that W ealthy individuals
are always in a position to leave a bequest and, the model being constant return
to scale and deterministic, this implies a "once wealthy, always wealthy" path
of development. This mechanism of adjustment is different from Matsuyama
(2000), whose model is based on the endogenous interest rates as lenders benefit
from the presence of the Poor agents who cannot do anything but lend and this
keeps interest rate low. In the models presented here the interest rate is results
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from the endogenous growth framework. When F inancial Intermediation is in-
troduced, it is assumed that financial transaction costs are fully born by Poor
agents. This is an example of the formalization of the "Wealthy get richer
at the expense of the Poor" view of Matsuyama (2000). As a consequence
inequality grows faster in the transitions stages in F inancial Intermediation
than in F inancial Autarky. At the steady state stage, this model agrees with
the commonly held expectation that more financial development leads to faster
growth and more equality. As to the effects of inequality on growth, in the
models in this Chapter inequality lowers growth by excluding some share of the
population from higher returns and contribution to aggregate capital accumu-
lation during transition. F inancial Intermediation dampens this effect giving
way to earlier participation of Poor workers to the accumulation process.
Summarizing, the mechanics of the models in this Chapter are determined
by the combination of a minimum investment requirement and financial inter-
mediation (or lack thereof) operating in an asymmetric information environ-
ment, which is implicitly assumed. This framework has a pervasive impact:
in financial autarky it generates returns on savings that are piece-wise defined
with respect to income and it de facto excludes Poor agents from contribut-
ing to aggregate capital accumulation and in financial intermediation it brings
about credit exclusion, i.e. no individual is ever able to borrow q, as well as
extra costs for savers, i.e. Poor agents. The models lead to conclude that
financial intermediation does bring benefits vs. financial autarky first of all by
shortening the first stage of development where Poor agents cannot afford a be-
quest due to the Kaldor-Keynes utility function, and secondly by accelerating
growth with respect to financial autarky if a perfectly elastic supply of funds,
say from international capital markets, is assumed. However, a trade off in
terms of a faster growth of inequality during transition will emerge. The steady
state under both financial regimes does bring the growth rate of inequality to
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a minimum. Should technological progress be of a capital-deepening sort, then
financial market imperfections will have a permanent impact both on growth
and on inequality. More precisely the economy will grow at a slower pace
and Poor individuals will never be able to access the high returns production
technology and the economy will evolve with persistent inequality.
Finally, it may be unsettling to some readers that the main policy rec-
ommendation emerging from a prima facie view of this model may hint at
supporting the laissez-faire view as the best recipe for lifting Poor individuals
out of their state. Distortionary tax or regulatory changes favouring the remu-
neration of savings of W ealthy individuals, even in spite of that of Poor ones,
would further accelerate these positive results. However, a not much more in
depth analysis of this work should also point out that policies aiming at lift-
ing the threshold q - say by offering government guarantees to initial loans to
Poor people or promoting microcredit lenders - would still be a first best with
respect to laissez-faire.
3.7 Appendices to Chapter 3
3.7.1 Financial Autarky
(3.19) encompasses 3 linear non homogeneous systems of differential equations
describing the dynamics of the variables kW,t, bW,t and bP,t in the three different
stages of development j = 1, 2, 3.
For each stage j the general solution for the single xl,t = {kW,t, bW,t, bP,t}
variable is6









where x∗l is the long run equilibrium level of xl, z are the solutions of the
characteristic equation of the system, so called characteristic roots, hl,v, sv are
constants derived from initial or boundary conditions and V is the number of
solutions 7.
Defining a normalized variable as x̂l,t = xl,t − x
∗
l , one can write its (nor-
malized) growth rate gx̂l
8 as














̟l,v,t = 1 and for 1 < v < V
Weights ̟l,v,t are actually function of time, however to simplify notation t
































t−1 (ln (zv)− ln (zv))
)
So the normalized growth rate of variable x̂l gx̂l is a weighted sum of the
7Writing the system in matrix notation as xt+1 = Ajxt + d1 it is immediate to verify
that V is the rank of the matrix of coefficients Aj , z are its eigenvalues and hl,vsv are
elements obtained by pre- and postmultiplying the matrix of eigenvalues by the matrix of









































= z1̟l,1 + z2̟l,2 + ...+ zV̟l,V
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common characteristic roots zv where the weights ̟l,v are ratios of exponential
functions that sum up to 19.
By construction the weight associated with the largest eigenvalue will tend














t−1 ∼ 1 where |z1| < |z2| < |z3| < ... <
|zV |











= 0+ if hl,vsv ≷ 0 and
V∑
v=1

















Hence in any stage j for any pair of variables x̂l, x̂m gx̂l|j > gx̂m|j if
9It is also easy to verify that the gross growth rates for the original variable xi,t and
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t
hl,V sV (zV )
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zv (̟l,v −̟m,v) > 0







Considering that under Financial Autarky two characteristic roots in stage
1 and one in stages 2 and 3 are equal to zero10 the solutions of the reduced
systems j = 1, 2, 3 are
z1 z2 z3
j = 1 0 0 (Γ (1− λ) + βRW )
j = 2 0 βRP (Γ (1− λ) + βRW )
j = 3 0 βRW Γ + βRW
(A3.3)
























































10The rank of a matrix is the number of linearly independent rows or columns and
rank(Aj=1) = 1 and rank(Aj=2) =rank(Aj=3) = 2. The eigenvalues corresponding to a
linear combination of independent rows or columns are zero.
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where and sl,j l = 1, 2, 3 are constants to be determined and



















Further supposing continuity, i.e. that the value of each variable at the
end of each stage is equal to the value of the same variable at the beginning of





s1,j=1 = (1− λ) (βRW − 1) k̂R,0 > 0 if βRW > 1







































































Proof. gk̂R|j=2 < gb̂P |j=2 as
̟b̂P |j=2 ((1− λ) Γ + βRW ) < ̟b̂P |j=2 (βRP )
since ̟b̂P |j=2 < 0
((1− λ) Γ + βRW ) > (βRP )







(Γ + βRW )






Proof. gk̂R|j=3 < gb̂P |j=3 as
̟b̂P |j=3 (Γ + βRW ) < ̟b̂P |j=3 (βRW )
since ̟b̂P |j=3 < 0 hence
Γ > 0
Proof. gk̂R|j=3 > gb̂R|j=3 as
(Γ + βRW )̟b̂R|j=3 > ̟b̂R|j=3 (βRW )
since ̟b̂R|j=3 > 0 hence
Γ > 0.
Inequality and its dynamics
Equation (3.21) yields












j = 3 s2,j=3 (z2,j=3)
t
(A3.6)














Proof. gδ̂t|j=1 > gδ̂t|j=2 as
0 > ̟δ̂j=2 (β (RP −RW )− Γ (1− λ0))
which is always true as RP < RW as detailed in para. 3.2.2. and ̟δ̂j=2 > 0
hence LHS<0











̟δ̂t|j=2 = 0 then limt→∞
RHS = 0 and gδ̂t|j=2 > gδ̂t|j=3
3.7.2 Financial intermediation
(3.30) encompasses 3 linear non homogeneous systems of differential equations
describing the dynamics of the variables kW,t, bW,t and bP,t. Under Financial
Intermediation the solutions of the reduced systems j = 1, 2, 3 are
z1 z2 z3
j = 1 0 1
2
(Γ + βRW −̥1)
1
2
(Γ + βRW +̥1)
j = 2 0 1
2
(Γ + βRW (2− ε)−̥2)
1
2
(Γ + βRW (2− ε) +̥2)




(Γ + βRW )






2 − 4λΓβRWε with (−Γ− βRW ε)
2
> 4λΓβRWε by hy-
pothesis.





(Γ + βRW +̥1) > (1− λ) Γ + βRW if
̥1 > (1− 2λ) Γ + βRW
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0 > 4λ [λ− 1] Γ2
which is always verified as RHS is always negative for 0 < λ < 1





(Γ + βRW (2− ε) +̥2) > (1− λ) Γ + βRW
0 > −4λ [1− λ] Γ2
which is always verified as RHS is always negative for 0 < λ < 1
Proof. zFI3|j=1 < z
FI
3|j=3 i = 2, 3
1
2
(Γ + βRW +̥1) < Γ + βRW
if −4λΓβRW < 0
which is always verified as LHS is always negative





(Γ + βRW +̥1) <
1
2
(Γ + βRW (2− ε) +̥2)
if 4λΓ2 [λ− 1] < 0
which is always verified as LHS is always negative
The full solutions are
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Solutions



































































where sv,j v = 1, 2, 3 are constants depending on initial and continuity


















































3.7.3 Financial autarky with capital-deepening initial
investment
(3.25) encompasses 3 linear non homogeneous systems of differential equations
describing the dynamics of the variables kW,t, bW,t, bP,t and qt. Under capital-
deepening initial investment the solutions of the reduced systems j = 1, 2, 3
are
z1 z2 z3 z4
j = 1 0 0 (Γ (1− λ) + βRW ) n
j = 2 0 βRP (Γ (1− λ) + βRW ) n
j = 3 0 βRW Γ + βRW n
(A3.10)































































where sv,j v = 1, 2, 3, 4 are constants depending on initial and continuity
conditions and could be made explicit along the lines of (A3.5), zv,j are from


















































































In Chapters 2 and 3 we have investigated the influence of financial openness
and income distribution respectively on the relationship between financial and
economic development. In both Chapters the theoretical framework has rested
on a causality assumption according to which financial development, whether
in the form of financial openness or financial intermediation as opposed to
financial autarky, would stimulate economic development. This Chapter aims
at providing empirical evidence for such a relationship through a two-step
process: identifying a long run equilibrium relationship between financial and
economic development - with an explicit role for openness - and then assessing
the direction of causality. Causality will hence be studied in a cointegration
setting as a long run phenomenon, i.e. testing significance of loading factors.
This topic has been quite deeply researched by several prominent scholars,
Luintel and Khan (1999) and Demetriades and Hussein (1996) among others.
More recently, Rousseau and Wachtel (2005) studied the relationship between
financial and economic development with cross section and panel techniques
where the dependent variable is the percentage growth of real per capita GDP.
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The authors use data on 84 countries — among which all those included in the
present Chapter — to find that causality from finance to growth is not strongly
persistent when data after the 1990s are used for estimations.
One of the main motivations for the present study is to investigate the
existence and direction of causality between financial and economic develop-
ment with data extending well after the 1990s - up to 2006 in fact - with time
series techniques. In line with the empirical literature on financial and eco-
nomic development, private credit as a percentage of GDP is used as a financial
development indicator. Also, given the volatility of variables for the sample
countries and the consequent need of dummies, a newly developed technique
for the detection and estimation of outliers is implemented.
The main result of the paper is that, contrary to Rousseau and Wachtel
(2005), a long run equilibrium relationship between financial and economic
development is identified with time series running well into the 21st century
and even in countries whose history is characterized by numerous years of high
inflation, policy shocks and/or other structural changes. Two cointegrating
vectors are mostly found in open economies which also show parameter esti-
mates in line with the thesis of Chapter 2, namely that openness has a positive
effect on financial development. For closed economies a model with one coin-
tegrating vector is the most frequent outcome and the relevance of openness is
much toned down, in line with the model design which reserves a specific role
for openness. Causality mostly runs along what is predicted by the model in
Chapter 2, namely that financial development causes economic development.
What is worth underlining is that for both the explanation of country differ-
ences in estimated values of single parameters and the direction of causality
de jure classification of openness used in Chapter 2 is needed along with the
operational definition of de facto openness, actually used as endogenous vari-
able in this Chapter and also inequality in the distribution of income plays a
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role in line with what is described in Chapter 3.
In what follows section 2 will briefly describe the data and the identification
and estimation techniques for outliers observations and section 3 will present
the outlier detection and estimation procedure. Cointegration estimations and
causality tests will be shown in section 4. Section 5 will discuss the results.
4.2 Data Description
The VAR model consists of five variables: financial development as measured
by credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP (FD), the logarithm of
real income per capita (Y P ), the logarithm of real capital per capita (KP ),
openness as measured by gross trade as a percentage of GDP (OP ) and real
interest rate (RR). Data frequency is annual and FD, Y P, trade, investment
and inflation data have been obtained from 2009 World Development Indica-
tors [WDI09 from now on]. Nominal interest rates have mostly been obtained
from various issues of the International Financial Statistics published by the
International Monetary Fund1. Countries have been chosen mostly among de-
veloping economies trying to capture different geographical origin (4 African,
2 Asian, 4 Latin American and 2 European countries), level of economic de-
velopment (4 Low income countries, 3 Lower Middle income ones, 3 Upper
Middle income ones and 2 High income countries) and average level of finan-
cial openness. Data availability - i.e. at least 35 years of data for all the time
series - has been the main driver in the choice of sample countries.
FD underpins a view of financial development mainly related to the func-
tion of credit as a stimulus of economic growth, rather than as financial de-
velopment as a result of accumulation of savings. This is in accordance with
1Details on sources and calculations for endogenous variables in each country are detailed
in table 4.1 in the Appendices.
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the McKinnon/Shaw view of inside money, namely that the supply of credit
is ultimately responsible for the quantity and quality of investment. FD has
been preferred to other frequently used measures of financial development such
as M2 as a percentage of GDP, which are nearer to the role of money as a fa-
cilitator of exchange, rather than a facilitator of investment. In fact, in case of
“liquidity trap”, i.e. availability of money which is not invested in production
but treasured, M2 as a percentage of GDP would increase but this would have
only marginal effects on aggregate demand and economic growth and hence on
the long run relationship between financial and economic development, which
is the aim of the research in this Chapter. Deposit/GDP ratio has not been
used as a financial development measure as it underpins a supply side view,
assuming most economic agents earn more than what they are willing to con-
sume and financial intermediaries are developed enough to be able to gather
a sizable part of that savings. Also credit-based measures of financial inter-
mediation are readily available and with longer time series from WDI09 and
they provide a better fit with the model developed in Chapter 2, hence the
preference for FD as a measure of financial development. A word of caution
must be spent on the fact that FD includes credit from government banks to
the private sector which may allocate credit according to criteria which differ,
sometimes markedly so, from profit maximization and this may weaken the
expected relationship between financial and economic development.
Empirical work on financial openness is always confronted with the choice
of the right indicator for such multifaceted phenomenon. The main alter-
natives can be classified under two headers: de jure indicators and de facto
indicators. The first group of measures of financial openness mainly rests on
combinations of discrete variables that aim at codifying legal restrictions on
cross-border financial transactions; the resulting indicators try to gauge how
much financial flows are allowed by international treaties and agreements to go
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in and out of a selected country. Chinn and Ito (2006) provide one of the most
recently calculated examples of a de jure financial openness indicator. While
better grounded theoretically and potentially rid of exogenous components, de
jure measures of openness might be more liable to the influence of interest
group politics. They may also overstate true openness due to enforcement
issues, as the lifting of capital account restrictions need not always translate
into greater capital account openness, especially if the right to engage in in-
ternational financial transactions is not fully enforced. Furthermore, as these
indicators mainly originate from discrete variables, they offer a relatively low
explanatory power within a integrated time series framework. The de facto
family of measures of financial openness is instead based on actual flows of
funds crossing a selected country’s borders as payments of international trans-
actions. Baltagi et al. (2009) maintain that elements that reflect historical,
geographical and international political factors, which are normally outside
the control of domestic policy makers make de facto openness more in line
with the actual state of affairs in a country and more suitable for empirical
testing. The main problem with this type of indicator lies the quality of data.
More specifically, while methodologies of data collecting and standardization
are quite established as far as international trade movements are concerned,
quality on financial flows data is much less consistent.
In this Chapter, a de facto measure of financial openness - and namely
gross trade openness as a percentage of GPD (OP ) - has been preferred to de
jure measures, as it is considered more suitable to test whether countries that
happen (not necessarily choose) to be more open to trade and capital flows
are also more financially developed. Data quality issues have also contributed
to drive the choice towards such an indicator. Support on the use of trade
openness as a proxy of financial openness comes from several sources. Baltagi
et al. (2009) who, using yearly data and dynamic panel estimation techniques,
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find that both trade and financial openness are statistically significant deter-
minants of banking sector development. Along the same lines, Chinn and Ito
(2006) further maintain that the opening of trade in goods is a precondition for
financial opening and that an increase in trade openness is a prolog to financial
openness and thence to financial development. Tornell andWestermann (2004)
find that while trade liberalization Granger-causes financial liberalization, the
test for reverse causation is rejected. The authors justify this finding mainly by
observing that exporters and importers need access to international financial
markets and since capital is fungible, it is difficult to insulate those financial
flows which are exclusively associated with trade transactions. In other words
an open trade regime is usually sustained by an open financial regime. On the
theoretical side Aizenman and Noy (2009) support these findings with a the-
oretical model that shows that de facto financial openness depends positively
on lagged trade openness. For a sample of developing countries the authors
find that a one standard deviation increase in the commercial openness index
is associated with a 9.5% increase in de facto financial openness.
OP has hence been selected as a proxy of financial openness among de facto
measures of financial openness. The limited availability of sufficiently long time
series of financial openness measures2 required for cointegration analysis also
played a role. In table 4.2 the main data on financial and economic develop-
ment in each country are summarized: financial development is represented
through its initial level (IFD), end level (ENDFD) and average growth rate
DFD while economic development is represented by Gross National Income
2Ranciere, Tornell and Westermann (2006) calculate de facto financial openness by com-
puting cumulative net capital inflows - including FDI, portfolio flows and bank flows - sent
by nonresidents from the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics.
For some countries, when the three series are not available, they use inflows to the banking
system only. Unfortunately these data start with 1980, making time series too short for a
cointegration exercise. The alternative of using FDI data is not recommended by the same
authors, who maintain that FDIs do not obviate the need for risky international bank flows.
The latter are essential to finance the non-tradable sector and hence to evaluate the full
benefit of openness on both tradable and non tradable sectors.
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(GNI) per capita in 2008 and average yearly growth rate of real per capita
income (DY P ). Average openness (AOP ) is also shown with values ranging
from just above 18% to nearly 60%; so according to a simple ordering Chile,
India, Italy, Pakistan, Peru and Venezuela will be considered as (relatively)
financially closed with a value below 50% (F inancially Closed from now on)
while the Central African Republic, Ecuador, Finland, Ghana, Kenya and Mo-
rocco will be considered (relatively) financially open (F inancially Open from
now on). This classification overlaps only partially with that in table 2.2
of Chapter 2 as India, Pakistan and Venezuela can be considered financially
closed, given the low level of commitment to liberalization and, symmetrically,
Ecuador, Ghana and Kenya, together with Finland, being a EMU and OECD
member country, can be considered financially open given their liberal regime.
Chile, Morocco and Peru, which are de facto financially open countries, con-
stitute borderline cases, given their limited commitment to de jure openness.
The reverse is true for Italy which, despite being a EMU and OECD member
country, i.e. being de jure financially open, will be defined as financially closed.
FC countries are all Middle Income countries with the exception of Italy
(a High Income country) and Pakistan (Low Income country), and as a group
they show an average GNI which is 8% higher than that of FO countries and
they end the sample period with a ENDFD over 30% higher than that of FO
countries. They are symmetrically spread across the distribution of income
spectrum with 3 countries, namely India, Italy and Pakistan showing a Gini
index in year 2000 below 40, and three with a more concentrated distribution
of income.
FO countries are all Low and Lower Middle Income countries with the
exception of Finland and show a slower financial and economic development.
They are also symmetrically spread across the distribution of income spectrum
and they show a lower average level of inequality as a group and a less pro-
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nounced trend in increasing inequality, once the Central African Republic is
excluded, than FO countries. 2 countries, namely Kenya and Morocco, even
show decreasing inequality.
Across groups, both economic and financial development exhibit signs of
non-linearity and geographical connotation. African countries show the lowest
growth rate in real per capita income and financial openness and the second
lowest in financial development. By contrast, Asian countries come out top in
all three dimensions.
Table 4.2 also shows that the contemporaneous correlations between FD
and the levels of real income and openness. Both are always positive with the
exception of the correlation between FD and openness in Kenya and Venezuela.
The correlation between income growth and financial development C(DY, FD)
is mixed with negative signs (Ecuador, Finland, Italy, Kenya and Venezuela)
that are less prevalent than in Luintel and Khan (1999) and nearly zero values
in Morocco, Pakistan and Peru. Correlation between openness growth and fi-
nancial development C(DOP,FD) is similarly of mixed sign with values close
to zero in Ecuador, Finland and Kenya. The overall evidence from table 4.2
seems to suggest that FC countries are more developed both economically and
financially than FO countries. FC countries show a pattern of correlations
between financial and economic development more in line with what is sug-
gested by the theory, whereas for FO countries the same is true with reference
to the patterns of correlation between openness and financial development.
Unit root test results on level variables and on first differences of the same
variables are given in tables 4.3 and 4.4. The presence of a unit root is found for
all level variables by both ADF and KPSS procedures in the Central African
Republic, and at least one of the 2 tests also indicates the presence of a unit
root in all variables in Ghana, India, Italy, Morocco and Pakistan. All variables
can be considered I(1) with the exception of RR in Chile, Ecuador, Finland,
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Peru and Venezuela. In Kenya all variables except OP can be considered I(1)
according to at least one test. The I(0) variables will still be included in the
study as literature suggests that treating I(0) variables as weakly exogenous
does not offer substantial differences in terms of interpretation of results (see
Luintel and Khan (1999)).
Also, either the ADF or the KPSS test provide evidence in support of the
possibility of some variables being I(2) for several countries. However, only in
Ecuador, Ghana, India, Italy, Kenya and Venezuela the identification of KP
as an I(2) series is robust to both unit root test. It must be said, however,
that the compounding formula used in the perpetual inventory methodology3
implies a smoothing of the investment series, hence the underlying properties
of the investment series, among which economic theory suggests integration of
order one, should be those of the respective investment series, save a higher
persistence. Also Johansen (1995) maintains that if the number of cointegrat-
ing relations exceeds the number of I(2) common trends - and this is the case
for Ghana, Italy, Kenya and Morocco with 2 cointegrating relations and one
I(2) series, as shown in tables 4.5 and 4.6 - the combinations of the cointe-
3Specifically, let K(t) equal the real capital stock in period t. Let I(t) equal the real
investment rate in period t. Let d equal the depreciation rate, which we assume equals 0.07.
Thus, the capital accumulation equations states that K(t + 1) = (1 − d)K(t) + I(t). To
make an initial estimate of the capital stock, the country is assumed to be at its steady-
state capital-output ratio. Thus, in terms of steady-state value, let k = K/Y , let g =
the growth rate of real output, let i = I/Y where Y is GDP. Then, from the capital
accumulation equation plus the assumption that the country is at its steady-state, it must
be that k = i/[g + d]. Thus, a reasonable estimate of the steady-state values of i, g, and d,
is obtained.
To make the initial estimate of k, the steady state capital output ratio for each individual
country, d is set at 0.07, g — the steady-state growth rate — is a weighted averaged of the
countries average growth rate during the first ten years for which there are output and
investment data. The world growth rate is computed as 0.0423 and, based on Easterly et al.
(1993, Journal of Monetary Economics), a weight of 0.75 is given to the world growth rate.
i is then computed as the average investment rate during the first ten years for which there
are data. To reduce the influence of business-cycles in making the estimate of Y (initial),
the average real output value between 1960-1969 is used as an estimate of initial output.
Thus, the capital stock in 1960 is given as Y (initial) ∗ k. Given depreciation, the guess at
the initial capital stock becomes relatively unimportant decades later. For further details
see Easterly and Levine (2001).
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grating variables in such setting can be stationary by themselves. Because of
a stronger economic interpretation of integration of capital stock series and of
the support of the literature all the sample countries and all the series will be
included in this study. India, where Y P , KP and OP might be considered
I(2) and Ecuador and Venezuela, where KP can be considered I(2) and Jo-
hansen’s cointegration test identifies only one cointegrating relation, might be
considered borderline cases.
ADF and KPSS tests, however, do not take into consideration the possi-
bility of breaks in the series. For this reason their results must be taken with
caution in such an uneven environment as that represented in figures 4.1 and
4.2 for the time span considered. The Sequential Break test4 in columns 6 and
7 of tables 4.3 and 4.4 shows that the null of no break unit root cannot be
rejected in any of the series with the exception of RR in the Central African
Republic, Chile, India, Peru and Venezuela and of Y P in Ecuador, Finland
and Kenya, all the other series can hence be considered I(1) and they will be
tested under the Johansen’s procedure.
Finally, the trace tests in tables 4.5 and 4.6 indicate a rank equal to 2
in 8 countries with 5% significance and this is confirmed by the maximum
eigenvalue statistic for Chile, Italy, Kenya and Peru. Results are not so clear-
cut for the Central African Republic and India, where the maximum eigenvalue
statistic is valid only at 10% significance, and for Morocco and Ghana, where
the maximum eigenvalue statistic suggests a rank of one. Following Luintel
and Khan (1999), however, the trace test is considered as more robust than
maximal eigenvalue statistics, so in what follows the Central African Republic,
4From Perron (1997) the unit root test for the innovational model is performed estimating
by OLS the regression: yt = µ + θDUt + βt + δD(Tb)t + αyt−1 +
k∑
i=1
ci∆yt−i + et where
DUt = 1(t > Tb) and D(Tb)t = 1(t = Tb + 1) and k is the lag parameter then obtaining
the t-statistic for testing α = 1. The break date is selected as the value which minimizes
t∗a =MinTb∈(k+1,T )tα̂(Tb, k)
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Ghana, India and Morocco will be considered with the rank set at 2 as well.
For Ecuador, Finland, Pakistan and Venezuela the rank will be set at 1 in
accordance with the results presented in the in tables 4.5 and 4.6.
4.3 The need of proper consideration for dummy
variables
Considering that the minimum time span in each sample country covers at least
35 years of deep structural changes, economic transition, financial liberalization
and other policy shocks, episodes of boom and bust may not be infrequent.
On this theme Loayza and Ranciere (2002) find that, in the case of countries
subject to the effects of financial crises longer than the average economic cycle,
ad hoc dummy variables are essential in order to obtain meaningful estimation
results. They observe that ”in the case of private credit its correlation with
growth is strongly negative prior to the crisis, and it becomes close to neutral
in the aftermath”.
Generally speaking, volatility around shocks causes autocorrelation in resid-
uals which might influence the determination of the cointegration rank as well
as parameter inference. As reviewed in para 1.5.3, the usual practice to limit
those effects is to detect outliers from the estimated residuals in cointegrated
VAR and to include unrestricted dummies to whiten residuals. This practice,
however, has no sound justification in theory.
Also, in a cointegrating framework, shocks may influence several endoge-
nous variables similarly, such that the effects cancel out in a linear combination,
or they may only affect a subset of endogenous variables, so that the effects
will not cancel themselves out and dummy variable(s) will have to be included
in estimations.
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In order to outline formally the above difference, define a p-dimensional





Qi∆Yt−i +m0 + ab
′
p+1t+ εt (4.1)
where Yt is the vector of the p endogenous variables in levels, a is the
vector of adjustment parameters, b is the vector of parameters specifying the
long term or equilibrium cointegration relationship, k is the number of the
lags (of the unrestricted, i.e. level, model) and Qi...Qk−1 the matrices of the
remaining autoregressive parameters, each of dimension pxp. The above speci-
fication contains an unrestricted constant m0 and a restricted linear drift term
ab′p+1t, allowing for a linear trend both in the stationary and non-stationary
combinations of the data.
The usual way to add dummy variables is to insert an additional deter-
ministic function µt containing indicator variables such as µt = mDt where
Dt is an n-dimensional vector of dummy variables and m is a p× n matrix of
unrestricted coefficients. Dt dummy variables are of the type
Dt(T0) = 1 {t = T0} and dt(T0) = ∆Dt(T0) (4.2)
where 1 {.} is the indicator function equal to one if the expression in curly
brackets is true.
In the terminology of Nielsen (2004) [HBN04 from now on], this will trans-





Qi∆Yt−i +m0 + ab
′
p+1t+mDt + εt (4.3)
In such a framework the event at t = T0 represented by Dt(T0) is to all
effects treated as a large innovation to the system and it is also furthermore
129
implicitly assumed that the transmission mechanism of this extreme shock
within the system is identical to that of normal innovations εt. This means
that the events represented by Dt, although they do not modify the equilib-
rium relationship ab′Yt−1, do modify the modelling of the behavior of the p-th
variable by mp; in other words should the estimated weights in mp result posi-
tive (negative) this would mean that the events in Dt have increased (lowered)
the level at which ab′Yt−1 is perched in the p-th equation.
On the other hand, there might be such events as to affect the equilibrat-
ing forces of the dynamic system through institutional changes related to the
shocks themselves. In these occurrences the transmission mechanism is differ-
ent from the usual one: wars with prolonged periods of rationing and price
controls provide an example5. In such a case "extreme value" observations,
i.e. outliers, are bound to be related to individual time series and not to the
dynamic model as such. As a consequence, the DGP could be written as an
unobserved components model in the form Yt = Xt + θDt where Xt are the
unobserved variables that obey a cointegrated VAR model, θ is a p×n matrix
of unrestricted coefficients andDt an n-dimensional vector of dummy variables
and the representation in the additive model H∗A(r) could be specified as
6
















5Isolated measurement errors in single time series, unfortunately, cause the same disrup-
tive effect on the transmission mechanims of dynamic systems.
6Were the restrictions on θi not imposed, the dynamics of the dummies would be ap-
proximated be the k free parameters θ, θ1, ..., θk−1 which would bring the model close to
the specification used by Johansen et al. (2000) for broken levels and linear trends. Such a




 b1 = θ
′b
θi = −Qiθ for i = 1, ..., k − 1
Amending the single time series with the additive dummy and the estimated
parameter θ is equivalent to interpolate the single "extreme value" data point
using the information available from the rest of the sample. In this case the
events in Dt are such that they modify the equilibrium relationship itself as a
result of the amendment(s) to the cointegrating series ab′ (Yt−1 − θ
′
Dt−1) . In
such a framework a counterfactual event study could be performed, confronting
the estimates of ab′ and those of ab from (4.1), i.e. using the unadjusted series
which represent the counterfactual situation that the "extreme value" had not
actually occurred7.
Also the specification in (4.4), differently from (4.3), makes the value of the
likelihood function invariant to the "extreme" observation in the single time
series, because it is replaced by an interpolated value.
Within this framework, rather than including innovational dummy vari-
ables in presence of large residuals, HBN04 suggests estimating both the in-
novational model H∗I (r) in (4.3) and the additive model H
∗
A(r) in (4.4) for a
given dummy variable Dt = Dt(T0) and then base the chosen specification on
a test criterion. As both models nest the basic model (4.1) the author suggest
testing H∗(r) ⊂ H∗I (r) and H
∗(r) ⊂ H∗A(r) with the LR test statistic
τ j = −2 logQ
(
H∗(r) | H∗j (r)
)
= −T log
∣∣∣Ω̂−1Ω̂j∣∣∣ j = I, A (4.5)
where Ω̂ and Ω̂j denote the estimated covariance matrices under H
∗(r) and
H∗j (r) respectively. The test will be compared to a critical value τ
c calculated
7No such study will be performed here as no significative results are obtained for countries
showing additive outliers. Interested readers should refer to Nielsen (2007).
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according to the Bonferroni inequality δmax = 1 − (1 − δ)1/T and used in
a χ2(p)-based test8, where p is the number of endogenous variables in the
model, to ensure an overall Type I error probability below δ = 5%. The
final specification of the model will hence include as many dummy variables
of the type for which the test is larger and it is above the critical value. The
above outlined procedure is based on Gaussian likelihood function, hence it
differs from the pseudo-maximum-likelihood (PML) approach to cointegration
analysis which is based on a fat tail distribution for the error term. Although
the two techniques may yield similar results in the case of IO-only dummy
specification, the HBN04 technique is considered better in so far the Gaussian
maximum likelihood approach offers an easier rank determination framework9.
As to the question of rank specification for testing, HBN04 underlines that
"in the case of a fixed number of outliers asymptotic inference in the cointe-
gration model is unchanged, in the sense that the asymptotic distributions are
unaffected. But the distortionary effects could be important in finite sam-
ples". More precisely, while ignoring innovational outliers has only minor
consequences for small sample inference on the cointegration rank of a VAR
process, additive outliers may bias inference towards the finding of stationar-
ity or cointegration. Therefore, forcing the unjustified introduction of additive
outliers can manipulate the cointegration rank. To this effect HBN04 suggests
8χ2(5) threshold values span from 19.94 for countries with 40 yearly observations to 20.31
for countries with 47 yearly observations as detailed in the notes of tables 4.7 and 4.8.
9Intuitively, considering that the PML estimation based on a multivariate student-t dis-
tribution corresponds to a "weighted" Gaussian, where the weights involve a Generalised
Least Square (GLS)-type transformation, the GLS transformation automatically gives lower
weight in the likelihood function to large residuals. Therefore the leptokurtic error distrib-
ution will by construction give more robustness to IOs. However, the PML is not automati-
cally robust to AOs as AOs are related to a particular time series and not to the model and
to innovations and the PML does not take this into account. Furthermore the pseudo-LR
test for rank determination in the PML approach necessitates the use of simulated distrib-
utions instead of the asymptotic table of the Gaussian approach. This brief outline of the
preference for the Gaussian approach aims at justifying the use of this technique intuitively
and it should not be considered exhaustive. Interested readers should refer to para. 5.3 of
Nielsen (2004).
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that "a pretest for the cointegration rank can be applied, and the search for
outliers can be made conditional on that estimated rank, r̂0 [and] ... there
might be a gain in the outlier detection from using a rank, r0, close to the true
rank, r". According to HBN04 the alternative procedure of using a stationary
model (i.e. rank r = 5 in our case) for the detection of outliers may create
difficulties in distinguishing the type of error, i.e. IO vs. AO, in small samples.
In the light of all the above considerations, the outlier detection and es-
timation procedure by Nielsen (2004) will be applied to each country in the
sample with the rank specified in tables 4.5 and 4.6.
4.3.1 Outlier Detection & Estimation
The results of the Detection & Estimation procedure, described in the previous
paragraph, are presented10 in tables 4.7 and 4.8 where:
• the first section shows n residuals from the estimation of H∗(r̂0) - where
r̂0 results from Johansen’s cointegration test reported in tables 4.5 and
4.6 - that are higher than twice the standard deviation
• the section headed Iteration 0 shows the likelihood ratio tests τ j,i =
−T log
∣∣∣Ω̂−1Ω̂j,i∣∣∣ for j = IO,AO and i = 1, ..., n where Ω̂ and Ω̂j,i rep-
resent covariance matrices of H∗(r̂0) and H
∗
j,i(r̂0) models respectively.
More precisely, in H∗IO,i(r̂0) µt = mDi and H
∗
AO,i(r̂0) tests (∆Yt − θidi)
• in the section headed Iteration 1, observation i1 has been chosen as the
first component of Di for the outlier type j1 such that for j = j1 and
i = i1 τ
∗
j1,i1
= max τ j,i
j=IO,AO; i=[1,n]
> τ c. The section shows the likelihood ratio
tests τ j,i = −T log
∣∣∣Ω̂1−1Ω̂j,i∣∣∣ for j = IO,AO and i = 2, ..., n where
10All calculations have been conducted in EViews 7 R©. See Appendix 4.6.3 for a sample
routine.
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• in the sections headed Iteration s, observation is has been chosen as the
s-th component ofDi for the outlier type js such that for j = js and i = is
τ∗js,is = max τ j,i
j=IO,AO; i=[1,n]
> τ c. The section shows the likelihood ratio tests
τ j,i = −T log
∣∣∣Ω̂s−1Ω̂j,i∣∣∣ for j = IO,AO and i = s+1, ..., n where Ω̂s and







For all countries the maximum number of dummies has been limited to 7,
i.e. from 15% to 18% of observations for single endogenous variables in the
sample countries, in order to preserve degrees of freedom. Only 50% of coun-
tries end up with the maximum number of dummies; in all cases, however, the
number of estimated dummies is less than the number of yearly observations
showing excess standard deviation in iteration 0 of the Detection & Estima-
tion procedure. In all countries with the exception of Italy, the procedure does
not detect any additive outliers, which are usually associated with data errors
in time series. This reinforces the claim that the cointegration rank from ta-
bles 4.5 and 4.6 is the true cointegration rank and it should guarantee a good
quality of estimates, sometimes doubted when time series from non-OECD
countries are used. For Italy, the procedure detects an AO-type for year 1970
for Y P series11: hence, following HBN04, data for that year are interpolated in
levels12. Amended data are checked again with Johansen’s cointegration test
11Values of parameter θ and p-value of student t distribution for significance are reported
here
CR Y P KP OP RR
θ -0.0106 0.0051 0.0045 -0.2638 0.1629
(p-value) 67% 0% 81% 92% 11%
.
12This is the reason why no dummies of the additive type appear in the cointegrating
vector, as it would be expected from equation 4.4. On the opportunity of using linear
interpolation of data in the presence of additive outliers, see Model M5 on page 265 of Nielsen
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which confirms a rank of 2.
Despite its being iterative, i.e. taking into account all previously found
outliers when testing for the next one, the procedure finds contiguous outliers
in 6 out of 12 countries, a sign that the effects of structural changes and other
policy shocks on financial development and economic growth are frequently
longer than a yearly cycle13. All outliers with a Chi-square test higher than
the critical value will be used for estimating cointegrating vectors.
Finally, the value added of the HBN04 procedure can also be seen in the
very small overlap between the breaks endogenously identified by the Struc-
tural Break tests in the single series and presented in tables 4.3 and 4.4 and
those identified by the procedure. This is a piece of supportive evidence to-
wards the fact that the multivariate nature of the VAR model does modify the
relative relevance of breaks with respect to testing single time series and the
heavy presence of outliers may help explain the contrasting results of the sta-
tionarity tests. Also, in most cases, the timing of the break dates identified by
the Nielsen (2004) procedure corresponds to important events in the countries,
as illustrated in tables 4.9 and 4.10.
4.4 Model Identification
Similarly to Luintel and Khan (1999) for countries with cointegration rank
equal to 2 the normalization restrictions are chosen with reference to FD
and Y P (formally b1,1 = 1 and b2,2 = 1) in order to obtain a financial depth
relationship (FD cointegration vector) and an (aggregate) production function
(2004). In this model Y P original1970 − (Y P
original
1969 + Y P
original
1971 ) is not significatively different
from θ2D70, confirming the equivalence of linear interpolation and HBN04 estimation.
13Arghyrou and Luintel (2007) among others face the same problem. The authors define
a period of three years as the neighbourhood of a break and represent it by a single shift,
identifying the exact break date as the one that produces the highest Chi-square statistic in
the sequential tests.
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(Output cointegration vector). The other over-identifying restrictions are:
1. the coefficient of the per capita capital in the FD cointegrating relation-
ship is zero (b1,3 = 0), since capital has no direct effect on the economy’s
supply of credit to the private sector;
2. the coefficient of FD in the Output vector is zero (b2,1 = 0), as economic
theory suggests that financial development has no direct effect on the
economy’s production function;
3. the coefficient of OP is non negative in at least one of the two cointe-
grating relationships (either b1,4 ≥ 0 or b2,4 ≥ 0). The restriction b1,4 > 0
captures the positive effects of financial openness on financial develop-
ment. Following Chinn and Ito (2006), capital account liberalization can
lead to the development of financial systems through several channels.
First, financial liberalization may mitigate financial repression in pro-
tected financial markets by allowing the real interest rate to rise to its
competitive market equilibrium. Second, removing capital controls al-
lows domestic and foreign investors to engage in more effective portfolio
diversification. Third, but not least, the liberalization process usually
increases the efficiency level of the financial system by weeding out in-
efficient financial intermediaries and by creating greater pressure for a
reform of the financial infrastructure. The restriction b2,4 > 0 captures
the real effects of the increased availability of credit, following financial
openness. It also aims to capture the economies of scale in the distribu-
tion of funds that the domestic economy reaches once it opens financially
as described in Chapter 2. Tornell andWestermann (2004) maintain that
while trade liberalization promotes efficiency and growth mainly in the
tradables sector, financial liberalization adds even more to growth be-
cause it eases financing constraints, leading to an increase in investment
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by financially constrained firms, most of which are in the nontradables
sector;
4. the coefficient on RR is non negative in at least one of the two coin-
tegrating relationships (either b1,5 ≥ 0 or b2,5 ≥ 0). The restriction
b1,5 > 0 captures profit for financial intermediaries, which is one of the
main drivers of financial development. As in Luintel and Khan (1999),
the restriction b2,5 > 0 can be interpreted as a proxy for technological
progress.
For countries with cointegration rank equal to 1, only a FD cointegrating
relationship will be identified with the additional restriction that b1,3 = 0.
Considering all the above restrictions, equations (4.3) and (4.4) can be
written in estimable form and they would result in:
∆Yt = a1,p(b1,1FDt + b1,2Y Pt + b1,3KPt + b1,4OPt + b1,5RRt + (4.6)
+b1,6t+ b1,0) + a2,p(b2,1FDt + b2,2Y Pt + b2,3KPt + b2,4OPt + b2,5RRt +






b1,1 = b2,2 = 1
b1,3 = 0
b2,1 = 0
(b1,4 ≥ 0) ∪ (b2,4 ≥ 0)
(b1,5 ≥ 0) ∪ (b2,5 ≥ 0)
if r = 2 or
∆Yt = a1,p(b1,1FDt + b1,2Y Pt + b1,3KPt + b1,4OPt + b1,5RRt + (4.7)






 b1,1 = 1b1,3 = 0 if r = 1 and
∆˜Y t = a1,p(b1,1F˜Dt + b1,2Y˜ Pt + b1,3K˜Pt + b1,4O˜Pt + b1,5R˜Rt + (4.8)
+b1,6t+ b1,0) + a2,p(b2,1F˜Dt + b2,2Y˜ Pt + b2,3K˜Pt + b2,4O˜Pt + b2,5R˜Rt +






b1,1 = b2,2 = 1
b1,3 = 0
b2,1 = 0
(b1,4 ≥ 0) ∪ (b2,4 ≥ 0)
(b1,5 ≥ 0) ∪ (b2,5 ≥ 0)
if r = 2






























with Di,t = 1 {t = i} or
∆˜Y t = a1,p(b1,1F˜Dt + b1,2Y˜ Pt + b1,3K˜Pt + b1,4O˜Pt + b1,5R˜Rt + (4.9)





 b1,1 = 1b1,3 = 0 if r = 1.
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4.4.1 Estimation results
The results in table 4.11 show for each country the identified cointegrating
vectors and the overidentifying restriction test which follows a χ2(1) probability
distribution.
It should be noted that in Chile, Italy, Pakistan and Peru the results of
the weak exogeneity test show no evidence of causality. As in Demetriades
and Hussein (1996) this contradicts the representation theorem of Engle and
Granger, thereby casting some doubt on the cointegration results for these
countries, which will therefore be excluded from the subsequent analysis.
In the other countries a number of common elements seem to emerge. First,
the detection and estimation technique helps in identifying a long run relation-
ship between financial and economic development for high-inflation countries,
namely Ecuador (16 years of yearly price growth above 25%, the threshold cho-
sen by Rjoja and Valev (2004)), Ghana (22 years) and Venezuela (14 years).
This goes against Rjoja and Valev (2004) who maintain that high inflation
leads not only to an underdeveloped financial system but also to a breakdown
of the finance-growth nexus.
Secondly, in all countries a F inancial Development cointegrating vector is
identified with a positive coefficient for Y P , with the exception of the Central
African Republic, India and Morocco. In particular the negative estimated
value for India may be explained by domestic financial repression. The latter
phenomenon is well described in Demetriades and Luintel (1996) who main-
tain that in the 1960s the government of India tightened its controls over the
financial system introducing liquidity requirements and lending rate controls;
domestic financial repression stepped up in 1969 with the nationalization of
the 14 largest commercial banks and was further extended in 1980. Domestic
financial liberalization followed only in 1990 with the end of directed credit
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and concessionary lending. So a relationship showing that the more income
per capita increases, the more financial development decreases, being maimed
in its function of channelling savings to productive investments by domestic
repression, is consistent with data. Also, the presence of I(2) series in India
must not be underestimated.
Among FO countries only the Central African Republic shows a deeply
negative estimate for parameter b1,2. This might be due to the extreme finan-
cial underdevelopment of the country, which ends the sample period with a
FD level which is lower than the initial level of financial development in any
country with the exception of Ghana. Also the fact that inequality reaches the
zenith in the Central African Republic might configure a case where growth is
capital-deepening and, as described in para. 3.5 of Chapter 3, inequality se-
riously hampers accumulation and growth. The fact that the Central African
Republic has the lowest capital-income ratio at the end of the sample period
across all the sample countries provides further support to this claim.
Estimates for b1,4 span from negative values (FO Finland and Kenya) to
very positive values (FC India). For the FO countries might be the case that
the marginal effect of increasing openness is low, while the large coefficient for
India might indicate the sizable potential gains in financial development from
openness, given the low level of actual openness of India, a de facto and de jure
FC country. It should be noted that Morocco’s end-of-sample level of de facto
openness does not differ much from that of Ghana or Ecuador, but the value
estimated for b1,4 is definitely larger in the former country. De jure openness
classification of table 2.2 of Chapter 2 indicates Morocco’s commitment only
under commercial presence mode, while Ghana and Ecuador are among coun-
tries showing full commitment to liberalization both under cross border mode
and under commercial presence. The difference in the effect of financial open-
ness on financial development might hence be explained by the difference in
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de jure openness and namely that the relatively de jure "closed" Morocco has
succeeded in taking more advantage of openness than de jure "open" Ecuador
and Ghana.
Finally, estimates for b1,5 are mostly positive and they are much smaller
than other coefficients. This outcome is in line with Arestis, Demetriades,
Fattouh and Mouratidis (2002) as b1,5 > 0 can be interpreted as the return on
financial intermediation. Again the distribution of countries between FC and
FO groups proves helpful as b1,5 < 0 is more frequently observed in FC coun-
tries. Financial intermediation in FC countries is probably protected from
international competition and subsidized by the government so profitability is
not such an important driving force of financial development. Estimates for
b1,5 are lower than those for b1,4 in most countries with exception of Ecuador
and Finland; this may indicate that when financial openness operates, it is
a stronger factor in financial development than return on financial interme-
diation. In Finland the loss of an independent monetary policy due to the
introduction of the Euro has possibly had an impact in reducing the role of
interest rates in financial development. By contrast, in Ecuador the low level
of financial development could not benefit in full from openness, despite its
fast dynamics. It is interesting to note that in FC India the estimate for
b1,4 is higher than that for b1,5, suggesting that financial openness more than
compensates the negative effects of low returns on financial intermediation in
explaining financial development.
As far as the Output cointegrating vector is concerned, all countries exhibit
a positive coefficient for b2,3, in line with the interpretation that the second
cointegrating vector represents a production function. The Central African
Republic shows a value compatible with endogenous growth theory.
Values estimated for b2,4 are mostly positive, in line with the prediction of
the models in Chapter 2, and capture the real effects of the increased availabil-
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ity of credit, originating from improvements in financial infrastructure which
alleviate information asymmetry, following financial openness. This is a sign
that for nearly all the FO countries in this sample financial openness - as
a form of financial liberalization - is positively related to economic growth.
Exceptions on opposite fronts are Ghana and India. For Ghana, Chapter 2
may suggest that it is a case where financial openness has brought about an
increase of financial costs relatively to productivity, thereby imposing a bur-
den rather than stimulating economic development. The fact that the country
is characterized by the second most dynamic openness and the bottom eco-
nomic growth across sample countries might also play a role. For India, a high
and positive estimated coefficient for b2,4 can represent the potential gains in
economic development from openness, given the low level of actual openness,
which are higher than those from the effect of real interest rates, estimated by
b2,5.
Estimates for b2,5 show positive values in all countries with the exception
of India, as just discussed. The model of development of India, characterized
until very recently by high labour intensity14 and where technological progress
played only a minor role, might be one of the reasons for the negative coefficient
for b2,5. Also, as described by Arestis and Demetriades (1997), India might be
a case where the belief that "keeping down the cost of capital is good for the
economy" by introducing financial repression measures, as it was the case in
India, may not be an optimal answer to smooth out unintended consequences
of financial liberalization. By contrast Morocco - a de facto open country but
with low de jure commitment to financial openness - is the only country where
estimates for b2,5 are larger than those for b2,4, this might be because low de
jure commitment to financial openness actually weaken the effect of financial
14India has one of the lowest average capital income ratio among Low and Lower Middle
income countries and it did nor reach a capital income ratio of 2 until the 1980s.
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openness on economic development.
As far as causality is concerned, long run causality is found when weak
exogeneity of a variable with respect to a single cointegrating vector is re-
jected. Hence, if a1,2 = 0 is rejected at the conventional significance level, one
can conclude that the second cointegrating vector, which represents Economic
Development, causes the first cointegrating vector, which represents Financial
Development. Similarly, if a2,1 = 0 is rejected at the conventional significance
level, one can conclude that financial development causes economic develop-
ment. If both the hypotheses that a1,2 = 0 and a2,1 = 0 are rejected at the
conventional significance level, then one concludes that there is bi-directional
causality between economic and financial development in the long run. Table
4.11 shows that:
• Financial Development causes Economic Development in Ecuador, Fin-
land, India, Kenya and Venezuela;
• Bi-directional causality between Economic Development and Financial
Development in the Central African Republic, Ghana and Morocco.
All countries conform with the consensus view stating that financial de-
velopment does cause economic development. Bi-directional causality is more
frequently observed in countries that combine a more equal distribution of in-
come (Ghana and Morocco), either with a robust economic growth (Morocco)
or low level of financial development (Ghana).
On the other hand, financial development as a primum movens in the
finance-growth nexus is associated either with an unequal distribution of in-
come (for Ecuador, Kenya and Venezuela) or with increasing level of inequality
(India and Finland). In Kenya, a Low Income, FO country showing robust
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growth in financial development and subdued economic growth, the substan-
tial reduction in inequality form 1985 to 2000 has not been sufficient to kick
in causality from economic growth to financial development as in Ghana. This
may be a case where, as described in stage 1 of the models in Chapter 3,
distribution of income is such that a sizable share of population cannot leave
bequest, i.e. take part in the accumulation process and growth.
The fact that FC India does not support causality from economic devel-
opment to growth as FO Morocco, a similar Lower Middle Income country
showing robust growth in both financial and economic development, may be
due to increasing trend in inequality, and this according to the models in Chap-
ter 3 is not favorable to growth. Also, the seemingly counter-intuitive result
that a FC country such as India may find in financial development a cause
for economic development should consider that the financial openness is an
important driving force for financial development, but by no means the only
one; in India domestic financial liberalization of the 1990s might have played
a similar "pull" role.
4.4.2 Quality of results and the role of outliers
In order to check for robustness of the estimations, the cointegrating vec-
tors have been estimated with dynamic OLS (DOLS) as well with the same
leads and lags as the order of differentiation of the variables in the Johansen’s
methodology and with the dummy variables as exogenous regressors. Results
of DOLS estimation presented in table 4.13 show that parameter estimations
are most similar to those obtained with Johansen’s estimation technique in
countries with a single cointegrating vector, possibly because in countries that
are cointegrated of rank 2 Johansen’s methodology seems to be more in a po-
sition to take full advantage of correlations across endogenous differentiated
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and lagged variables. With DOLS estimates for b1,2 and b1,4 would not be sig-
nificative in India and Venezuela, b1,5 would not be significative in the Central
African Republic, Ghana and Kenya. b2,3 and/or b2,4 would not be significa-
tively different from zero in Central African Republic, Ghana and Morocco.
In Kenya and India b2,5 would not result significative too.
Results of the Hansen’s parameter instability test15 on DOLS confirm the
absence of parameter instability, further supporting the quality of the model
estimations.
As to the usefulness of the outlier detection and estimation procedure,
it can be directly assessed by the comparison of the results of the estimates
obtained including dummy variables and excluding them, presented in table
4.12. First of all, without dummies residuals of the estimations would not be
normally distributed in two thirds of the sample countries. Also, in Ghana and
Morocco only one of the loading factors would be significant without dummies,
none in the Central African Republic, Ecuador, Finland, India and Venezuela.
Ecuador would not pass the overidentification test and Finland and Venezuela
just barely so. Also b1,2 would not be significantly different from zero in Ghana,
Morocco and Venezuela and b1,4 would not be significantly different from zero
in Finland. It would be very difficult to have and economic interpretation for
b2,3 in the Central Africa Republic as well. Therefore it can be concluded that
the use of the dummies does increase significance of the parameters’ estimates,
15Hansen (1992) proposes the use of the LC test statistic, which arises from the the-
ory of Lagrange Multiplier tests for parameter instability, to evaluate the stability of the
parameters. The LC statistic examines time-variation in the scores from the estimated equa-
tion. Let ŝt be the vector of estimated individual score contributions from the estimated
equation, and define the partial sums, Ŝt =
t∑
τ=1
ŝτ where Ŝt = 0 by construction. Then








. For DOLS Ŝt is defined for the subset of original regressors, and G
may be computed using the method employed in computing the original coefficient standard
errors.
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allowing for meaningful comparisons among countries and groups, and in the
end improves the identification of the model. The use of the detection and
estimation procedure also allows a parsimonious use of dummies with respect to
the standard use of "rules of thumb" on observations showing excess standard
deviation, which are frequently applied in practice. The procedure therefore
saves degrees of freedom, which are precious in time series studies with low
frequency data. In this study only in Ghana, out of all sample countries,
the procedure identifies the same number of dummies as observations showing
excess volatility while the number of dummies is lower for all other countries.
Ghana is also the only country with 1 observation (year 1982) where the
outliers identified by the HBN04 Detection & Estimation procedure and those
identified by the Structural Break test overlap. This reinforces the claim that
cointegration does modify the relative relevance of breaks with respect to test-
ing single time series and should be treated with a specific technique, as the
one developed by Nielsen (2004). As an example it is useful to compare the
first section of tables 4.7 and 4.8 - showing standard deviation in excess of 2 -
with dummy coefficients at the bottom of tables 4.14 and 4.15. In the case of
Finland the first section of table 4.8 shows that years 1974 and 1991 exhibit
excess standard deviation for several endogenous variables and with opposite
signs, while 1972 show excess standard deviation just for Y P . In table 4.14
coefficients of d1 (year 1974) and d4 (1991) show 3 significative coefficients for
the variables showing excess standard deviation in table 4.8 and with compat-
ible signs. On the contrary, d3 (1972) shows 3 significative coefficients none of
which in the equation describing the short-term behavior of Y P, which showed
excess standard deviation for that year, as indicated in table 4.8.
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 aim at representing the contribution of large innovation
dummies in the first two estimated equations, namely financial development
(∆FD) and economic growth (∆Y P ). The dark shaded area represents equa-
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tions (4.6) or (4.7), depending on the rank used for estimation from tables 4.5
and 4.6, with the significative parameters reported in tables 4.14 and 4.15 net
of the short term components
k−1∑
i=1




ar,p(br,1FDt+ br,2Y Pt+ br,3KPt+ br,4OPt+
br,5RRt + br,6t+ br,0). As the innovational model aims at capturing the role of
large innovations to the system which do not modify its dynamic transmission
mechanism, their result is a shift in the equilibrium relationships within equa-
tions describing endogenous variables. The relative importance of such shift
is shown by the width of the darker shaded area and it essentially depends on
the size of the deterministic component m0, on the number of significative Dt
dummies and on the size of the estimated parameter(s) m. Ghana, Kenya and
Venezuela, which support a trend specification with no constant in the data
but only in the cointegrating relationship(s), show a very narrow darker area
representing the pure effect ofmDt, while in other countries despite the "noise"
represented by m0 it is easier to recognize the changing width of the darker
area depending on number and magnitude of significative dummies along the
estimated equilibrium relationship. This "buffer" nature of dummies aims at
smoothing the estimation results, dampening the effects of large innovations.
Ecuador, with 2 significative dummies in both ∆FD and ∆Y P equations, and
India, with 1 significative dummy in ∆FD and 4 in ∆Y P equations are exam-
ples of asymmetric impact of dummies in the different endogenous variables.
In the former country the deterministic component is not significative in the
∆Y P equation and in the latter country it is not significative in the ∆FD
equation. So Ecuador is an example of the impact of m0 as a magnifier of the
effect of dummies in ∆FD as opposed to ∆Y P, the reverse situation is true
for India, a country whose ∆Y P equation shows one of the higher number of
significative dummies (4). According to table 4.14 the estimations say that
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while the debt crisis in the 1980s in Ecuador had a negative impact on finan-
cial development and a positive one on economic growth (while the year 2000
crisis had a negative one), the austerity program of 1988 had a positive impact
on financial development and none on economic growth. As indicated in table
4.15, in India the early 1970s oil shock, as well as negative interest rates in the
same decade and disorders following the assassination of Prime Minister Indira
Ghandi in mid-1980s all have a negative impact on economic growth and only
the expansionary monetary policy of the late 1980s has a positive impact on
growth.
In no estimated equation the number of significative dummies is higher
than five, i.e. between 10% and 13% of observations in the sample size, thereby
limiting the risk of overfitting.
4.5 Discussion
The contribution that this paper aims to offer is a study of the link between
financial and economic development within a time series framework with data
extending over the Nineties and an explicit role for openness. On the one hand,
the choice of time series analysis tries to address the concerns about structural
homogeneity, i.e. parameter constancy, which has raised many reservations
in the empirical literature based on cross-section techniques, as reviewed by
Andersen and Tarp (2003). The time series approach allows the analysis on the
finance-growth nexus to be carried out for each country singularly and therefore
does not need instruments in order to take care of cross-country institutional
heterogeneity or different levels of development, both economic and financial,
as suggested by Arestis and Demetriades (1997) among others. On the other
hand, the time span of the analysis (1961-2008) has been characterized by
structural and policy changes calling for the use of dummy variables to obtain
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meaningful estimates. Hence a newly developed technique has been applied to
detect and estimate outliers and create ad hoc dummies.
Sample countries are almost equally divided between cointegrating model
of rank two and one; the single cointegrating vector model is relatively more
frequent among F inancially Closed countries. The study identifies a F inancial
Development cointegrating vector, with mostly a positive effect of income per
capita, openness and real interest rates, as well as an Output vector, for the
countries of rank two, with the positive effects of capital stock, openness and
real interest rate expected in an aggregate production function augmented by
the real effect of openness.
The estimated effect of the income per capita in the F inancialDevelopment
cointegrating vector is more widely ranged in F inancially Open countries, un-
derlining the different effects that financial openness may activate on the tra-
ditional links between economic growth and financial development. Also, more
than one third of the countries show a negative effect of income per capita on
F inancial Development, mainly due to financial repression or unequal income
distribution.
The estimated effect of openness in the F inancial Development cointegrat-
ing vector is broadly ranged with de facto financially open countries ranking
among the highest values. Within FO countries the distinction between de
facto and de jure open countries from Chapter 2 proves useful in explaining
differences in estimations across countries. Also, in most countries the effect
of openness in the F inancial Development cointegrating vector is larger than
that of the real interest rate, suggesting that once de facto openness oper-
ates, it is a stronger factor in financial development than return on financial
intermediation per se.
A negative effect of real interest rate in the F inancial Development coin-
tegrating vector is more frequently observed in FC countries, possibly due to
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the protection from international competition and/or to government subsidies.
The economic development cointegrating vector, estimated only for coun-
tries supporting 2 cointegrating vectors, shows mostly positive coefficients, in
line with the theory that capital per capita, availability of funds due to fi-
nancial openness and the real interest rate play a positive role in economic
development.
As far as causality is concerned, results in this Chapter are in line with
the consensus view that financial development causes economic growth. The
combination of openness and income distribution with dynamics of economic
and financial development comes useful for the interpretation of differences in
the direction of causality across countries sharing the same level of economic
development.
One last word on the countries that were excluded from the analysis: the
fact that they have all been grouped among FC countries and are Upper Mid-
dle or High income countries, is in itself telling about the need of further re-
search in the relationship between financial development, openness (or, rather,
lack thereof) and economic growth for developed economies. For Low-Income
Pakistan the minor role played by the banking system in providing funds to
the economy due to the extensive role of agricultural cooperatives and the
informal financial market, as mentioned by Demetriades and Hussein (1996),
might have played a major role in the exclusion.
Finally, one should underline that the sequential procedure to identify and
estimate outliers is based on the initial estimation of the cointegration rank by
Johansen’s methodology. Therefore the criticism about the sensitivity of the
latter methodology to VAR lag length by Andersen and Tarp (2003) does also
apply here.
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4.6 Appendices to Chapter 4
The Appendices cover three topics: data sources (App. 4.6.1), the outlier
detection and estimation implementation sequence (App. 4.6.2) and a sample
routine (App. 4.6.3) and diagnostic and estimation results (App. 4.6.4).
4.6.1 Data & Sources
Table 4.1: Variables and Sources
Variable Description Source
FD Credit to private sector as a percentage of
GDP
WDI (2009)
YP (Log of) real income per capita in national cur-






KP (Log of) real capital stock per capita in na-
tional currency calculated with perpetual in-
ventory formula from Easterly and Levine




OP Gross trade openness as a percentage of GDP Import, Exports
and GDP: WDI
(2009)








• for Central African Republic and Ghana inflation is measured by
the rate of growth of GDP deflator;
• for Chile nominal interest rates are measured by the rate on short term
loans from the IFS. For 1961-1976 data have been supplied by the Central
Bank of Chile;
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• for Finland and Italy nominal interest rates are measured by the Eu-
rosystem marginal lending facility rate from 1999 onwards;
• for India nominal interest rates are measured by bank rates from the
International Financial Statistics (IFS);
• for Kenya nominal interest rates are measured by lending rates from
the IFS;
• for Morocco nominal interest rate are measured by maximum export
credit rates from the IFS from 1989 to 1997.
4.6.2 Sequential implementation of routines to obtain
the HBN04 procedure in EViews 7 R©
This sequence assumes that diagnostic tests an the Johansen’s cointegration
test have given results supporting the hypothesis that the "true model" sup-
ports two cointegrating vectors.
1. Open program file my0.prg and fill in country code17, lag length and
trend specification18and run the programme. The program produces a
vector - named out - of all observations where the residual is larger than
twice the standard deviation;
2. Open program file my1.prg, fill in the usual data, add length of the
outlier vector out and run the programme. The program produces the
table ioall_nod with the tIO test for all the observations in the vector
out;
17It is a 2 character field with the first two letters of the international country code. So
Ghana would have %co="gh".
18Trend specification is "b” or “c” or “d” as described in the notes at the bottom of tables
4.8 and 4.9. So Ghana would have %tr="b".
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3. Open program filemy2.prg, fill in the usual data, add length of the out-
lier vector out and run the programme. The program produces the table
aoall_nod with the tAO test and θ estimations for all the observations
in the vector out;
4. If the largest value among tIO and tAO is t
∗
IO , then open program file
my3.prg, fill in the usual data, add length of the outlier vector out
and position of observation corresponding to t∗IO (say year yy) in the
vector out and run the programme. The program produces the tables
ioalld1_yy and aoalld1_yy with the tIO and tAO tests for all the ob-
servations in the vector out except observation (yy) and a vector out119
of all the remaining observations where the residual was originally larger
than twice the standard deviation;
5. If the largest value among tIO and tAO is t
∗
AO , then amend observation at
year yy with the estimated θ or a linear interpolation of the previous and
following observation and amend the original vector out taking away the
year where the data correction has been made. Create manually a new
(i.e. shorter) version of vector out. Then open program file my3.prg,
fill in the usual data, add the length of the new outlier vector out and
position of observation corresponding to the largest t∗IO (say year yy) in
the new vector out and run the programme on the amended data set.
The program produces the tables ioalld1_yy and aoalld1_yy with the
tIO and tAO tests for all the observations in the vector out except obser-
vation (yy) and a vector out1 of all the remaining observations where
the residual was originally larger than twice the standard deviation;
6. Run programs subsequently starting from my4.prg, filling in the usual
19As shown in table 4.11 yy for Ghana is year 2000 hence the first dummy is d1_00.
Vector out1 for Ghana will include 1971, 1975, 1982, 1983, 1984 and 1993.
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data, the length of the out(n+1) vector resulting from the previous
routine and the position of the observation showing the largest tIO or
test the amended data if the largest statistic is of AO-type. Repeat this
step until there are no more observations with significative test values20
or until the number of dummy variables has reached 7.
After here continue with standard cointegration analysis and related tests.
4.6.3 Eviews 7 R© Program to detect and estimate the
second Outlier for Ghana once an IO-type outlier
has already been found for year 2000













’set length of vector out1
!e=6







group gr %one %two %three %four %five
’+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
20As shown in the final section of table 4.11, for Ghana all outliers are to be considered
significative.
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’STEP 1: calculate t0
smpl s1
%ob =@otod(out1(!d,1))






var v1.ec(%tr, %r) %b %z gr @ %first %it
scalar llk%it = v1.@logl
’STEP 2: calculate t_io values
smpl s1
for !i = 1 to !d-1
%obs =@otod(out1(!i,1))






’io test for every observation
var v1.ec(%tr, %r) %b %z gr @ %first %it d%name







setcell (ioall%it,!i+1,3,-2*(llk%it - llk%name))
delete v1
’+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
’STEP 3: calculate theta and t_ao
’create a beginning for a counter of iterations starting at zero
%zero="_"+@str(0)
’convert endogenous variables to matrix endo0
stom(gr,endo0)
var ve0.ec(%tr, %r) %b %z gr @ %first %it
ve0.makeresids r_cr r_yc r_kc r_op r_rr
group res0 r_cr r_yc r_kc r_op r_rr
matrix err0=@convert(res0)
matrix omega0 = @cov(res0)
scalar llk%name%zero = ve0.@logl





























’ !p, !q and !u are counters of endo variables
for !u =1 to 5
’ !rp is a counter of the rank
for !rp =1 to !r







for !p =1 to 5







for !p =1 to 5







for !p =1 to 5








for !p =1 to 5











matrix hk0=gamma1%name%zero - gamma2%name%zero
matrix hw0=gamma2%name%zero - gamma3%name%zero
matrix hz0=gamma3%name%zero - gamma4%name%zero
matrix hy0=gamma4%name%zero






’multiply components of matrix H times lagged errors
’–––––––-
If !l=1 then






if !l =2 then







if !l =3 then








if !l =4 then







































’create iteration counter !s and convergence measure !t
!s=0
!t=100
while !s<999 and !t>0.0001
’–––––-
’create labels to count iterations on the same dummy
%old="_"+@str(!s)
%new="_"+@str(!s+1)
’create new endogenous variable X(t) = Y(t) - theta*D





’create label to count iterations on the same dummy
%c=%name+%new
’and move new endogenous variable to group gr%c
mtos(endo%name%new,gr%c)
’start new iteration to estimate theta
var v%c.ec(%tr, %r) %b %z gr%c @ %first %it
v%c.makeresids r_1 r_2 r_3 r_4 r_5
group res%c r_1 r_2 r_3 r_4 r_5
matrix err%c=@convert(res%c)























matrix beta%c = away*betafull%c






for !u =1 to 5







for !p =1 to 5






for !p =1 to 5







for !p =1 to 5
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for !p =1 to 5












matrix hk%c =gamma1%c- gamma2%c
matrix hw%c =gamma2%c - gamma3%c













if !l =2 then









if !l =3 then









if !l =4 then




































’calculate the norm - i.e. is the largest column sum in a matrix and no
element in a matrix can exceed that of the norm - as the measure for
convergence of theta between the latest two iterations
scalar conv%c=@norm(theta%c-theta%name%old)
































































’io test for every observation
var v1.ec(%tr, %r) %b %z gr @ %first %it d%name







setcell (ioall%it,!i+1,3,-2*(llk%it - llk%name))
delete v1
’delete llk??
’create a beginning for a counter of iterations starting at zero
%zero="_"+@str(0)
’convert endogenous variables to matrix endo0
stom(gr,endo0)
smpl s1
var ve0.ec(%tr, %r) %b %z gr @ %first %it
ve0.makeresids r_cr r_yc r_kc r_op r_rr
group res0 r_cr r_yc r_kc r_op r_rr
matrix err0=@convert(res0)
matrix omega0 = @cov(res0)
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scalar llk%name%zero = ve0.@logl




























’ !p, !q and !u are counters of endo variables
for !u =1 to 5
’ !rp is a counter of the rank
for !rp =1 to !r







for !p =1 to 5







for !p =1 to 5







for !p =1 to 5








for !p =1 to 5











matrix hk0=gamma1%name%zero - gamma2%name%zero
matrix hw0=gamma2%name%zero - gamma3%name%zero
matrix hz0=gamma3%name%zero- gamma4%name%zero
matrix hy0=gamma4%name%zero




























































’create iteration counter !s and convergence measure !t
!s=0
!t=100
while !s<999 and !t>0.0001
’–––––-
’create labels to count iterations on the same dummy
%old="_"+@str(!s)
%new="_"+@str(!s+1)
’create new endogenous variable X(t) = Y(t) - theta*D





’create label to count iterations on the same dummy
%c=%name+%new
’and move new endogenous variable to group gr%c
mtos(endo%name%new,gr%c)
’start new iteration to estimate theta
var v%c.ec(%tr, %r) %b %z gr%c @ %first %it
v%c.makeresids r_1 r_2 r_3 r_4 r_5
group res%c r_1 r_2 r_3 r_4 r_5
matrix err%c=@convert(res%c)






























for !u =1 to 5







for !p =1 to 5






for !p =1 to 5







for !p =1 to 5








for !p =1 to 5













matrix hk%c =gamma1%c- gamma2%c
matrix hw%c =gamma2%c - gamma3%c













if !l =2 then








if !l =3 then









if !l =4 then
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’calculate the norm - i.e. is the largest column sum in a matrix and no ele-
ment in a matrix can exceed that of the norm - as the measure for convergence
of theta between the latest two iterations
scalar conv%c=@norm(theta%c-theta%name%old)













































































’STEP 5: create new out2 vector
vector(!e-1) out2














4.6.4 Diagnostic and estimation results
Table 4.2: Some Summary Statistics by Country




2000 C(Y,FD) C(DY,FD) C(OP,FD) C(DOP,FD)
Central Afr. Rep. 410       L 13.9 7.03 1.4% -0.8% 51.90  1961 2008 47 0.85 0.13 0.89 -0.01 
Chile 9,370    UM 8.66 88.53 4.4% 2.7% 48.25  1961 2007 46 54.91 56.90 0.75 0.17 0.84 -0.06 
Ecuador 3,690    LM 18.1 27.12 4.0% 1.6% 51.80  1970 2008 38 44.40 56.00 0.35 -0.24 0.04 0.01
Finland 47,600  H 45.1 82.01 3.4% 3.0% 56.12  1961 2007 46 22.40 28.00 0.72 -0.46 0.39 0.08
Ghana 630       L 5.78 17.79 2.9% 0.3% 50.70  1961 2006 45 35.30 40.70 0.69 0.30 0.79 -0.12 
India 1,040    LM 14.7 50.36 5.1% 3.0% 18.38  1963 2008 45 32.00 36.00 0.86 0.48 0.86 0.32
Italy 35,460  H 71.9 101.79 2.8% 2.5% 41.74  1965 2007 42 32.50 35.80 0.30 -0.20 0.43 0.25
Kenya 730       L 12.7 26.40 4.7% 1.3% 59.79  1967 2008 41 57.00 44.50 0.90 -0.26 -0.20 0.05
Morocco 2,520    LM 25.5 79.50 4.5% 2.2% 52.60  1961 2008 47 39.70 39.40 0.97 0.03 0.93 0.22
Pakistan 950       L 25.7 29.38 5.3% 2.5% 32.50  1967 2007 40 28.40 29.60 0.44 0.07 0.03 0.23
Peru 3,990    UM 16.6 25.09 3.6% 1.3% 35.94  1961 2008 47 42.70 49.33 0.34 0.03 0.17 0.16
Venezuela 9,230    UM 28.6 21.52 3.1% 0.4% 47.85  1962 2008 46 44.90 45.80 0.23 -0.18 -0.20 -0.02 
C(Y, FD) = correlation between the level of financial development and the level of real per capita income.
C(DY,FD) = correlation between the level of financial development and the rate of growth of real per capita income.
C(OP, FD) = correlation between the level of financial openness and the level of real per capita income.
C(DY,FD) = correlation between the rate of growth of financial openness and level of financial development.
DYP = average annual percentage growth rate of real per capita income during the sample period.
AOP = financial openness as measured by imports plus exports as a percentage of GDP average for the sample period.
Obs = number of annual observations.
Gini = coefficient that measures the area between the 45-degree line and the Lorenz curve, divided by 1/2, the total area under the 45-degree line. The Gini 
coefficient will be equal to 0 when the distribution is equal and equal to 100 when all the income is owned by a single person. Source UNU-WIDER.
WB Classification: The country groups by GNI are: Low income countries, (GNI of US$975 or less); Lower Middle income countries, (GNI between US$976 and 
US$3,885); Upper Middle income countries, (GNI between US$3,886 and $11,905); and High income countries (GNI above US$11,906).
IFD = financial development as measured by credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP at the initial (i.e., first) year of the sample period.
ENDFD = financial development at the end (i.e. final) year of the sample period.
DFD = average annual percentage growth rate of financial development during the sample period.
NOTES
GNI = Real per capita Gross National Income in current US dollar (Atlas method) for the year 2008; obtained from World Development Report, 2009.
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 FD – credit to the private sector as % of GDP (LHS) 
 OP – imports plus exports as a % of GDP (LHS) 
 RR – real interest rate – RHS  
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Figure 4.2: Financial Development and Openness - FO countries






















































































































































 FD – credit to the private sector as % of GDP (LHS) 
 OP – imports plus exports as a % of GDP (LHS) 
 RR – real interest rate – RHS  
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FD 2 -1.18 47 0.76 ** -4.37 1977 D(FD) -2.69 ** 0.08
YP 2 0.66 47 0.82 ** -3.48 1970 D(YP) -3.16 * 0.27
KP 2 0.46 47 0.83 ** -3.04 1990 D(KP) -2.16 0.31
OP 2 -0.09 47 0.84 ** -3.42 1970 D(OP) -4.43 * 0.16
RR 2 -2.93 ** 47 0.19 -5.85 1972 * D(RR) -4.48 * 0.28
INDIA
FD 3 0.24 44 0.71 ** -2.91 1987 D(FD) -1.12 0.18
YP 3 3.02 44 0.81 ** -0.83 1970 D(YP) -2.38 0.79 **
KP 3 1.92 44 0.84 ** -2.12 2003 D(KP) 1.24 0.78 **
OP 3 2.56 44 0.74 ** -1.82 2002 D(OP) -0.44 0.57 **
RR 3 -4.72 * 44 0.36 * -8.54 1973 * D(RR) -4.87 * 0.19
ITALY
FD 2 0.00 43 0.26 -2.06 1997 D(FD) -2.00 0.34
YP 2 -3.72 * 43 0.81 ** -2.76 2001 D(YP) -2.69 ** 0.75 **
KP 2 -4.12 * 43 0.79 ** -4.76 1971 D(KP) -1.13 0.70 **
OP 2 -0.87 43 0.61 ** -4.41 1984 D(OP) -3.26 * 0.11
RR 2 -1.40 43 0.30 -3.37 1979 D(RR) -2.94 * 0.08
PAKISTAN
FD 2 -2.39 41 0.11 -3.02 1971 D(FD) -4.10 * 0.21
YP 2 -0.16 41 0.78 ** -3.14 1995 D(YP) -2.81 ** 0.09
KP 2 -0.11 41 0.78 ** -3.58 1977 D(KP) -2.08 0.13
OP 2 -2.71 ** 41 0.48 ** -4.59 1970 D(OP) -4.29 * 0.13
RR 2 -2.52 41 0.38 * -4.05 1976 D(RR) -4.57 * 0.20
PERU
FD 3 -1.69 48 0.40 * -4.63 1994 D(FD) -3.10 * 0.07
YP 3 -0.99 48 0.16 -3.32 1986 D(YP) -3.50 * 0.20
KP 3 -1.41 48 0.64 ** -4.18 1987 D(KP) -2.69 ** 0.15
OP 3 -0.93 48 0.14 -2.31 2003 D(OP) -3.17 * 0.39 *
RR 3 -3.11 * 48 0.13 -14.9 1991 * D(RR) -5.04 * 0.50 **
VENEZUELA
3b FD 3 -1.20 47 0.26 -5.00 1987 * D(FD) -2.21 0.31
YP 3 -1.80 47 0.57 ** -3.07 1981 D(YP) -2.57 0.16
KP 3 -2.08 47 0.21 -3.18 1987 D(KP) -1.75 0.40 *
OP 3 -2.42 47 0.45 * -4.24 1995 D(OP) -3.15 * 0.04
RR 3 -4.30 * 47 0.17 -6.48 2000 * D(RR) -6.17 * 0.17
NOTES
(i)   Lag is for variables in level.








** and * indicate rejection of H(0) at 10% and 5% significance level respectively.




(iv) SBT is Sequential Break test for IO model 1 from Perron (1997) and the common lag. 
H(0) for SBT is no-break unit root. SBT critical value is: -5.23 (5% level). 
(ii)  H(0) for ADF test: Series has a unit root. ADF test is calculated with the lag set in 
coloumn 2.
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FD 2 -2.20 41 0.68 ** -3.03 2000 D(FD) -5.41 * 0.39 *
YP 2 -0.91 41 0.74 ** -3.48 1988 D(YP) -3.73 * 0.11
KP 2 0.43 41 0.78 ** -4.41 1998 D(KP) -2.95 * 0.31
OP 2 -1.67 41 0.74 ** -3.54 1985 D(OP) -4.67 * 0.11
RR 2 -2.34 41 0.42 * -5.45 1984 * D(RR) -5.56 * 0.23
ECUADOR
FD 2 -2.39 39 0.19 -3.25 1986 D(FD) -2.49 0.05
YP 2 -1.84 39 0.67 ** -5.24 2002 * D(YP) -2.70 ** 0.17
KP 2 -2.47 39 0.72 ** -4.58 1973 D(KP) -1.70 0.47 **
OP 2 -2.14 39 0.48 ** -3.06 1985 D(OP) -3.21 * 0.07
RR 2 -2.92 ** 39 0.12 -3.66 1992 D(RR) -4.64 * 0.26
FINLAND
FD 1 -1.60 47 0.58 ** -4.33 1990 D(FD) -2.43 0.07
YP 1 -1.08 47 0.87 ** -5.83 1988 * D(YP) -4.41 * 0.15
KP 1 -1.49 47 0.82 ** -4.25 1989 D(KP) -2.88 ** 0.43 *
OP 1 -0.35 47 0.73 ** -3.89 1983 D(OP) -4.80 * 0.14
RR 1 -2.64 ** 47 0.30 -3.82 1981 D(RR) -5.55 * 0.17
GHANA
FD 2 0.34 46 0.28 -2.27 1970 D(FD) -2.83 ** 0.40 *
YP 2 -1.23 46 0.26 -2.92 1973 D(YP) -3.14 * 0.38 *
KP 2 -1.21 46 0.20 -1.75 1974 D(KP) -0.66 0.43 *
OP 2 0.08 46 0.50 ** -3.43 1974 D(OP) -3.04 * 0.43 *
RR 2 -1.59 46 0.22 -4.49 1982 D(RR) -5.01 * 0.05
KENYA
FD 1 -2.57 42 0.42 * -3.10 1976 D(FD) -5.68 * 0.24
YP 1 -2.87 ** 42 0.50 ** -7.20 1969 * D(YP) -4.35 * 0.31
KP 1 -3.30 * 42 0.62 ** -3.52 1990 D(KP) -1.72 0.62 **
OP 1 -3.01 * 42 0.12 -3.51 1980 D(OP) -5.64 * 0.14
RR 1 -2.39 42 0.20 -3.77 1992 D(RR) -5.14 * 0.12
MOROCCO
FD 3 1.43 48 0.91 ** -2.69 2005 D(FD) -0.54 0.38 *
YP 3 -0.08 48 0.90 ** -3.76 1990 D(YP) -4.14 * 0.09
KP 3 -1.53 48 0.87 ** -4.11 1972 D(KP) -1.83 0.21
OP 3 0.48 48 0.82 ** -3.78 2005 D(OP) -3.38 * 0.31
RR 3 -1.66 48 0.30 -3.31 1985 D(RR) -3.53 * 0.09
NOTES
(i)   Lag is for variables in level.








** and * indicate rejection of H(0) at 10% and 5% significance level respectively.




(iv) SBT is Sequential Break test for IO model 1 from Perron (1997) and the common lag. 
H(0) for SBT is no-break unit root. SBT critical value is: -5.23 (5% level). 
(ii)  H(0) for ADF test: Series has a unit root. ADF test is calculated with the lag set in 
coloumn 2.
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Table 4.5: Johansen’s Cointegration Test - FC countries
 LM(iii) h+1 p-val
JB(iv) df p-val
CHILE 0.59 102.4 0% ** 39.63 1% **
2b 0.49 62.73 1% ** 29.76 4% ** 29.91  3 23%
0.38 32.97 9% * 20.72 8% * 66.17  10 0%
0.16 12.25 43% 7.86 56%
0.09 4.39 36% 4.39 36%
INDIA 0.59 87.44 0% ** 35.81 3% **
3c 0.49 51.63 2% ** 27.26 5.5% * 16.85  4 89%
0.30 24.38 19% 14.45 33% 7.95    10 63%
0.18 9.92 29% 7.99 38%
0.05 1.93 16% 1.93 16%
ITALY 0.70 117.30 0% ** 48.08 0% **
2d 0.55 69.22 2% ** 32.39 5% ** 26.91  3 36%
0.31 36.83 18% 14.97 64% 34.88  10 0%
0.26 21.87 15% 12.27 39%
0.21 9.60 15% 9.60 15%
PAKISTAN 0.77 115.80 0% ** 55.23 0% **
2d 0.48 60.57 9% * 25.18 28% 13.14  3 96%
0.35 35.39 23% 16.61 49% 4.10    10 94%
0.27 18.79 29% 11.93 42%
0.17 6.86 36% 6.86 36%
PERU 0.80 127.44 0% ** 69.79 0% **
3b 0.59 57.65 2% ** 38.83 0% ** 33.36  4 12%
0.24 18.82 80% 12.27 63% 8.62    10 57%
0.11 6.56 92% 4.88 90%
0.04 1.67 84% 1.67 84%
VENEZUELA 0.71 104.89 0% ** 52.67 0% **
3b 0.39 52.22 7% * 21.60 30% 18.16  4 84%
0.32 30.62 14% 16.35 27% 20.84  10 2%
0.20 14.27 27% 9.65 37%
0.10 4.61 33% 4.61 33%
NOTES
(i)   Lag is in VEC i.e. for differentiated variables. Trend assumptions:
(ii) MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values











(iii) VEC Residual Serial Correlation LM Test. H0: no residual autocorrelations at 
lag h+1 where  (h+1) = lag((VEC) +1). Prob from chi-square with 25 df.
b = No deterministic trend in the data, and an intercept but no trend in the 
cointegrating equation 
c = Linear trend in the data, and an intercept but no trend in the cointegrating 
equation  
d = Linear trend in the data, and both an intercept and a trend in the cointegrating 
equation 
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Table 4.6: Johansen’s Cointegration Test - FO countries
 LM(iii) h+1 p-val
JB(iv) df p-val
CEN. AF. REP. 0.65 102.4 0% ** 39.69 3% **
2d 0.55 62.75 4% ** 30.38 8% * 19.19  3 79%
0.38 32.37 37% 18.37 35% 10.90  10 37%
0.24 14.01 66% 10.53 56%
0.09 3.48 82% 3.48 82%
ECUADOR 0.72 107.3 0% ** 45.90 1% **
2d 0.59 61.39 8% * 32.28 5.1% * 15.86  3 92%
0.27 29.11 56% 11.56 90% 24.50  10 1%
0.26 17.54 38% 10.99 51%
0.17 6.55 39% 6.55 39%
FINLAND 0.57 72.68 3% ** 37.55 2% **
1c 0.34 35.13 44% 18.97 42% 17.82  2 85%
0.19 16.16 70% 9.75 77% 147.3  10 0%
0.13 6.41 65% 6.12 60%
0.01 0.29 59% 0.29 59%
GHANA 0.61 94.24 0% ** 40.30 1% **
2b 0.44 53.94 4.8% ** 24.75 14% 23.64  3 54%
0.30 29.20 19% 15.64 32% 42.49  10 0%
0.19 13.56 32% 9.06 43%
0.10 4.50 34% 4.50 34%
KENYA 0.60 100.86 0% ** 36.22 3% **
1b 0.54 64.65 0% ** 31.40 2% ** 22.21  2 62%
0.40 33.25 8% * 20.74 8% * 21.27  10 2%
0.18 12.50 40% 8.11 53%
0.10 4.39 36% 4.39 36%
MOROCCO 0.66 100.60 0% ** 47.70 0% **
3c 0.41 52.90 2% ** 23.55 15% 24.08  4 51%
0.30 29.35 6% * 15.44 26% 15.65  10 11%
0.20 13.91 9% * 9.65 24%
0.09 4.26 4% ** 4.26 4% **
NOTES
(i)   Lag is in VEC i.e. for differentiated variables. Trend assumptions:
(ii) MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values











(iii) VEC Residual Serial Correlation LM Test. H0: no residual autocorrelations at 
lag h+1 where  (h+1) = lag((VEC) +1). Prob from chi-square with 25 df.
b = No deterministic trend in the data, and an intercept but no trend in the 
cointegrating equation 
c = Linear trend in the data, and an intercept but no trend in the cointegrating 
equation  
d = Linear trend in the data, and both an intercept and a trend in the cointegrating 
equation 
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Table 4.7: Outlier Detetection and Estimation - FC countries
Year FD YP KP OP RR AO AO
CHILE: (Rank = 2, Lag = 2, Trend = b)
1966 -0.19 2.20 1.56 0.37 -0.51 9.65 3.99 9.24 6.86 7.51 0.62 9.13 4.20 10.23 3.57
1971 -0.82 1.85 0.59 -2.54 -0.91 22.74 * 10.46 14.67 21.96 * 14.89 23.24 * 17.25 23.15 * 19.07 19.73
1973 0.38 -1.72 -2.59 1.01 -4.56 67.60 * 2.10 d1_73
1978 1.28 -0.85 0.38 -1.59 2.46 27.18 * 5.46 22.59 * 3.95 25.77 * 0.07 d3_78
1982 3.89 -2.42 -1.80 0.09 0.02 60.98 * 15.35 59.84 * 11.74 d2_82
1993 1.14 0.82 2.22 -1.54 0.61 16.93 5.01 12.11 7.14 14.83 0.09 25.79 * 7.46 d4_93
1999 -0.16 -1.66 -2.14 -0.19 -0.28 7.91 0.59 9.08 8.38 15.14 5.94 16.67 4.94 16.93 3.44
INDIA: (Rank = 2, Lag = 3, Trend = c)
1974 -0.08 -1.82 -0.07 1.06 -3.38 37.35 * 3.18 d1_74
1976 0.77 -1.07 -0.33 0.32 2.11 23.92 * 6.66 32.01 * 7.36 d2_76
1978 -0.17 0.18 -0.76 -0.56 2.14 15.78 5.71 19.62 12.19 16.53 4.91 15.80 13.01 13.49 5.36
1984 1.49 -2.94 -1.48 -0.07 0.19 24.58 * 19.21 27.42 * 26.94 * 26.90 * 12.86 24.24 * 4.82 d4_84
1988 0.59 2.75 1.00 0.06 0.46 23.05 * 15.93 23.59 * 16.01 27.65 * 14.79 d3_88
1989 -2.36 0.90 -1.10 -0.50 1.37 21.43 * 3.70 22.82 * 4.03 23.92 * 3.60 22.20 * 2.82 14.96 1.94
ITALY: (Rank = 2, Lag = 2, Trend = d)
1970 0.14 2.06 1.71 0.49 0.66 7.76 8.56 10.13 15.12 12.83 17.56 12.83 18.64 11.72 17.50 16.23 21.25 * 70_ yc
1973 0.76 -0.15 0.19 -2.00 0.28 11.87 5.50 18.51 3.55 19.30 4.55 19.24 3.73 17.35 2.76 20.14 * 4.80 28.92 * 6.80 d6_73
1974 -1.43 0.92 2.26 1.35 -2.67 39.27 * 7.29 d1_74
1981 -0.60 -0.21 -0.12 1.19 2.75 20.39 8.99 15.20 5.08 15.62 1.60 17.55 5.55 22.28 * 10.12 d5_81
1986 -0.08 0.53 -0.58 -2.84 -1.15 17.42 15.49 18.13 11.95 19.04 -5.87 21.30 * 0.23 d4_86
1993 -0.02 -3.20 -2.46 0.78 -1.73 28.10 * 5.84 30.79 * 7.84 26.76 * 4.19 d3_93
1999 3.59 0.60 0.89 -0.59 -0.35 32.33 * 12.17 35.28 * 12.32 d2_99
PAKISTAN: (Rank = 1, Lag=2, Trend =d)
1992 0.52 1.51 2.71 0.62 -0.63 11.99 5.73 12.64 7.90
1996 1.30 -0.32 -0.26 1.28 2.10 9.55 11.40 10.15 12.24
1997 -0.71 -1.96 -2.16 -0.17 -0.23 9.68 6.77 11.66 0.27
2004 2.29 1.30 -0.33 -1.45 -0.26 25.36 * 8.64 d1_04
PERU: (Rank = 2, Lag = 3, Trend = b)
1970 0.90 -0.36 -2.56 -0.34 -0.71 21.29 * 9.27 17.89 0.71 26.01 * 0.95 34.13 * 1.08 d4_70
1974 -0.75 2.48 2.79 2.13 1.25 16.40 4.31 13.00 0.27 16.77 9.38 15.72 10.12 23.17 * 13.94 26.72 * 12.66 d6_74
1979 0.34 -0.21 0.61 2.35 0.95 14.74 8.55 17.67 2.05 16.52 5.09 15.43 1.80 16.26 19.27 19.57 7.22 18.86 6.61
1980 1.93 -2.50 0.05 0.18 -0.67 14.35 8.83 18.65 6.99 11.91 9.88 18.88 9.85 23.33 * 10.82 d5_80
1984 1.49 2.07 1.59 0.51 0.95 35.23 * 7.37 29.95 * 9.72 29.06 * 6.87 d3_84
1988 2.17 -1.02 2.17 1.83 -0.93 43.54 * 0.74 51.47 * 0.93 d2_88
1989 -0.97 -1.28 -1.50 -1.33 -2.05 54.14 * 0.01 d1_89
1998 1.84 -0.99 -0.18 -2.27 -0.07 19.85 5.67 20.06 5.45 22.32 * 5.81 22.19 * 8.35 22.38 * 9.59 21.13 * 7.15 19.74 6.78
VENEZUELA: (Rank = 1, Lag = 3, Trend = b)
1974 -2.15 -0.95 -1.58 2.81 -0.53 15.29 17.2 15.25 3.52 25.11 * 3.90 32.36 * 7.73 d4_74
1975 0.44 -0.94 0.86 -0.26 -2.20 25.83 * 2.86 20.33 * 0.77 19.16 0.15 21.21 * 0.01 24.86 * 1.00 23.59 * 0.92 d6_75
1983 -0.28 -0.94 -2.33 -2.97 0.58 35.10 * 23.89 * 35.14 * 18.08 34.95 * 17.08 d3_83
1989 -3.51 -3.36 -2.69 1.39 -1.42 36.59 * 18.94 37.64 * 3.52 d2_89
1993 -0.08 -0.49 -0.80 -0.56 2.18 14.60 11.13 10.33 8.79 13.51 8.12 11.93 6.16 12.43 8.89 11.43 1.13 17.14 3.53
1995 0.77 0.11 0.81 -2.32 1.01 13.62 11.76 16.49 9.08 15.31 12.10 15.06 11.90 35.40 * 21.13 * d5_95
1996 1.08 0.66 0.02 1.08 -2.57 50.19 * 6.08 d1_96
NOTES
Chi. Sq = critical value calculated with the Bonferroni inequality to ensure an overall type I error probability below 5%.
* indicates 5% significance with respect to critical value ranging from 19.94 for Pakistan to 20.31 for Peru.
IO IO IO AO
Lag is in VEC i.e. for differentiated variables. Trend assumptions: b = no deterministic trend in the data, and an intercept but no trend in the cointegrating equation; c = 
linear trend in the data, and an intercept but no trend in the cointegrating equation; d = linear trend in the data, and both an intercept and a trend in the cointegrating 
equation.
IO (AO) = likelihood ratio test obtained by the ratio of the likelihood of the ECM model with all dummies detected up to iteration n and that at iteration n-1 or no dummies 
at the iteration 0.
Iteration 4 Iteration 5 Iteration 6Excess standard dev Iteration 1 Iteration 2 Iteration 3Iteration 0 TotalIOAOIOIO AOAO IO AO
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Table 4.8: Outlier Detetection and Estimation - FO countries
Year FD YP KP OP RR AO AO
CEN. AF. REP.: (Rank = 2, Lag = 2, Trend = d)
1974 2.92 0.86 0.74 1.15 0.55 30.69 * 14.22 29.97 * 21.06 * d2_74
1980 2.31 -1.87 -2.15 2.25 -0.55 21.04 * 2.07 19.31 8.81 31.61 * 8.49 25.97 * 11.41 d4_80
1983 0.45 -2.05 -0.64 -0.41 1.07 10.94 2.01 15.86 1.61 19.46 1.71 23.08 * 1.92 23.82 * 0.30 28.02 * 0.45 d6_83
1992 -1.25 -2.08 -0.37 -0.62 0.67 10.73 6.97 7.91 5.47 8.08 12.73 9.21 0.03 11.55 4.09 11.17 4.03 13.59 4.66
1994 -0.52 1.13 -0.17 2.75 -3.67 25.95 * 13.21 28.28 * 9.73 38.95 * 16.44 d3_94
1996 -0.02 -1.26 -2.47 -0.66 1.08 31.13 * 27.13 * d1_96
2000 0.38 0.43 -0.46 2.32 -2.03 11.85 2.62 12.48 4.32 18.69 7.18 25.92 * 13.61 27.39 * 6.88 d5_00
2003 0.28 -2.24 -1.81 -0.48 0.54 9.30 6.54 11.43 4.56 17.36 5.45 15.35 7.09 20.29 * 7.06 24.78 * 9.85 32.61 * 11.79 d7_03
ECUADOR: (Rank = 1, Lag = 2, Trend = d)
1973 -1.13 1.11 -0.31 -1.04 2.13 19.11 3.17 16.91 1.14 19.37 1.88 18.16 2.75 16.30 3.70 10.25 3.26
1983 3.00 -1.95 -1.54 -0.38 -0.59 17.55 4.10 25.99 * 8.50 24.32 * 9.89 d3_83
1988 -2.58 1.55 1.21 0.12 -0.43 29.54 * 12.09 40.94 * 10.82 d2_88
1993 0.99 -0.70 0.10 -2.46 -0.56 22.18 * 10.23 22.09 * 10.70 22.21 * 9.91 23.76 * 8.64 24.98 * 9.84 d5_93
1999 0.55 -3.11 -3.52 1.53 -0.81 30.85 * 4.68 22.19 * 8.51 20.43 * 6.63 32.14 * 4.31 d4_99
2000 0.15 -0.92 0.49 1.70 -3.15 61.23 * 10.55 d1_00
FINLAND: (Rank = 1, Lag = 1, Trend = c)
1964 0.03 0.74 0.73 0.54 -2.76 20.16 13.61 21.35 * 15.00 22.17 * 16.06 22.09 * 18.40 22.83 * 16.38 d5_64
1968 -1.62 -0.31 -0.03 0.86 -2.16 8.65 7.84 9.87 7.96 11.47 3.46 13.60 3.54 12.90 3.13 21.52 * 6.59 20.14 4.66
1969 1.09 2.70 0.96 0.54 2.47 23.81 * 6.70 24.42 * 8.77 d2_69
1972 -1.13 2.99 1.43 1.61 0.36 19.17 12.46 19.60 2.83 28.46 * 4.88 d3_72
1974 -1.12 -0.91 3.15 2.58 -2.92 40.20 * 13.40 d1_74
1976 -1.16 -0.41 -2.09 0.04 0.67 12.56 3.24 12.79 6.45 13.81 5.51 14.38 7.36 14.94 7.56 14.25 6.84 14.62 7.29
1986 -0.23 -0.14 -0.53 -2.10 0.75 7.37 2.79 9.16 3.41 9.83 3.37 10.07 3.52 10.03 3.32 9.92 2.87 12.47 3.96
1991 2.11 -3.28 -2.37 -0.82 0.62 19.98 4.32 20.09 5.17 21.22 * 4.84 24.59 * 6.48 d4_91
2000 -0.68 0.37 0.18 2.85 -0.02 14.40 10.57 16.68 15.53 17.31 15.60 19.96 17.71 21.43 * 18.37 23.13 * 18.06 d6_00
2001 1.02 -0.73 -1.21 -2.03 0.40 7.76 3.23 9.88 3.63 9.11 3.17 10.84 3.00 10.76 3.35 9.45 2.11 11.12 3.55
GHANA: (Rank = 2, Lag = 2, Trend = b)
1971 3.16 -0.03 -0.23 -1.31 -0.42 21.88 * 12.06 24.66 * 13.21 21.23 * 11.89 25.22 * 16.87 27.46 * 17.88 d5_71
1975 -0.37 -2.65 -0.61 1.18 -0.79 15.99 5.63 15.13 4.77 14.71 4.11 19.62 6.28 20.91 * 9.40 21.85 * 8.84 25.52 * 8.63 d7_75
1982 0.99 -2.43 -0.29 -0.17 1.61 19.81 3.03 20.29 * 5.03 17.86 8.58 23.70 * 4.19 24.15 * 3.56 24.51 * 3.89 d6_82
1983 -0.08 -2.12 -0.81 0.27 -3.08 29.74 * 16.87 39.40 * 23.17 * d2_83
1984 1.31 1.40 2.00 0.96 2.39 24.34 * 0.98 24.83 * 1.66 43.18 * 11.38 d3_84
1993 -0.27 0.99 3.31 0.70 0.13 26.27 * 9.32 28.34 * 8.51 26.73 * 8.29 28.21 * 7.90 d4_93
2000 0.91 -0.92 -0.28 3.41 -0.66 35.28 * 15.78 d1_00
KENYA: (Rank = 2, Lag = 1, Trend = b)
1970 0.24 -2.62 0.50 0.09 0.27 29.91 * 22.91 * 33.75 * 7.60 d2_70
1971 0.45 3.44 2.40 0.32 -1.73 38.05 * 2.61 d1_71
1974 -0.27 -0.61 -0.13 2.76 -0.23 18.10 15.75 19.56 17.38 19.56 18.48 29.77 * 23.27 * d4_74
1978 2.03 -0.31 2.46 0.65 -0.78 16.57 17.43 20.36 * 14.88 24.43 * 21.05 * 21.89 * 12.77 26.58 * 10.39 d5_78
1979 -0.42 -1.16 -2.31 -1.32 0.59 10.90 6.45 7.73 4.26 11.49 6.97 15.35 8.33 12.40 8.45 10.67 7.48 13.93 9.60
1983 -0.34 -0.64 -0.07 -1.36 2.04 9.06 9.08 8.82 11.19 10.07 10.87 8.80 9.58 9.68 11.42 10.13 15.28 9.78 8.77
1985 1.68 0.74 2.09 -0.56 -0.08 8.50 6.07 12.92 7.11 13.16 6.52 14.60 7.08 13.50 11.58 20.40 * 16.41 d6_85
1993 -2.65 -0.23 0.08 3.34 -1.09 32.70 * 6.00 32.83 * 5.27 33.95 * 5.20 d3_93
MOROCCO: (Rank = 2, Lag = 3, Trend = c)
1967 -0.80 1.07 2.13 -0.23 -0.26 8.74 3.15 8.22 3.39 7.89 2.29 19.03 0.40
1970 -1.99 0.35 2.47 0.21 0.62 20.19 * 6.12 18.88 3.21 20.66 * 0.00 18.63 7.62
1974 0.02 -0.51 0.96 3.30 -3.88 41.94 * 8.63 d1_74
1983 -0.11 -1.22 -2.16 -1.68 1.53 10.99 1.78 14.45 2.55 15.04 2.25 14.78 0.20
1994 -1.91 2.45 1.12 -0.95 -0.32 25.86 * 5.37 25.46 * 4.07 31.66 * 5.39 d3_94
2004 -2.54 1.42 0.14 -1.02 -0.25 15.70 13.60 15.70 8.83 17.11 7.57 15.75 12.95
2007 3.21 0.34 0.18 -0.54 -0.16 29.10 * 29.10 * d2_07
NOTES
Chi. Sq = critical value calculated with the Bonferroni inequality to ensure an overall type I error probability below 5%.
IO IO IO AO
Lag is in VEC i.e. for differentiated variables. Trend assumptions: b = no deterministic trend in the data, and an intercept but no trend in the cointegrating equation; c = 
linear trend in the data, and an intercept but no trend in the cointegrating equation; d = linear trend in the data, and both an intercept and a trend in the cointegrating 
equation.
IO (AO) = likelihood ratio test obtained by the ratio of the likelihood of the ECM model with all dummies detected up to iteration n and that at iteration n-1 or no dummies 
at the iteration 0.
Iteration 4 Iteration 5 Iteration 6Excess standard dev Iteration 1 Iteration 2 Iteration 3Iteration 0 TotalIOAOIOIO AOAO IO AO
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Table 4.9: Detected outliers and events - FC Countries
COUNTRY Year CR YP KC OP RR Event Source
CHILE 1973 0.38 -1.72 -2.59 1.01 -4.56 Coup d'etat
1978 1.28 -0.85 0.38 -1.59 2.46
6th year of double digit inflation. Labour law reform  
allowing dismissal "without cause"
1982 3.89 -2.42 -1.80 0.09 0.02
Banking crisis (1982 -1985) and foreign currency 
bank debt default (1983-1990)
CK(2003), 
S&P(2002)
1993 1.14 0.82 2.22 -1.54 0.61 Slowdown in international trade. Elections
INDIA 1974 -0.08 -1.82 -0.07 1.06 -3.38
Oil shock. Double digit inflation and negative real 
interest rates
1976 0.77 -1.07 -0.33 0.32 2.11 Drop in inflation and negative interest rates
1984 1.49 -2.94 -1.48 -0.07 0.19
Religious riots. Assassination of Prime Minister I. 
Ghandi and Bhopal disaster
1988 0.59 2.75 1.00 0.06 0.46 Expansionary monetary policy
ITALY 1970 0.14 2.06 1.71 0.49 0.66
End of "Autunno caldo": a period of strikes and 
social unrest
1973 0.76 -0.15 0.19 -2.00 0.28
1974 -1.43 0.92 2.26 1.35 -2.67
1981 -0.60 -0.21 -0.12 1.19 2.75
Public finance reform takes interest rates back to 
positive values . Obligation for the Bak of Italy to 
buy public debt ends ("divorzio")
1986 -0.08 0.53 -0.58 -2.84 -1.15 Slowdown in international trade
1993 -0.02 -3.20 -2.46 0.78 -1.73
During 1990–94, 58 banks (accounting for 11
percent of lending) were merged with other
institutions. CK(2003)
1999 3.59 0.60 0.89 -0.59 -0.35
Financial liberalisation in preparation of access to 
euro
PAKISTAN 2004 2.29 1.30 -0.33 -1.45 -0.26 Expansionary monetary policy
PERU 1970 0.9 -0.36 -2.56 -0.34 -0.71 Import substitution + limits to foreing investments
1974 -0.75 2.48 2.786 2.129 1.252
Oil shock. Double digit inflation and negative real 
interest rates
1980 1.93 -2.50 0.055 0.181 -0.67 Slowdown in international trade 
1984 1.49 2.072 1.586 0.511 0.953
1988 2.17 -1.02 2.172 1.834 -0.93
1989 -0.97 -1.28 -1.50 -1.33 -2.05
VENEZUELA 1974 -2.15 -0.95 -1.58 2.809 -0.53
1975 0.44 -0.94 0.863 -0.26 -2.20
1983 -0.28 -0.94 -2.33 -2.97 0.582
1989 -3.51 -3.36 -2.69 1.387 -1.42
1995 0.77 0.111 0.81 -2.32 1.008
1996 1.08 0.663 0.015 1.076 -2.57
NOTES:
CK(2003): Caprio, G., Klingebiel, D., 2003.
DL(1997): Demetriades, P.O., Luintel, K., 1997.
LR(2002): Loayza, N., Ranciere, R., 2002.
MRS(2003): Manasse, P., Roubini, N., Schimmelpfennig A., 2003.
M(2003): Moody's, 2003
S&P(2002): Standard and Poor's, 2002.
YL (2010): Yong, C., Lee Nah, Q., 2010.
Oil shock. Double digit inflation and negative real 
interest rates
Major bank failures CK(2003)
Banking crisis, foreign currency bond (1995-1997) 




Two large banks fails. Nationalization of the 





Table 4.10: Detected outliers and events - FO Countries
COUNTRY Year CR YP KC OP RR Event Source
CEN. AF. REP. 1974 2.92 0.86 0.74 1.15 0.55 Expansionary monetary policy
1980 2.31 -1.87 -2.15 2.25 -0.55
Transition year after Emperor Bokassa I is 
overthrown and "bloodless coup" against President 
David Dacko
1983 0.45 -2.05 -0.64 -0.41 1.07
1994 -0.52 1.13 -0.17 2.75 -3.67
1996 -0.02 -1.26 -2.47 -0.66 1.08
2000 0.38 0.43 -0.46 2.32 -2.03
2003 0.28 -2.24 -1.81 -0.48 0.54
ECUADOR 1973 -1.13 1.11 -0.31 -1.04 2.13
Jump in trade due to oil exports. Inflation reach 
double digit and real interest rate turn negative
1983 3.00 -1.95 -1.54 -0.38 -0.59 Debt Crisis (1982 - 1996) MRS(2003)
1988 -2.58 1.55 1.21 0.12 -0.43
End of free market FX system and austerity 
program
1999 0.55 -3.11 -3.52 1.53 -0.81
2000 0.15 -0.92 0.49 1.70 -3.15
FINLAND 1964 0.03 0.74 0.73 0.54 -2.76
1968 -1.62 -0.31 -0.03 0.86 -2.16
1969 1.09 2.70 0.96 0.54 2.47 Inflation falls. Positive real interest rates
1972 -1.13 2.99 1.43 1.61 0.36
1974 -1.12 -0.91 3.15 2.58 -2.92
1991 2.11 -3.28 -2.37 -0.82 0.62
Government takes control of 3 banks that together 
accounted for 31% of deposits
CK(2003), 
LR(2002)
2000 -0.68 0.37 0.18 2.85 -0.02 Finland adopts Euro
GHANA 1971 3.16 -0.03 -0.23 -1.31 -0.42 Coup d'etat
1975 -0.37 -2.65 -0.61 1.18 -0.79 Drought + rejection of foreign debt payments
1982 0.99 -2.43 -0.29 -0.17 1.61
1983 -0.08 -2.12 -0.81 0.27 -3.08
1984 1.31 1.40 2.00 0.96 2.39
1993 -0.27 0.99 3.31 0.70 0.13
4th Republic inaugurated. Boom year and start of 
high inflation cycle
2000 0.91 -0.92 -0.28 3.41 -0.66 Elections. Boom year and start of high inflation 
KENYA 1970 0.24 -2.62 0.50 0.09 0.27
1971 0.45 3.44 2.40 0.32 -1.73
1974 -0.27 -0.61 € 2.76 -0.23
Oil shock. Double digit inflation and negative real 
interest rates
1978 2.03 -0.31 2.46 0.65 -0.78 Coffee production boom 
1985 1.68 0.74 2.09 -0.56 -0.08
1993 -2.65 -0.23 0.08 3.34 -1.09
MOROCCO 1974 0.02 -0.51 0.964 3.30 -3.88
Oil shock. Double digit inflation and negative real 
interest rates
1994 -1.91 2.452 1.122 -0.95 -0.32 Recovery after 2-year crisis
2007 3.21 0.34 0.177 -0.54 -0.16 Real interest rate turn positive + export led boom
NOTES:
CK(2003): Caprio, G., Klingebiel, D., 2003.
DL(1997): Demetriades, P.O., Luintel, K., 1997.
LR(2002): Loayza, N., Ranciere, R., 2002.
MRS(2003): Manasse, P., Roubini, N., Schimmelpfennig A., 2003.
M(2003): Moody's, 2003
S&P(2002): Standard and Poor's, 2002.
YL (2010): Yong, C., Lee Nah, Q., 2010.
Systemic banking crises. Foreign Currency Bank 
Debt Default (1983 - 2002)
LR(2002), 
S&P (2002)
Banking crises (1985 -1989) and (1993 - 1995). 
Foreign Currency Bank Debt Default (1994-2003)
CK(2003), 
LR(2002), 
Boom bust cycle in agricoltural exports





Bank deposits frozen for 6 months. By January 
2000, 16 financial institutions closed (12) or taken 
over (4) by the government. All deposits unfrozen 
by March 2000. Debt crisis (1999 - 2001)




Stagnation + Banking crisis (1982-1989)
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Table 4.11: Identified Cointegrating Vectors and Causality Tests
OR (ii)
b1,0 b1,2 b1,4 b1,5 b1,6 a1,1 b2,0 b2,3 b2,4 b2,5 b2,6 a2,2 Chi2(1)
p-val p-val p-val p-val p-val p-val p-val p-val p-val p-val p-val p-val p-val Chi2 p-val
Cen. Af. Rep. 5.95 -0.57 0.022 0.017 0.004 -0.38 -5.07 1.16 0.031 0.022 0.032 -0.55 0% 19.07 0%
2d 0% 0% 0% 15% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 99%     0.73 8%
Chile 3.34-   0.23 0.009 0.00   -0.25 0.57- 0.99   0.00  -0.28 0.07 1.01   60%
2b 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 9% 0% 1% 1% 79% 0.95   62%
Ecuador -5.62 0.82 0.003 0.006 -0.011 -0.12 0.05
2d 0% 6% 0% 0% 0% 82% 14.55 0%
Finland -5.23 0.62 -0.006 0.050 -0.07 2.26
1c 0% 1% 0% 8% 13% 13.64 0%
Ghana -0.57 0.09 0.002 0.001 -0.22 2.2 0.61 -0.002 0.002 -0.60 0.20 8.97   1%
2b 0% 0% 1% 8% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 66% 5.96   5%
India 2.42 -0.30 0.037 -0.017 -0.11 3.96 0.46 0.047 -0.039 -0.23 0.00 0.00   100%
3c 3% 0% 1% 4% 0% 0% 0% 98% 17.91 0%
Italy 27.71 -3.12 0.011 0.042 0.111 -0.10 0.01 0.61 -0.002 -0.003 0.007 -0.39 0.47 0.17   92%
2d 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 3% 0% 0% 49% 3.81   15%
Kenya -2.90 0.34 -0.006 -0.005 -0.34 4.2 0.52 0.005 -0.48 0.09 0.97   62%
1b 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 76% 9.42   1%
Morocco 0.35 -0.08 0.014 -0.23 5.95 0.30 0.007 0.011 -0.58 0.19 40.54 0%
3c 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 91% 8.47   4%
Pakistan -1.75 0.27 -0.017 0.012 -0.007 -0.10 0.10
2d 9% 0% 0% 9% 1% 75% 2.15   34%
Peru 14.95 -1.97 0.052 0.000 -0.06 5.03 0.26 0.026 0.000 -0.42 0.70 0.05   98%
3b 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 40% 0.47   79%
Venezuela 3.97-   0.58 0.02-   -0.06 0.04





Country,       
VEC lag, 
Trend type
Financial Development Coint.Vect. (i)
FD=b1,0+b1,2YP+b1,4OP+b1,5RR+b1,6t





(ii)  OR are Over-identifying Restrictions which are Chi2(1) distributed. For Morocco OR Restrictions are Chi2(2) distributed.
(iii) dn_yy = dummy at year yy obtained at iteration n. dn_yy=0 t≠yy and dn_yy=1 t=yy.
(iv) Test is calculated as difference in loglikelihood functions without and with restriction on a(i,j)=0. The test is Chi2(2) distributed except for Morocco 
where it is Chi2(3) distributed. If the null a(i,j)=0 where i≠j is rejected, then the vector j causes variable i. Rejection of both a(i,j)=0 for each i≠j implies bi-















(i)  Percentage figures below coefficients are marginal p-values i.e., marginal significance level of likelihood ratio tests under the null that the coefficient 




















Table 4.12: Comparison of Johansen’s methodology Estimation Results: Mod-
els with dummies vs. without dummies
OR
b1,0 b1,2 b1,4 b1,5 b1,6 a1,1 b2,0 b2,3 b2,4 b2,5 b2,6 a2,2 Chi2(1)
p-val p-val p-val p-val p-val p-val p-val p-val p-val p-val p-val p-val p-val
Cen. Af. Rep. 5.95 -0.57 0.022 0.017 -0.38 -5.1 1.16 0.031 0.022 0.032 -0.55 0.00 20.7 3 71%
2d 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 99% 10.7 10 38%
3.48 -0.21 -0.012 -0.024 -0.008 -0.05 -184.2 14.38 0.031 -0.097 0.381 0.00 0.47 19.3 3 78%
9.7% 0% 0% 2% 65% 0% 0% 0% 91% 49% 10.7 10 38%
Ecuador -5.62 0.82 0.003 0.006 -0.011 -0.12 0.05 26.8 3 37%
2d 0% 6% 0% 0% 0% 82% 10.5 10 40%
8.22 -1.04 -0.019 -0.008 0.025 0.05 12.95 12.6 3 98%
0% 0% 0% 0% 16% 0% 13.5 10 20%
Finland -5.23 0.62 -0.006 0.050 -0.07 2.26 25.2 2 45%
1c 0% 1% 0% 8% 13% 11.6 10 31%
-3.64 0.40 0.003 0.080 -0.02 3.59 19.0 2 80%
2% 50% 0% 49% 6% 183.7 10 0%
Ghana -0.57 0.09 0.002 0.001 -0.22 2.19 0.61 -0.002 0.002 -0.60 0.20 27.9 3 31%
2b 0% 0% 1% 8% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 66% 13.1 10 22%
-0.12 0.02 0.002 0.002 0.01 2.44 0.57 -0.002 0.003 -0.64 0.85 21.8 3 65%
69% 68% 0% 90% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 36% 47.8 10 0%
India 2.42 -0.30 0.037 -0.017 -0.11 3.96 0.46 0.047 -0.039 -0.23 0.00 11.2 4 99%
3c 3% 0% 1% 4% 0% 0% 0% 98% 17.8 10 6%
-2.73 0.36 -0.028 0.022 -0.05 5.07 0.35 0.047 -0.034 0.08 0.91 16.5 4 90%
0% 0% 0% 61% 0% 0% 44% 34% 6.9 10 74%
Kenya -2.90 0.34 -0.006 -0.005 -0.34 4.19 0.52 0.005 -0.48 0.09 23.8 2 53%
1b 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 76% 14.4 10 16%
-2.99 0.35 -0.005 -0.002 -0.61 3.15 0.61 0.006 -0.73 0.37 21.0 2 69%
0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 54% 21.8 10 2%
Morocco 0.35 -0.08 0.014 -0.23 5.95 0.30 0.007 0.011 -0.58 0.19 15.2 4 94%
3c 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 91% 5.0 10 89%
-0.08 -0.03 0.014 -0.18 5.61 0.34 0.005 0.012 -0.46 0.52 24.3 4 50%
62% 13% 0% 1% 0% 5% 77% 17.0 10 7%
Venezuela -3.97 0.58 -0.002 -0.020 -0.06 0.04 27.4 4 34%
3b 3% 1% 53% 0% 6% 85% 4.2 10 94%
3.46 -0.36 -0.008 -0.026 -0.02 3.07 16.0 4 92%
30% 41% 8% 0% 60% 8% 23.4 10 1%
NOTES
di_yy = dummy at year yy obtained at iteration i
(ii) JB = Jarque Bera Test.H0: residuals are multivariate N.
For every country indicated in the row heading the top set of results originates from the model with the dummies specified in the “IO dummies” column, 
while the second set originates from the model without dummies showing shaded area under the “IO dummies” column heading”.
d1_74 d2_76 d3_88 
d4_84
d1_00 d2_88 d3_83 
d4_99 d5_93 
d1_74 d2_69 d3_72 
d4_91 d5_64 d6_00
d1_00 d2_83 d3_84 
d4_93 d5_71 d6_82
Country
Financial Development Cointegrating 
FD=b1,0+b1,2YP+b1,4OP+b1,5RR+b1,6t YP = b2,0+b2,3KP+b2,4OP+b2,5RR+b2,6t
(i)  VEC Residual Serial Correlation LM Test. H0: no residual autocorrelations at lag h+1 where (h+1) = lag((VEC) +1). P-values from chi-square with 25 
d1_71 d2_70 d3_93 
d4_74 d5_78 d6_85
d1_74 d2_07 d3_94
d1_96 d2_89 d3_83 
d4_74 d5_95 d6_75
IO dummies
Economic Development Cointegrating 
d1_96 d2_74 d3_94 






Table 4.13: Comparison of DOLS and Johansen’s methodology Estimation
Results and Hansen’s Instability Test
OR
b1,0 b1,2 b1,4 b1,5 b1,6 a1,1 Adj R2 b2,0 b2,3 b2,4 b2,5 b2,6 a2,2 Adj R2 Chi2(1)
p-val p-val p-val p-val p-val p-val LC p-val p-val p-val p-val p-val p-val LC p-val
Cen. Af. Rep. 5.95 -0.57 0.022 0.017 -0.38 -5.1 1.16 0.031 0.022 0.032 -0.55 0.00
2d 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 99%
-6.15 0.48 0.005 0.003 0.008 0.82   18.7 -0.43 -0.008 -0.011 0.97   
4% 5% 8% 27% 6% 0.03   13% 62% 33% 5% 0.04   
Ecuador -5.62 0.82 0.003 0.006 -0.011 -0.12 0.05
2d 0% 6% 0% 0% 0% 82%
-0.54 0.17 -0.009 0.001 0.002 0.84   
50% 14% 0% 9% 7% 0.04   
Finland -5.23 0.62 -0.006 0.050 -0.07 2.26
1c 0% 1% 0% 8% 13%
-4.59 0.60 -0.012 0.013 0.90   
0% 0% 0% 2% 0.04   
Ghana -0.57 0.09 0.002 0.001 -0.22 2.19 0.61 -0.002 0.002 -0.60 0.20
2b 0% 0% 1% 8% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 66%
-1.33 0.22 0.001 0.000 0.83   2.84 0.51 -0.001 0.004 0.92   
0% 0% 0% 22% 0.04   0% 0% 44% 1% 0.03   
India 2.42 -0.30 0.037 -0.017 -0.11 3.96 0.46 0.047 -0.039 -0.23 0.00
3c 3% 0% 1% 4% 0% 0% 0% 98%
0.60 -0.05 -0.001 0.038 0.000 0.52   2.52 0.68 0.017 -0.003 1.00   
80% 86% 95% 2% 0% 0.02   0% 0% 0% 73% 0.02   
Kenya -2.90 0.34 -0.006 -0.005 -0.34 4.19 0.52 0.005 -0.48 0.09
1b 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 76%
-4.14 0.44 -0.003 -0.001 0.83   2.85 0.64 0.005 0.000 0.90   
0% 0% 1% 24% 0.06   0% 0% 2% 91% 0.09   
Morocco 0.35 -0.08 0.014 -0.23 5.95 0.30 0.007 0.011 -0.58 0.19
3c 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 91%
-1.55 0.15 0.009 0.005 0.000 0.96   5.14 0.38 0.004 0.019 0.99   
28% 39% 5% 2% 0% 0.02   0% 0% 29% 1% 0.03   
Venezuela -3.97 0.58 -0.002 -0.020 -0.06 0.04
3b 3% 1% 53% 0% 6% 85%
-4.03 0.57 0.000 -0.018 0.000 0.67   




Percentage figures below estimated coefficients are the marginal p-values i.e., marginal significance level of  t-student test under 
the null that the coefficient under consideration is zero. In DOLS regression leads and lags are simmetrical (r=q) and are the same 
as the lags used in the Johansen's cointegrated model.
LC is Hansen instability test. H0: cointegration. Rejection of H0 might indicate parameter instability. Hansen (1992) indicates that 
all p-values of LC statistic in the table are larger than 20%.
For every country the first two rows indicate the results from Johansen's cointegration methology and the third and fourth line those 
from DOLS. DOLS have been estimated with the same leads and lags as those used in unit root tests and with all the dummies as 
deterministic regressors. Equations are:
Percentage figures below estimated coefficients are the marginal p-values i.e., marginal significance level of likelihood ratio tests 
under the null that the coefficient under consideration is zero; they are Chi2(1) distributed. aij are the associated loading factors. OR 
are Over-identifying Restrictions which are Chi2(1) distributed.
Country
Financial Development Cointegrating Vector
FD=b1,0+b1,2YP+b1,4OP+b1,5RR+b1,6t
Economic Development Cointegrating Vector
YP = b2,0+b2,3KP+b2,4OP+b2,5RR+b2,6t
187
Table 4.14: Short-term dynamics: Central African Republic, Ecuador, Finland
and Ghana
Central Afr. Rep. Ecuador Finland Ghana
D(FD) D(YP) D(KP) D(OP) D(RR) D(FD) D(YP) D(KP) D(OP) D(RR) D(FD) D(YP) D(KP) D(OP) D(RR) D(FD) D(YP) D(KP) D(OP) D(RR)
a(1,p) 0.38-   0.51   0.06-   26.93- 105.2- 0.12-   0.22   0.01-   18.2-   90.9   0.07-   0.07   0.03   9.58   10.45 0.22-   0.64-   0.48-   75.67 74.45 
p-val 0% 4% 19% 49% 0% 0% 0% 67% 13% 0% 8% 0% 0% 3% 0% 8% 1% 0% 18% 48%
a(2,p) 0.29   0.55-   0.02-   30.52 95.51 0.18-   0.60-   0.04-   94.01- 123.7- 
p-val 0% 1% 69% 34% 0% 2% 0% 63% 1% 6%
m(0,p) 0.02-   0.06-   0.01-   4.73-   0.51   0.01   0.01-   0.01   1.57   3.81   0.02-   0.02   0.00   2.61   1.07   
p-val 0% 0% 0% 3% 80% 2% 35% 10% 45% 23% 1% 0% 40% 0% 1%
D(CR)(-1) q(1,1,p) 0.02-   0.90-   0.04-   34.26 138.9 0.32   0.45   0.05-   2.72   190    0.48   0.21   0.15   31.14 20.04 0.11-   0.37-   0.03   197.3- 269.3- 
p-val 88% 2% 64% 58% 2% 0% 4% 59% 95% 0% 0% 1% 0% 4% 3% 55% 34% 85% 2% 8%
D(CR)(-2) q(1,2,p) 0.43-   0.54-   0.23-   21.54- 71.86- 0.22-   0.07   0.06   54.9-   83.6-   0.36-   0.62   0.36   34.69- ######
p-val 0% 13% 0% 70% 17% 1% 72% 42% 10.0% 9.9% 4% 10% 4% 67% 32%
D(CR)(-3) q(1,3,p)
p-val
D(YC)(-1) q(2,1,p) 0.01-   0.28   0.14   0.45-   71.27- 0.03-   0.68   0.11   126    128-    0.32   0.94   0.39   10.61 24.20 0.07   0.41   0.12   106.0 136.0 
p-val 88% 6% 0% 98% 0% 83% 0% 25% 0% 5% 15% 0% 0% 64% 8% 22% 0% 4% 0% 1%
D(YC)(-2) q(2,2,p) 0.04   0.38   0.08   14.85- 99.85 0.21   0.43   0.15   56.7-   50.7   0.05   0.25   0.02-   73.21 221.4 
p-val 54% 1% 1% 54% 0% 3% 3% 7% 11% 35% 50% 9.7% 80% 3% 0%
D(YC)(-3) q(2,3,p)
p-val
D(KC)(-1) q(3,1,p) 0.54-   1.00-   0.37   ###### 126.4 0.44-   1.18-   0.50   218-    317    0.72   1.17-   0.31   145.2- 79.6-   0.20   0.26   0.62   9.21-   63.8   
p-val 2% 9.8% 0% 21% 15% 9.8% 3% 2% 3% 4% 10% 0% 0% 0% 0% 20% 44% 0% 90% 64%
D(KC)(-2) q(3,2,p) 0.04-   1.60-   0.24-   15.18 148.3- 0.04   1.39   0.14   135.0 190-    0.22-   0.95-   0.29-   92.07 4.4-     
p-val 84% 0% 1% 84% 3% 86% 0% 46% 9.6% 12% 17% 1% 8% 22% 97%
D(KC)(-3) q(3,3,p)
p-val
D(OP)(-1) q(4,1,p) 0.00   0.00-   0.00-   0.17-   0.03   0.00-   0.00-   0.00-   0.25-   0.26   0.00-   0.00-   0.00   0.28   0.14-   0.00-   0.00-   0.00-   0.19   0.12   
p-val 39% 2% 0% 47% 90% 1% 54% 35% 23% 39% 19% 98% 19% 3% 7% 14% 6% 43% 22% 67%
D(OP)(-2) q(4,2,p) 0.00   0.00-   0.00-   0.20-   0.19-   0.00-   0.00   0.00   0.12-   0.24-   0.00-   0.00-   0.00-   0.21-   0.07-   
p-val 14% 9% 1% 24% 24% 35% 6% 83% 51% 38% 71% 32% 0% 8% 74%
D(OP)(-3) q(4,3,p)
p-val
D(RR)(-1) q(5,1,p) 0.00-   0.00-   0.00-   0.06   0.61-   0.00-   0.00   0.00-   0.03-   0.10   0.00-   0.00   0.00   0.58   0.03   0.00-   0.00-   0.00-   0.03-   0.35-   
p-val 21% 3% 0% 65% 0% 0% 24% 4% 65% 36% 88% 59% 14% 0% 79% 50% 0% 75% 72% 4%
D(RR)(-2) q(5,2,p) 0.00-   0.00-   0.00-   0.01   0.35-   0.00   0.00   0.00-   0.06-   0.01-   0.00-   0.00-   0.00-   0.02   0.45-   
p-val 5% 78% 19% 90% 0% 87% 5% 16% 35% 93% 66% 1% 55% 74% 0%
D(RR)(-3) q(5,3,p)
p-val
D1_yy m(1,p) 0.00-   0.07-   0.05-   1.97-   9.58   0.00   0.07-   0.05-   10.11 25.1-   0.03-   0.01-   0.03   10.04 5.67-   0.01   0.02-   0.01   31.52 19.30- 
p-val 86% 7% 0% 73% 7% 74% 1% 0% 5% 0% 22% 48% 0% 0% 0% 61% 46% 67% 0% 10%
D2_yy m(2,p) 0.10   0.09   0.00-   14.57 5.23   0.01   0.01-   0.01   17.76 107-    0.03   0.06   0.01   3.25   5.63   0.01-   0.09-   0.01-   5.72   79.64- 
p-val 0% 2% 90% 1% 32% 65% 71% 40% 0% 0% 20% 0% 7% 24% 0% 50% 0% 51% 41% 0%
D3_yy m(3,p) 0.02-   0.04   0.00-   17.91 21.60- 0.07-   0.11   0.01   12.41 51.1-   0.04-   0.08   0.01   5.77   0.34   0.04   0.06   0.04   13.94 105    
p-val 9.9% 17% 70% 0% 0% 0% 0% 40% 7% 0% 12% 0% 8% 5% 85% 5% 11% 2% 9% 0%
D4_yy m(4,p) 0.04   0.07-   0.01-   10.66 5.38-   0.04   0.01-   0.02-   4.91   35.5-   0.05   0.06-   0.01-   1.27-   2.12   0.01-   0.04   0.06   7.91   15.83- 
p-val 0% 2% 6% 3% 23% 2% 77% 11% 40% 0% 7% 0% 2% 65% 20% 47% 16% 0% 19% 16%
D5_yy m(5,p) 0.02   0.05   0.01-   15.95 12.67- 0.01   0.02-   0.00-   15.20- 5.59-   0.00   0.02   0.01   2.22   6.66-   0.04   0.00   0.01-   14.93- 10.96- 
p-val 10% 16% 4% 1% 2% 47% 46% 86% 0% 48% 90% 19% 38% 41% 0% 0% 87% 41% 1% 33%
D6_yy m(6,p) 0.01-   0.15-   0.00-   0.17-   8.16   0.03-   0.02   0.00   9.94   0.59   0.01   0.10-   0.01-   2.34   36.45 
p-val 67% 0% 84% 97% 9% 32% 26% 49% 0% 72% 45% 0% 70% 71% 0%
D7_yy m(7,p) 0.02   0.10-   0.02-   4.63-   0.17-   0.01-   0.11-   0.00-   6.44   4.20-   
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Table 4.15: Short-term dynamics: India, Kenya, Morocco and Venezuela
India Kenya Morocco Venezuela
D(FD) D(YP) D(KP) D(OP) D(RR) D(FD) D(YP) D(KP) D(OP) D(RR) D(FD) D(YP) D(KP) D(OP) D(RR) D(FD) D(YP) D(KP) D(OP) D(RR)
a(1,p) 0.11-   0.19   0.07   4.76-   30.53 0.34-   0.35-   0.16-   81.7-   95.1-   0.23-   0.37   0.02   1.46   35.39- 0.06-   0.13-   0.04-   1.93   74.3-   
p-val 4% 0% 8% 49% 2% 0% 0% 1% 0% 1% 0% 1% 83% 93% 1% 6% 1% 2% 55% 0%
a(2,p) 0.00   0.23-   0.06-   3.20   37.49- 0.13-   0.48-   0.05   1.93   187.2- 0.48   0.58-   0.07-   88.66 10.05 
p-val 91% 0% 4% 53% 0% 25% 0% 50% 93% 0% 0% 0% 46% 0% 52%
m(0,p) 0.01   0.09   0.03   2.02-   14.96 0.06   0.05-   0.00   7.83   3.54   
p-val 51% 0% 2% 31% 0% 0% 1% 87% 0% 5%
D(CR)(-1) q(1,1,p) 0.01-   0.36-   0.00-   8.70-   35.76 0.23-   0.36   0.09-   20.8   13.44 0.69   0.39-   0.06-   69.01 26.89 0.60   0.56   0.21   57.9-   44.9   
p-val 95% 7% 99% 72% 44% 9% 3% 31% 42% 78% 0% 15% 65% 3% 27% 0% 7% 3% 0% 33%
D(CR)(-2) q(1,2,p) 0.09   0.54   0.26   13.23 68.24- 0.46   1.17-   0.22-   68.50 18.45 0.52   0.29   0.02   7.48   156.5 
p-val 67% 1% 8% 61% 16% 0% 0% 26% 11% 57% 2% 39% 83% 73% 0%
D(CR)(-3) q(1,3,p) 0.04   0.14-   0.19   16.77 48.88- 0.22   0.68-   0.26-   55.49- 3.64   0.04-   0.21   0.03-   31.5   7.52-   
p-val 86% 51% 19% 52% 31% 12% 3% 13% 15% 90% 80% 42% 73% 7% 85%
D(YC)(-1) q(2,1,p) 0.32-   0.35   0.23   3.00-   34.70 0.06   0.68   0.17   1.19-   26.59- 0.20-   0.35   0.14   66.46- 26.61- 0.05   0.47   0.07   7.73   28.69- 
p-val 3% 2% 3% 88% 33% 54% 0% 0% 95% 41% 4% 12% 25% 1% 20% 73% 5% 30% 62% 43%
D(YC)(-2) q(2,2,p) 0.12-   0.24   0.23   15.60 67.58 0.59-   0.69   0.18   74.93- 30.50- 0.16-   0.43-   0.08-   31.1-   16.88 
p-val 35% 8% 2% 36% 4% 0% 0% 13% 1% 14% 30% 8% 26% 5% 65%
D(YC)(-3) q(2,3,p) 0.01-   0.30   0.15   7.28   20.60- 0.15-   0.48   0.00-   44.14- 3.77   0.11   0.20   0.02   25.9-   81.06- 
p-val 93% 2% 10% 65% 50% 4% 0% 99% 2% 80% 35% 28% 74% 3% 0%
D(KC)(-1) q(3,1,p) 1.09   1.19-   0.23-   45.92 183.5- 0.06   0.21   0.43   137.9- 226.1 0.13-   0.38   0.83   24.22- 35.1-   0.48-   1.70-   0.54   17.1   182.4- 
p-val 1% 1% 48% 42% 9% 74% 31% 0% 0% 0% 47% 37% 0% 64% 38% 40% 5% 4% 76% 17%
D(KC)(-2) q(3,2,p) 0.06-   0.81-   0.27-   56.40- 231.1- 0.49   0.14-   0.25-   48.54 45.3-   0.42-   1.09   0.10   10.7   234.3- 
p-val 88% 5% 35% 27% 2% 4% 81% 42% 47% 38% 53% 28% 74% 87% 13%
D(KC)(-3) q(3,3,p) 0.70-   0.59-   0.11   69.41 58.50- 1.20-   0.89   0.27   128.3- 28.06 0.79   0.70-   0.05-   27.33- 165.3 
p-val 7% 14% 69% 17% 53% 0% 6% 30% 2% 52% 10.0% 34% 82% 57% 14%
D(OP)(-1) q(4,1,p) 0.01-   0.01   0.00   0.10   0.19   0.00-   0.00-   0.00   0.04   0.29-   0.00-   0.01   0.00   0.14-   0.45-   0.00   0.01   0.00   0.61-   0.45   
p-val 0% 2% 3% 78% 77% 34% 27% 79% 70% 13% 2% 0% 13% 57% 2% 1% 2% 36% 0% 23%
D(OP)(-2) q(4,2,p) 0.00   0.00-   0.00   0.40   0.45   0.00-   0.01   0.00   0.08-   0.11-   0.00   0.01   0.00   0.10   0.92   
p-val 94% 52% 16% 24% 49% 0% 0% 46% 75% 58% 0% 0% 52% 50% 1%
D(OP)(-3) q(4,3,p) 0.00   0.00   0.00   0.17-   1.56-   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.15   0.02   0.00-   0.00   0.00-   0.47   0.18   
p-val 81% 19% 80% 69% 5% 73% 9% 49% 45% 88% 22% 72% 66% 0% 53%
D(RR)(-1) q(5,1,p) 0.00   0.00   0.00   0.08-   0.08-   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.23   0.05-   0.00   0.00   0.00-   0.52   0.64-   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.18-   0.62   
p-val 16% 1% 65% 56% 75% 2% 34% 0% 1% 77% 22% 57% 86% 4% 0% 13% 66% 49% 0% 0%
D(RR)(-2) q(5,2,p) 0.00   0.00   0.00   0.05-   0.09   0.00   0.00   0.00-   0.47   0.40-   0.00   0.002 0.00   0.01-   0.48   
p-val 50% 0% 68% 59% 58% 77% 26% 62% 7% 5% 1% 2% 25% 85% 0%
D(RR)(-3) q(5,3,p) 0.00   0.00-   0.00   0.04-   0.29   0.00   0.00   0.00-   0.42   0.10-   0.00-   0.001 0.00   0.08   0.58   
p-val 2% 52% 90% 68% 7% 0% 15% 40% 4% 53% 76% 9.6% 63% 8% 0%
D1_yy m(1,p) 0.00-   0.04-   0.00   1.73   18.70- 0.03   0.18   0.06   10.96 25.53- 0.00   0.01-   0.02   13.94 13.74- 0.09   0.05   0.01-   6.24   51.06- 
p-val 97% 1% 99% 34% 0% 20% 0% 0% 1% 0% 90% 66% 34% 0% 0% 6% 48% 60% 17% 0%
D2_yy m(2,p) 0.03   0.06-   0.01-   1.48   21.40 0.01   0.11-   0.02   3.90   3.32-   0.06   0.01   0.01   1.25-   0.86-   0.14-   0.16-   0.04-   7.72   19.03- 
p-val 23% 1% 62% 59% 0% 66% 0% 16% 23% 58% 0% 75% 78% 75% 78% 0% 0% 0% 2% 1%
D3_yy m(3,p) 0.02   0.05   0.01   0.37   1.83-   0.06-   0.02-   0.00   16.43 14.17- 0.05-   0.12   0.03   5.48-   2.07-   0.01-   0.04-   0.04-   15.71- 8.12   
p-val 19% 0% 63% 86% 64% 0% 43% 80% 0% 2% 0% 0% 21% 23% 56% 79% 46% 1% 0% 28%
D4_yy m(4,p) 0.03   0.05-   0.01-   0.06   2.12-   0.00   0.00   0.01   20.76 3.35-   0.10-   0.06-   0.03-   15.99 10.13- 
p-val 3% 0% 30% 97% 58% 98% 90% 23% 0% 63% 0% 21% 8% 0% 17%
D5_yy m(5,p) 0.04   0.01-   0.04   3.52   6.21-   0.05   0.01-   0.01   15.76- 7.78-   
p-val 1% 66% 0% 29% 31% 24% 93% 53% 0% 41%
D6_yy m(6,p) 0.02   0.02   0.03   1.12-   3.55-   0.02-   0.09-   0.02   1.11   26.00- 
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Figure 4.3: Financial Development and Growth: Central African Republic, Ecuador, Finland and Ghana
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 Cointegrating relationships with significative parameters from table 4.12: Σ2r=1(a(r,i)*(Σ7p=1 b(r,p)*(Yt-1,i:1;t)  
 deterministic parts with significative parameters from tables 4.14 and 4.15: (m0+Σ7s=1m(i,s)*Ds)  
 for i=1 (∆(FD) equation in upper panel) and for i=2 (∆(YP) equation in lower panel) 
 
190
Figure 4.4: Financial Development and Growth: India, Kenya, Morocco and Venezuela
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 deterministic parts with significative parameters from tables 4.14 and 4.15: (m0+Σ7s=1m(i,s)*Ds)  
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